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Abstract
In the face of daunting environmental challenges, leadership in the development of
environmental policy may be more important now than ever. While some countries
are willing to devote substantial time and resources to working on environmental issues,
others lag behind. In this dissertation, I explore what it means to be a policy leader,
the state and trajectory of environmental policy leadership globally, and which actors
systematically catalyze (or obstruct) environmental policy leadership.
I propose that policy leadership is an observable, persistent behavior in which a
government is 1) innovative, adopting new policies quickly and 2) influential, inspiring
other governments to adopt these same policies. I argue that transnational advocates,
such as international NGOs and multinational corporations, are particularly well-
positioned to strengthen (or weaken) policy leadership. Providing information, building
capacity, and conducting pressure campaigns in multiple jurisdictions at the same time,
transnational advocates are uniquely positioned to affect both the spread and uptake of
new policies. Using novel data on the adoption of 3,000 environmental policies by 185
countries, I measure leadership in the development of environmental policy over time
and assess the role of transnational advocates in policy development. I find that large
international environmental NGOs spark environmental policy leadership, particularly in
developing countries and on issues related to traditional environmental topics of flora,
fauna, and pollution. In contrast, lobbying by multinational corporations in developed
countries sharply reduces environmental policy leadership. These results demonstrate
the substantial and varied impacts of transnational advocacy on environmental policy
leadership.
I make three notable contributions in this dissertation. First, I improve on prior
xi
conceptualizations of policy leadership, providing a definition that is straightforward to
operationalize while speaking to more general understandings of leadership. Second,
I develop a novel method for identifying policy adoptions from a compilation of laws
and regulations; this generates a new database of environmental policy adoptions that
overcomes the geographic and topical limitations of existing datasets. Finally, I contribute
the first systematic, quantitative evidence of the impact of transnational advocates on
policy change, demonstrating the importance of their activities for environmental policy
development.
With little time to waste, it is critical to understand why and when governments
act as environmental policy leaders, and what can be done to facilitate environmental
policy leadership. Through this research, it is clear that accounting for the activities of
transnational advocates should be a key component of any attempt to catalyze proactive




On December 12, 2020, the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and France co-hosted
the Climate Ambition Summit, a virtual event intended to accelerate efforts to address
climate change. Perhaps the highest-profile event of a rapid series of global initiatives
on climate change, biodiversity, and ecosystem conservation, 75 countries presented new
commitments, including achieving carbon neutrality, raising carbon taxes, and ceasing
oil and gas exploration, while representatives from the technology, cement, and airline
industries announced voluntary commitments to advance energy efficiency, use renewable
energy, and achieve net-zero carbon emissions. United Nations Secretary-General António
Guterres celebrated the event’s success, observing, “The Summit has now sent strong
signals that more countries and more businesses are ready to take the bold climate action
on which our future security and prosperity depend” (United Nations Climate Change
2020).
Recent events like the Climate Ambition Summit are encouraging, but, as the
Secretary-General alluded to indirectly, there are some countries ready to take bold action
on climate—but others are not. The uneven commitment by national governments to
leading the development of environmental policy stands as a major challenge to address
persistent environmental problems. In the fifty years since the first Earth Day in 1970,
some governments, such as Costa Rica, have stepped up to take high-profile leadership
roles (Boza 1993; Steinberg et al. 2001), while others have stalled or even retreated
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(Jänicke 2005). In 2012, for example, the Dutch government publicly stated that they
“did not want to be a frontrunner” on climate action (Minnesma 2019). In light of
mounting global environmental challenges and increasingly urgent calls to action (e.g.,
United Nations Climate Change 2020; Nature Climate Change 2020), there is an ongoing
deficit of leadership in environmental policy. What, then, works to catalyze environmental
policy leadership?
In this dissertation, I contribute a new, more precise conceptualization of environ-
mental policy leadership, and formulate and test a novel, network-based theory of the
catalytic impact that transnational environmental advocacy has on environmental pol-
icy leadership. First, I add conceptual clarity by proposing a theory-informed and
empirically-rooted definition of policy leadership consisting of an internal component—
frequent innovation—and an external component—widespread influence. I present policy
leadership as a persistent and observable behavior compatible with systematic measure-
ment and explanation, rather than imbuing the concept of policy leadership with sub-
jective or normative meaning. Second, I create a novel dataset of 3,000 environmental
policy adoptions from around the world to construct a dynamic measure of environmental
policy leadership (and its constituent components of innovation and influence) for 185
countries between 1950 and 2019, providing the most comprehensive presentation to date
of empirical variation in the evolution of environmental policy leadership among coun-
tries and over time. Third, I assess the extent to which changes in environmental policy
leadership are explained by the activities of the largest transnational environmental advo-
cates, a set of actors that include environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
multinational corporations, and international development organizations (IDOs).
I find strong evidence that large international environmental NGOs have a robust,
positive, and substantively important effect on environmental policy leadership. Further
investigation reveals that this effect is concentrated in developing countries and on
traditional environmental policy issues relating to flora, fauna, and pollution. My results
also indicate that lobbying by multinational corporations leads to a sharp decrease in
environmental policy leadership in developed countries. Environmental spending by IDOs
2
generally does not affect environmental policy leadership.
Overall, my findings indicate that transnational environmental advocates can play
an important role in both catalyzing and obstructing environmental policy leadership.
The practical implications of my analysis suggest that large international environmental
NGOs can be effective advocates for policy leadership, primarily in developing countries
and for policies relating to fauna, flora, and pollution. Additionally, advocates for greater
environmental policy leadership may want to take steps to limit lobbying by multinational
corporations in developed countries, as corporate environmental lobbying tends to weaken
rather than enhance environmental policy leadership.
1.1 Why study (environmental) policy leadership?
Emphasizing the importance of the role states play in shaping the speed and spread of
public policy, I define policy leadership as a compound concept consisting of the rapid
adoption of new policy ideas and widespread influence on the policymaking of other
jurisdictions. Encompassing both domestic policy change and the projection of policy
influence abroad, policy leadership aligns with more generic definitions of leadership that
insist upon the combination of decisive action (“walking the walk”) and the inspiration of
others (“talking the talk”). As frequently observed by policy diffusion scholars, a complete
understanding of policy change requires the consideration of both internal and external
processes (Berry and Berry 2014).
Policy leadership also speaks to “second image reversed” analyses (Gourevitch 1978),
which trace the origins of domestic policy change to international examples and dynamics.
Policy leadership emphasizes that some countries contribute more examples, and attract
more followers, than others. With rapid domestic policy changes that start or accelerate
processes of policy diffusion, understanding the causes and consequences of policy
leadership is likely to be an outcome of interest for any scholar of policy change.
Environmental policy is a particularly promising domain for studying policy leader-
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ship.1 Countries face similar environmental problems and have become more and more
connected to each other through trade and communication over the past several decades.
Moreover, environmental policy has been the topic of intensive international cooperation
for decades, especially since the 1960s (Knill et al. 2010; Andersen and Liefferink 1997).
This cooperation goes beyond international environmental agreements, extending to in-
ternational environmental standards and programmatic interventions. While the national
differences in culture, institutions, and economic relations are likely to persist to some
extent (van Waarden 1995), it is increasingly plausible that policymakers from different
governments learn from and coordinate with each other (Lenschow et al. 2005).
An important implication of strengthening environmental policy leadership is the
rising potential for environmental policy convergence (Knill et al. 2012a). Environmental
policy leadership could produce a race to the bottom in environmental protection (Drezner
2001), as has been observed in corporate tax competition (Swank 2006), the downsizing
of the public sector (Lee and Strang 2006), and other policy topics. In the environmental
context, this dynamic could produce, among other examples, “pollution havens” (Cole
2004).
Alternatively, environmental policy leadership may produce a race to the top, in
which the pro-environmental policies of powerful countries push other governments to
strengthen their own policies or risk a deterioration in economic or political relations—
a phenomenon commonly referred to as the “California effect” (Vogel 1997). While case
studies2 and descriptive analyses3 suggest that countries’ environmental policy repertoires
are becoming more similar, the contributions of specific factors driving environmental
policy convergence are only starting to come into focus.
1Environmental policy is the set of “tools, techniques, programs, instruments, plans, and ideas
associated with the governance of ecosystems and their interactions with society” Pacheco-Vega (2021,
p.387).
2For example, Héritier (1995),Liefferink and Andersen (1998),Vogel (2018).
3For example, Tews et al. (2003),Busch et al. (2005),Liefferink et al. (2009),Knill et al.
(2012a),Sommerer and Lim (2016).
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1.2 Environmental policy leadership: The known and
unknown
To understand how and why transnational advocacy should matter for environmental
policy leadership, it is important to first step back and consider what prior analyses
have uncovered and what remains overlooked. There is a considerable body of work on
leadership in political science, ranging from analyses of individual politicians to discourse
analysis. The study of leadership in policy development has a similarly long history, often
traced back to Walker’s (1969) essay on leader states in US policymaking. Over the past
25 years, scholars have paid particular attention to policy leadership in the development
of environmental policy, with work spanning from international environmental and
climate regimes,4 regional environmental policy,5 and national environmental policy.6
In this literature, scholars have investigated the relationship between environmental
policymaking and a suite of internal factors, located within a focal government’s
jurisdiction, and external factors, events or processes from international fora or the
jurisdictions of other governments that influence the focal government’s policymaking
process (Collier and Messick 1975; Berry and Berry 2014). Policy leaders are typically
identified through some combination of domestic policy activity and the existence of
followers (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017; Jänicke and Wurzel 2019).
Despite the considerable attention of scholars to environmental policy leadership,
it is surprising how many gaps remain in our knowledge of this topic, and how big
these gaps are. For example, studies have identified a range of structural factors that
matter for environmental policy leadership, but these tend to change slowly and thus
struggle to explain variation in policy leadership over time. Similarly, while scholars
have shown that transnational communication is an important driver of environmental
4For example, Andresen and Agrawala (2002), Karlsson et al. (2011), Parker et al. (2015), and
Keohane (2017).
5For example, Liefferink and Andersen (1998) and Jänicke and Wurzel (2019).
6On international policy leadership, see Young (1991), Underdal (1994), Grubb and Gupta (2000),
Wurzel and Connelly (2011). On regional environmental policy leadership, see Andersen and Liefferink
(1997), Jordan et al. (2010), Jänicke and Wurzel (2019). On national environmental policy leadership,
see Héritier (1995), Steinberg et al. (2001), Liefferink et al. (2009), Schaffrin et al. (2014).
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policy leadership, there has been little consideration of indirect forms of communication
brokered by transnational advocates. Moreover, as I describe in detail in Chapter 2,
existing conceptualizations of environmental policy leadership have been insufficient and,
as demonstrated in a systematic review of existing datasets in Chapter 4, empirical tests
tend to be on a narrow range of policies in only a handful on countries.
In the remainder of this section, I provide a brief overview of the state of the literature
on the internal and external drivers of environmental policy leadership, noting areas of
disagreement, conflicting or weak evidence, untested assumptions, and oversights. This
discussion sets the stage for my own, improved theory and conceptualization of policy
leadership, which I present briefly in the following section and explore in greater detail
in Chapter 2.
1.2.1 The internal drivers of environmental policy leadership
Scholars have identified four types of internal drivers of environmental policy leadership:
economic resources and structure, institutional capacity, public demand for environmental
policy, and environmental problem pressure.7 Starting with economic considerations, the
political economy of environmental policy leadership will vary according to the economy’s
structure of production and consumption. Policymakers have stronger incentives to
develop environmental policy when their economies depend on agriculture and industry, as
these policies have more direct impacts on resource-intensive agricultural and industrial
production more than service industries (Salzman 1999). The total level of economic
production is also believed to affect policy leadership, as market size is a critical
component shaping international regulatory competition (Vogel 1997). There is also
the potential relevance of economic resources on environmental policy leadership via the
Environmental Kuznets Curve, but this relationship has found only limited empirical
support (Stern 2004).8
7I derive these categories from Jänicke (2005).
8The Environmental Kuznets Curve is a hypothesized relationship between environmental degradation
and economic development, with environmental degradation accelerating as income per capita rises, but
at some point, the trend reverses such that increasing incomes lead to environmental improvement,
resulting in a U-shaped function of income per capita (Stern 2004).
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Turning to institutional capacity, environmental policy leaders must have sufficient
human and financial resources available to devote toward environmental policymaking
and, possibly, promoting environmental policy abroad (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). A
ministry with a specific portfolio of environmental policies is a clear sign that at least some
minimum amount of resources is allocated toward environmental policymaking (Knill
et al. 2010). The existence of an environmental ministry also facilitates the application
of political capital toward environmental policymaking by giving voice to environmental
issues in a government cabinet (Busch and Jörgens 2005; Aklin and Urpelainen 2014).
A second institutional consideration is the number of procedural hurdles policymakers
must navigate to enact environmental policy proposals. If there are more institutional
constraints, often measured in terms of the number of veto players in the policymaking
process (Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis et al. 2002), it tends to be more challenging to change
environmental policy (Knill et al. 2010), and thus more difficult to exercise environmental
policy leadership.
Environmental policy leadership is thought to be closely related to the demand for
environmental protection. This demand may be most visible in the preferences of gov-
erning parties (Knill et al. 2010). However, there is open debate on whether the left-right
dimension is the most important for environmental policy leadership, with inconsistent
empirical support for the proposition that left-wing governments demand more environ-
mental protection.9 These mixed results may reflect the potential for environmental
issues to cut across the left-right spectrum, with religious conservatives framing environ-
mental policy as saving “God’s creation” and socialists preferring to maintain economic
employment over environmental protection (Neumayer 2003). However, if the governing
party is in favor of strong environmental protection, regardless of its ideological position,
environmental policy leadership becomes more likely (Knill et al. 2010). Looking beyond
government, there is strong evidence that environmental policy leadership is more likely
when there is a high level of general environmental awareness in the population (Ander-
9Findings supporting the pro-environmental consequences of leftist governments include King and
Borchardt (1994), Jahn (1998), Neumayer (2003). Findings that do not support the proposition include
Scruggs (1999) and Knill et al. (2010).
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son et al. 2017) and when there is a strong presence of domestic environmental NGOs
(Stadelmann and Castro 2014; Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2020).
The final set of domestic factors is environmental problem pressure, with the
expectation that governments should be more likely to act as environmental policy leaders
as a function of the severity of their environmental problems. However, the direction of
this relationship is not clear. While many analysts propose that governments should
become more responsive to environmental concerns as problems worsen (Ringquist 1994;
Sapat 2004), others argue that governments that have already overseen the degradation
of environmental quality are more likely to maintain their record of poor environmental
governance and continue to ignore problems despite deteriorating conditions (Stadelmann
and Castro 2014). Analysts have also differed in their measurement of environmental
problem pressure, especially for analyses across a broad range of environmental policies.
Common measurement approaches are population density, energy use, and carbon dioxide
emissions per capita (Holzinger et al. 2008b), but the conceptual relationship between
these measures and specific environmental problems (e.g., land degradation) can be
relatively weak.
In sum, there is widespread agreement that economic resources, institutional capacity,
the demand for environmental policy, and environmental problem pressure affect
environmental policy leadership. Some of these factors have received relatively strong
empirical support, such as the importance of a ministry dedicated to environmental
policymaking and the environmental preferences of parties in government. Other factors
have more mixed evidence, with wide variation in the direction and strength of their
relationship with environmental policy leadership depending on the analyst’s specific
measurement and modeling strategy. This latter category includes economic wealth,
leftist governments, and environmental problem pressure.
A key knowledge gap regarding the internal drivers of environmental policy leadership
is that many of the factors identified in the literature tend to change slowly. Character-
istics like wealth, population density, and the number of domestic environmental NGOs
tend to persist from year to year. As a result, while these variables can explain abso-
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lute levels of environmental policy leadership, they have only a limited ability to explain
variation in environmental policy leadership over time.
1.2.2 The external drivers of environmental policy leadership
Prior work has examined three types of relationships external to a government’s juris-
diction that affect environmental policy leadership: cooperative harmonization, coer-
cive imposition, and transnational communication (Busch and Jörgens 2005; Holzinger
et al. 2008b). Cooperative harmonization describes interdependent policymaking stem-
ming from international agreements between governments. While cooperative harmo-
nization produces international institutions that reflect the preferences of member states
(Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008; Wurzel et al. 2017), it is thought to exert an inde-
pendent effect on environmental policy leadership because 1) cooperation is needed to
better realize governments’ own policy preferences (e.g., in the presence of cooperation
problems) and 2) environmental policy is just one of many issues that lead countries to
participate in international institutions, especially broader institutions like the European
Union that facilitate cooperation on a wide range of topics (Holzinger et al. 2008b; Mar-
tin and Simmons 1998). However, even EU regulations are no guarantee of national-level
policy adoption, due to both the incorporation of flexibility mechanisms and a deficit of
implementation (Héritier and Knill 2001). Cooperative harmonization is important, but
no all-encompassing, as reflected in the only partial convergence of EU member states’
national environmental policies (Liefferink and Jordan 2005).
Coercive imposition describes a less cordial version of cooperative harmonization,
in which there are material consequences for governments that fail to adhere to
stipulations of more powerful institutions. This dynamic can be seen in the environmental
policymaking of EU applicant countries, which are obliged to adopt certain policies
to be considered for membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Mattli and
Plümper 2004), as well as in developing countries seeking financial assistance from the
World Bank (Biersteker 1990; Busch et al. 2005). However, doubt remains regarding
the prevalence with which coercion impacts policy leadership in practice (Brooks 2005,
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2007), as the potential for such conditions may simply provide a convenient excuse for
pursuing controversial reforms willingly initiated by host governments (Mukherjee and
Singer 2010).
Perhaps the most important means by which policy leaders influence their followers is
through transnational communication of policy ideas (Weidner 2002; Kern et al. 2001).
Since the 1970s, institutional environmental protection by national governments has
become a norm of modern statehood—an outcome credited in large part to transnational
communication (Meyer et al. 1997). Policymakers may meet directly with one another
in bilateral settings and, with the aid of cultural similarity in language, religion, or
geographical proximity (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Lenschow et al. 2005; Holzinger
et al. 2008b), develop similar institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and engage in
policy transfer (Bennett 1991; Brooks 2005). Alternatively, policymakers may interact
at international meetings (Busch et al. 2005). For example, countries that frequently
put on events together at United Nations climate change conferences are more likely
to adopt climate policies (Kammerer and Namhata 2018). Similarly, and perhaps more
forcefully, Meyer et al. (1997) argue that “formalized national [environmental] ministries
arise only when enough international conferences and organizations exist for ministers
to attend” (639). Policymakers also need not engage directly with each other but
instead communicate via go-betweens (Graham et al. 2013). As discussed further in
Chapter 3, these go-betweens may be epistemic communities of scientists and experts
(Haas 1992), transnational advocates, or transnational networks of advocates (Keck and
Sikkink 1998, 1999). Scholars have only examined the policy impacts of transnational
communication at international meetings, typically by counting the number of shared
institutional memberships (Holzinger et al. 2008b; Greenhill 2015) or the number of
co-sponsored side events at multilateral conferences (Kammerer and Namhata 2018),
generally overlooking both direct bilateral interaction and the effect of transnational
advocacy.
Overall, there is strong evidence that cooperative harmonization matters for environ-
mental policy leadership, but it provides no guarantee of leadership. In contrast, coercive
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imposition is possible, but it has attracted only weak empirical support. Transnational
communication has generated enduring interest from scholars and considerable theoreti-
cal development, and the effect of direct policymaker interaction on policy leadership has
received empirical support.
As this discussion demonstrates, while scholars have made substantial progress
in identifying the external drivers of environmental policy leadership, there remain
important gaps in knowledge. For example, there tend to be limited opportunities in
practice for policymakers to interact at international fora, which are oriented around
only a handful of high-profile topics (e.g., climate change). The empirical effect of other
channels of transnational communication has not been thoroughly evaluated, even though
these are often deeper and more enduring forms of engagement. For example, while there
is indicative evidence that transnational environmental NGOs stimulate environmental
policy leadership across countries (Steinberg et al. 2001), their impact has not been
systematically investigated—a gap that motivates this analysis.
1.3 Overview of the argument
My dissertation consists of two components. The first is a primarily theoretical
portion in which I propose a new conceptualization of policy leadership and, within
the environmental context, explain variation in environmental policy leadership as a
function of the activities of transnational environmental advocates. The second part
is a primarily empirical portion in which I create a new dataset on transnational
environmental advocacy and environmental policy adoptions and assess the extent to
which transnational environmental advocates catalyze changes in environmental policy
leadership. I summarize each of these components below.
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1.3.1 Theory and conceptualization of environmental policy lead-
ership
I propose a new conceptualization of policy leadership and, within the environmental
context, explain variation in environmental policy leadership as a function of the activities
of transnational environmental advocates. Building on the existing literature on both
leadership in general, and policy leadership in particular, I define policy leadership as the
phenomenon in which a government is 1) highly innovative, adopting new policies quickly
and 2) influential, substantially shaping the diffusion of policies to other jurisdictions.
This definition stems from the premise that policy leadership is a persistent and observable
behavior in which organizations take decisive action and inspire others to follow their
example (Helms 2012).10 A key benefit of this definition is that it can be translated into
the language of network analysis. Using a network perspective, the internal and external
components of policy leadership can be reformulated in terms of a policymaking network
in which countries, the nodes in the network, are more or less innovative, and countries
influence each other through persistent leader-follower relationships.
Of the internal and external factors affecting countries’ level of environmental policy
leadership, perhaps the most widely studied may be transnational communication. But
while the effects of direct communication between policymakers are relatively well-
studied (e.g., Kammerer and Namhata 2018), the causes of such communication are
often overlooked. I focus in particular on transnational actors as potentially important
agents for catalyzing environmental policy leadership.
Transnational advocacy has existed for decades (Gourevitch 1978), but policy advo-
cacy by environmental non-governmental organizations (Reimann 2006), multinational
corporations (Kim and Milner 2021), and international development organizations (Rah-
man et al. 2016) has professionalized and expanded across national boundaries in recent
10Some scholars hold that policy leaders should also practice and inspire exemplary behavior, such as
enacting the most stringent policies (e.g., Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Jänicke 2005). As I discuss in
the following chapter, stringency is often a difficult concept to operationalize, and, more importantly,
requiring policy leaders to exhibit exemplary behavior fails to capture the potential impact of policies that
reduce environmental stringency. As such, policy stringency falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.
However, I return to a discussion of the implications of transnational advocacy for environmental policy
stringency in the conclusion.
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decades, creating transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999). By
providing information, building human and financial capacity, and waging pressure cam-
paigns, transnational advocates seek to raise countries’ environmental policy leadership
by speeding the adoption of new environmental policies and amplifying the influence of
countries that adopt favored policies. In practice, the efforts of transnational environ-
mental advocates can take a wide range of forms, from educational workshops to lobbying
legislators to placing policy conditions on grants or investment. In this dissertation, I pro-
vide the first quantitative assessment of whether and when the activities of transnational
advocates systematically affect environmental policy leadership.
Viewing this analysis from an alternative perspective, I argue that one way to establish
the effectiveness of transnational environmental advocacy is to assess the extent to which
it systematically shapes the adoption and spread of environmental policy. Typically,
scholars focus on individual episodes in which advocacy mattered or did not matter for
the adoption of a given policy in a particular context. I make a theoretical contribution by
looking at policy advocacy as a long-running series of interactions in which an advocate’s
influence on the policymaking process makes some marginal increase in the probability
of a policy proposal’s success.
1.3.2 Measuring and explaining variation in environmental pol-
icy leadership
As I discuss in detail in Chapter 3, any attempt to evaluate the effect of transnational
advocacy on environmental policy leadership requires data on environmental policymak-
ing around the world, over time, and across multiple policy areas. Based on a systematic
literature review, I determine that existing datasets have insufficient topical and geo-
graphic scope. Accordingly, I introduce a novel dataset of environmental policies across
the entire topical domain of environmental policy, the largest of its kind and a substantial
improvement over existing datasets in its temporal, topical, and geographic scope. I also
compile original data on the activities of the eleven largest transnational environmental
NGOs, the largest subsidiaries of all S&P 500 firms, and the disbursement of funds for
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all environmental projects funded by all bilateral and multilateral IDOs reporting to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) database. All three types of transnational advocates will push
policymakers to devote more time and resources to developing new environmental poli-
cies. Individual advocacy organizations may disagree on the details of specific proposals
(e.g., setting a carbon tax at $50 or $10 per ton), but they will all want the government
to take a clear position on a given issue.11
I then calculate dynamic environmental policy leadership scores for 185 countries
between 1950 and 2019. Specifically, I measure policy innovation as the rate at which
lawmakers adopt new environmental policies and influence as the number of instances in
which a country’s environmental policy adoptions persistently predict another country’s
policy adoptions. I combine each country’s innovation rate and number of influence
relationships to create a unified measure of policy leadership. With this measure, I
provide the first empirical description of environmental policy leadership across the entire
domain of environmental policy, at a global geographic scale, and over the entire period
of modern environmental governance.
Next, I estimate the relationship between the activities of transnational environmental
advocates and environmental policy innovation, influence, and leadership for the period
2002–2019. On average, large international environmental NGOs lead governments to
increase their rate of environmental policy innovation by 6.6%, increase their probabil-
ity of forming a leader-follower relationship with another country by 9.4%, and, conse-
quently, raise their environmental policy leadership by 7.2%. This effect is moderated
by the broader economic context, organizational strategy, and issue characteristics. In-
ternational environmental NGOs catalyze environmental policy leadership primarily in
developing (non-OECD) countries. In terms of organizational strategy, I show that en-
vironmental NGOs with collaborative or confrontational styles can affect environmental
policy leadership, but their respective efficacy diminishes when both confrontational and
collaborative organizations are present at the same time. The characteristics of the issue
11There may be instances in which an advocate prefers ambiguity for strategic reasons, but I assume
this is relatively rare.
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at hand also appear to matter, with environmental NGOs making the largest impact for
policies relating to flora, fauna, and environmental media (e.g., air and water).
Lobbying by multinational corporations and environmental spending by IDOs are
not related to environmental policy leadership on average. Further, environmental
lobbying by multinational corporations leads to a substantively large decrease of 28%
in environmental policy leadership in wealthy OECD member states. This result
contrasts with theories of multinational corporate support for environmental policies in
developing countries (e.g., Garcia-Johnson 2000) and suggests that in developed countries,
multinationals behave like their domestic counterparts in largely opposing environmental
policy change (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009).
Overall, these findings indicate that transnational advocacy by international environ-
mental NGOs leads governments in developing countries to demonstrate greater leader-
ship in the development of environmental policy, while lobbying by multinational corpo-
rations stymies environmental policy leadership in developed countries.
1.4 Contributions
This project makes several contributions to the study of policy leadership and environ-
mental advocacy. First, I make a conceptual contribution to the study of policy leader-
ship. I deviate from subjective, normative, or mechanism-specific definitions, proposing
instead that policy leadership is the combination of rapid policy adoption and widespread
influence. Rather than focusing on the merit of policies adopted and disseminated by pol-
icy leaders, I conceptualize policy leadership as a persistent, value-neutral organizational
behavior. While policy leadership is a latent attribute, recent advances in the mea-
surement of policy innovation (Boehmke and Skinner 2012) and policymaking influence
relationships (Desmarais et al. 2015) facilitate the intersubjective observation of policy
leadership.12 In many ways, my approach to policy leadership aligns with the priorities
of earlier scholarship in its emphasis on both the rapid policy adoption and patterns in
12In using the term “intersubjective,” I mean that the measure does not depend on the researcher’s
experience and perspective, instead “existing between conscious minds” OED Online (2021).
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the diffusion of new policies (e.g., Walker 1969).13
Second, I make a meaningful contribution to the study of transnational advocacy
by linking the activities of advocates to actual changes in public policy. There are
deep literatures on the organization and strategic behavior of NGOs (e.g., Hadden 2015;
Hadden and Jasny 2019; Stroup and Wong 2017), businesses (e.g., Brulle 2018; Cory et al.
2021), and IDOs (e.g., Hicks et al. 2010; Rahman and Giessen 2017), but there is relatively
little work on the specific policy impacts of advocacy. This lacuna is, in part, due to the
difficulty of establishing a credible counterfactual of policy change in the presence or
absence of advocacy. To overcome this challenge, I formulate a theory of policy advocacy
that rests on three propositions that have not been sufficiently emphasized in prior work.
First, the unique position of transnational advocates relative to domestic policymaking
processes allows for the construction of a counterfactual for understanding their impact
on policy change. Second, policy advocacy is most profitably viewed from a probabilistic
perspective, requiring the examination of a wide range of policies across many country-
years. Third, a key consequence of the activities of transnational advocacy networks,
which are themselves already the subject of considerable study (e.g., Keck and Sikkink
1998, 1999), is the structure of persistent transnational policymaking networks.
Third, from an empirical perspective, I offer many advances in this project. I address
longstanding imbalances in the topical and geographic coverage of data on environmental
policy adoption by creating a dataset of environmental policy adoptions that spans
multiple decades, includes nearly every country, and reaches across the full range of
environmental topics. Aiming to contribute to growing interest in studying public policy
beyond developed countries and thematically-narrow areas (e.g., Sommerer and Lim
2016; Boehmke et al. 2020), this dataset lays the foundation for a wide array of future
studies on environmental policy change around the world. I also collect a new dataset
on the activities of international environmental NGOs and create new measures of the
geographic and temporal variation in the activities of multinational corporations and
financial flows from IDOs. Responding to calls for large-N quantitative studies that test
13A policy is new if it is the first such policy to be adopted by a particular government (as opposed to
being the first time such a policy is adopted by any government).
16
and compare effects of multiple causes of policy change across different topics (Holzinger
et al. 2008a), I leverage these data to analyze the impact of three of the most important
types of transnational relationships affecting environmental policy development. To my
knowledge, this study is the first quantitative analysis of the role international NGOs,
IDOs, or multinational corporations play as agents of policy leadership, spurring (or
obstructing) domestic environmental change and accelerating (or slowing) the spread of
policy ideas across the jurisdictions in which they work.
Finally, this paper speaks directly to the practical challenge of fostering leadership
in environmental policy. With a growing need for urgent action to address climate
change, the loss of biodiversity, and many other global environmental problems, it is
increasingly important for governments to invest in and promote innovative approaches
to environmental governance. By measuring and explaining variation in environmental
policy leadership, I identify the countries on the cutting-edge of environmental policy
development with the ability to shape global trends in environmental governance. In
finding that transnational advocates can catalyze the growth of environmental policy
leadership, I provide evidence of the important role transnational advocates play in global
environmental governance.
1.5 Plan of the dissertation
In the remainder of this dissertation, I offer a new definition and theory of environmental
policy leadership, a novel approach to measuring the concept, and explain its variation
across countries and over time. The purpose is to better understand the extent to
which transnational advocates systematically catalyze changes in environmental policy
leadership. The analysis proceeds as follows.
The next chapter (Chapter 2) develops a network-based understanding of policy
leadership. I place policy leadership in the context of an array of other concepts regarding
change and interdependence in policymaking, consider the strengths and weaknesses of
existing definitions of policy leadership, and summarize trends in the measurement and
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explanation of policy leadership. I detail a new definition of policy leadership consisting
of rapid policy adoption and widespread influence on policy diffusion, components rooted
in the timing and pattern of policy change. I also discuss policymakers’ incentives
and disincentives for environmental policy leadership. I then demonstrate how policy
leadership can be represented as a network graph, laying the theoretical foundation for
measuring and explaining environmental policy leadership in future chapters.
In Chapter 3, I delve into the ways in which transnational advocates can act as
catalysts of environmental policy leadership. I explain the mechanisms by which advocacy
impacts the policymaking process and characterize three key transnational environmental
advocates: international environmental NGOs, multinational corporations, and IDOs. I
also describe new country-level data on the activities of these advocates over time. I
outline the challenge of evaluating the impact of transnational advocacy and propose
that changes in policy leadership are suitable outcomes for measuring the effectiveness
of policy advocacy over long periods of time. Based on this proposal, I elucidate a
set of expectations regarding the potential impacts of transnational advocacy on policy
leadership.
Chapter 4 presents a new database of environmental policy adoptions. Based on a
systematic literature review, I show that existing data on environmental policy adoptions
are not balanced in their geographical and topical content, with strong biases in favor
of the inclusion of developed countries and a relatively small subset of topics in the
environmental policy domain. Using FAOLEX, the largest global compilation of national
environmental laws and regulations, I describe a methodology for identifying distinct
environmental policies and their earliest dates of adoption in each country. I leverage these
data to create the dependent variables for my analysis, environmental policy innovation,
influence, and leadership from 1950 to 2019.
Chapter 5 empirically tests the hypotheses that emerge from the discussion of
transnational advocacy in Chapter 3. Using measures of environmental policy leadership
derived from the FAOLEX database, I assess the extent to which the activities
of international environmental NGOs, multinational corporations, and IDOs affect
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environmental policy leadership, as well as its constituent components of policy innovation
and influence. I end the chapter by considering the conditions for successful environmental
advocacy, finding that the impact of transnational advocacy on environmental policy
leadership depends on a country’s level of economic development, the advocate’s use of
collaborative or confrontational tactics, and whether the issues at hand relate to resource
use or more traditional environmental issues of flora, fauna, and pollution.
My dissertation concludes that transnational advocates play an important role in en-
vironmental policy leadership, acting both as catalysts or obstacles for environmental
policy leadership. Through a combination of information provision, capacity building,
and pressure campaigns, environmental NGOs are effective in encouraging policymakers
in developing countries to adopt policies more quickly, while multinational corporations
successfully slow the pace of environmental policy development in developed countries.
Both environmental NGOs and multinational corporations play a linking role, strategi-
cally amplifying the influence of the governments with which they interact. These results
suggest that transnational advocacy, especially by international environmental NGOs,
can be a viable means to respond to increasingly urgent calls for environmental policy
leadership. The concluding remarks in the final chapter contextualize my findings and




Understanding of Policy Leadership
Leadership, broadly understood, consists of decisive actions that inspire others to
follow (Helms 2012). But, despite attracting substantial attention from scholars, policy
leadership remains an elusive and contested concept. In this chapter, I begin by
briefly explaining policy leadership’s relation to other concepts that describe trends and
interdependence in policymaking, such as policy diffusion and policy transfer. I then
assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing understandings of policy leadership before
proposing a new conceptualization rooted in the view that leadership is a persistent
and observable behavior. Finally, I construct a typology based on my definition of
policy leadership that describes ideal-type roles countries play in policy development
and transpose this typology into a network graph, an analytical move that provides a
convenient theoretical platform for both measuring and explaining variation in policy
leadership.
2.1 Overview of prior work on policy leadership
Leadership in policy development is a longstanding topic of interest to scholars across the
subfields of political science. Perhaps the earliest work on policy leadership is in American
politics, generally focused on the longstanding problem of untangling the policymaking
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relationships among the U.S. states (e.g., Walker 1969; Vogel 1997; Desmarais et al.
2015). Scholars of comparative politics have also taken an intense interest in how foreign
policymaking can lead to domestic policy change in other countries (e.g., Lundqvist 1974;
Gourevitch 1978; Sommerer and Lim 2016). International relations has engaged with
policy leadership both in international fora (e.g., Young 1991; Liefferink and Andersen
1998; Jänicke and Wurzel 2019) and via transnational relations (e.g., Busch and Jörgens
2005; Pacheco-Vega 2015).
In this sub-section, I describe the analytical relationship of policy leadership relative
to the concepts of policy diffusion, policy transfer, policy convergence, and isomorphism.
I then discuss three competing definitions of policy leadership, as well as broad tendencies
in their use in practice.
2.1.1 Placing policy leadership in context
A broad range of scholars have engaged with the subject of policy development, generating
an array of concepts that are related to, but distinct from, policy leadership. Governments
act as policy leaders if they tend to quickly adopt policies and influence the adoption
of those policies by other governments. Policy leaders affect policy change in other
jurisdictions by shaping macro-level policy diffusion processes, in which policy decisions
are systematically conditioned on the prior policy decisions of other governments (Gray
1973; Rogers 2003; Simmons and Elkins 2004), and micro-level policy transfer processes,
in which specific ideas are communicated and adapted to the follower state’s context (Rose
1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000). As a result, policy leaders and their followers
experience policy convergence, with governments’ respective policy portfolios becoming
more alike (Holzinger et al. 2008a; Sommerer and Lim 2016), and even isomorphism,
with institutions and cultures becoming more similar over time (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Bennett 1991). Thus, policy leadership describes an organizational behavior that
works through policy diffusion and policy transfer, resulting in policy convergence and
isomorphism.
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2.1.2 Existing definitions of policy leadership
Despite the clear analytical distinctions between policy leadership and its related
concepts, the definition of policy leadership itself remains contested. At least three
competing definitions of policy leadership have emerged. These definitions differ in their
relative emphasis and stipulations on policymaker intent and behavior, the normative
content of policies adopted, and the specific mechanism by which leaders influence their
followers. I present and assess each of these conceptualizations in turn.
The first definition proposes that states are leaders if they display high ambition
in policy development both in domestic policy and in international fora, such as the
European Union (Liefferink and Andersen 1998; Wiering et al. 2018). On the domestic
level, ambition is often equated with stringent policy (Wiering et al. 2018), but some
authors also view being the first to adopt policies as an indication of ambition (Liefferink
and Wurzel 2017). At the international level, ambitious states play an active, visible role
and attract followers, although there is some inconsistency as to whether leader states
simply need to have followers (Jänicke and Wurzel 2019) or must actively seek to attract
followers (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017; Wurzel et al. 2017). This ambition-based definition
is commonly used in analyses that explicitly aim to identify instances of policy leadership.
Defining policy leadership in terms of internal and external ambition is problematic
on both empirical and theoretical grounds. It is exceedingly challenging to measure
a country’s ambition or intent in a systematic way because what is beneficial for the
environment is often contested (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017). As Knill et al. (2012a)
observe, biofuels are promoted as a way to reduce fossil fuel consumption but may be
seen as an irresponsible use of arable land. Similarly, nuclear energy can be framed as a
renewable energy source useful for mitigating climate change or as an unsafe, expensive,
and non-renewable source of energy. Understanding a country’s intentions or ambitions
would seem to require knowing the inner mental states of policymakers, a task so difficult
as to lead even scholars working within this framework to acknowledge, “Clearly, there
is a normative dimension involved in defining what constitutes an environmental leader”
(Liefferink and Wurzel 2017, p. 953). If leaders can be identified through observable
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behaviors—decisive action and influence over the behavior of others—there is no need to
resort to subjective judgments.
Measuring policy leadership using ambition is also flawed on theoretical grounds.
Ambition speaks to a government’s intent, not the extent to which its plans are brought
to fruition. From this perspective, it does not matter if a country is successful in attracting
followers so long as it attempts to do so. But focusing on intent, rather than behavior,
does not align well with the idea that a leader is defined, at least in part, by having
followers (Andresen and Agrawala 2002; Torney 2019). Simply attempting to attract
followers, without regard to the success of those efforts, is not sufficient grounds to be
called a leader. Further, it is unnecessary to limit external ambition to policymaking in
international fora, as doing so overlooks bilateral influence relationships. A more minor
criticism is that if policy adoption is to be considered, being early to adopt a policy would
seem to speak more directly to the concept of internal policy ambition than being the
first to adopt a policy.
The second definition of policy leadership holds that leader states enact the most
stringent policies and, as a result, set an example that other states emulate (Andersen
and Liefferink 1997; Jänicke 2005). This definition has been widely used in studies
of policy convergence (e.g., Liefferink et al. 2009; Knill et al. 2012a; Sommerer and
Lim 2016). For subject areas like the environment, this definition aligns well with the
idea that leadership is about solving problems and attracting followers (Andersen and
Liefferink 1997). Moreover, in contrast to ambition, stringency is often straightforward
to operationalize, especially in the context of pollution or manufacturing.
This definition has two weaknesses. First, it conflates decisive action with a high level
of stringency, overlooking the potential impact of policies that cut regulatory stringency.
Second, this definition suggests that there are no leaders in a race to the bottom, a
dynamic in which states lower the stringency of their policies and, in doing so, inspire
others to do the same (Drezner 2001). In fact, any policy can be emulated, regardless of
its stringency or even its effectiveness (Weyland 2005; Marsh and Sharman 2009; Shipan
and Volden 2021). For example, anti-money laundering policies spread rapidly around
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the world despite questionable evidence of their effectiveness (Sharman 2008).
The third definition of policy leadership asserts simply that a policy leader is a
jurisdiction from which other jurisdictions draw lessons (Pacheco-Vega 2021). This view is
particularly amenable to the policy transfer literature in its emphasis on lesson-drawing
(Rose 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000). It also discards stipulations regarding
the intent or stringency of the leader’s policies. However, restricting leadership to
the phenomenon of lesson-drawing rules out leadership through other means, such as
cooperative harmonization (Knill et al. 2012a). It is also incomplete because the definition
does not articulate expectations for leaders’ domestic policymaking behavior, such as
being on the cutting edge of policy development.
2.1.3 Trends in the study of policy leadership
Looking beyond specific definitions of leadership, there is widespread agreement that
countries may vary in their policy leadership across topics and over time.1 Nevertheless,
and regardless of the underlying definition used, existing analyses display a “striking
persistence of stereotypical classifications” (Knill et al. 2012a, p. 37). In the context of
environmental policy, for example, scholars have asserted as common knowledge that:
• Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Sweden are leaders
• Belgium, France, and Italy are middling
• Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Mexico are laggards
• Eastern European states were laggards but have improved
• The United States and Japan were leaders but have since reduced their policy
leadership.2
1For variation across topics, examples include Héritier (1995), Andresen and Agrawala (2002),Weidner
(2002),Jänicke (2005). For variation over time, examples include Andresen and Agrawala (2002), Jänicke
(2005), Szarka (2006), and Holzinger et al. (2011).
2See, e.g., Liefferink and Andersen (1998), Jänicke (2005), Liefferink and Wurzel (2017), and Weidner
(2020). These claims are summarized in Knill et al. (2012a).
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Conclusions such as these are often justified with anecdotes, but when scholars do
attempt to support their claims with more systematic evidence, they typically rely
on single-country case studies. For example, Wiering et al. (2018), Hysing (2014),
and Dyrhauge (2020) examine the trajectory of environmental policy leadership in the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, respectively, while Steinbacher (2018) explores the
international consequences of German leadership in renewable energy policy. Some
scholars also consider policy leadership in the context of pairs or small groups of countries.
Héritier (1995) compared German and British air quality policy and, in a rare study
on countries beyond Europe, Steinberg et al. (2001) examined environmental policy
leadership in Costa Rica and Bolivia. Single-country case studies can be informative, but
do not speak to the extent to which relationships identified in the case hold elsewhere.
There are only a handful of studies that conduct relatively large-N quantitative studies
of policy leadership. These analyses operationalize the concept in terms of the number of
policies adopted, the speed of policy adoption, and, most frequently, policy stringency.3
A shortcoming across these quantitative approaches is that they only measure decisive
action, the internal component of leadership, and entirely omit measures of the extent to
which countries attract followers, the external component of leadership.
2.1.4 Summary of existing work on policy leadership
Reflecting the challenging nature of the concept, scholars have proposed multiple
competing definitions of policy leadership, each with respective strengths and limitations.
Definitions that rely on ambition force the analyst to make subjective judgments about
policymaker intent. Stringency-based definitions overlook the potential for leader states
to set bad examples. Definitions that define leaders simply as sources of lesson-
drawing are simultaneously overly restrictive, by excluding intentional efforts to create
interdependent policymaking, and overly broad, by omitting consideration of domestic
policymaking behavior. In practice, scholars have been quick to make broad judgments
about countries’ policy leadership, failing to differentiate policy leadership across topics
3Relevant studies include Holzinger et al. (2008b); Liefferink et al. (2009); Holzinger et al. (2011);
Knill et al. (2012a); Sommerer and Lim (2016).
25
and time, often without systematic evidence. While there is a robust and growing set of
case studies and small-N studies, there have been relatively few attempts to systematically
measure and explain policy leadership across countries, and none of those that have been
conducted have explicitly incorporated both the internal and external components of
leadership.
2.2 Policy leadership: Innovation and influence
In this section, I propose a new, theoretically-robust definition of policy leadership. I start
from general definitions of leadership and then move from individual-level understandings
of leadership in policymaking to an institution-level understanding of policy leadership.
I then articulate how this new conceptualization of policy leadership can be applied for
systematic empirical analysis.
A commonly accepted understanding of leadership presents leaders as actors who
take decisive actions that inspire others to follow (Helms 2012). That is, leadership is a
combination of behaviors involving both a leader and their followers (Torney 2019). Part
of being a leader—taking decisive action—is within the actor’s control, but another,
critical component of leadership—the inspiration of others—lies outside of the focal
actor’s control. It is only if, upon observing the actions of the focal actor, others freely
decide to become followers and engage in similar behavior themselves, can an actor be
called a leader. A leader without followers is no leader at all.
This understanding of leadership typically operates at the level of individuals rather
than organizations (Kingdon and Stano 1984). In the context of the policymaking process,
individual leadership in policy change takes four distinct, but related forms.4 First,
individuals can act as intellectual leaders, injecting new ideas into the political debate.
These ideas may be new policy paradigms (e.g., taxing pollution), policy instruments
(e.g., carbon taxes), or policy settings (e.g., carbon taxes at $50 per ton) (Hall 1993).
Second, individuals can act as instrumental leaders, attracting attention and support to
4This typology is from Andresen and Agrawala (2002) and is based on Young (1991), Young (1998)
and Underdal (1994).
26
policy ideas (Underdal 1994).5 The third type of individual-level leadership is structural,
in which people use power to shape the incentives of others to facilitate the incorporation
of a select number of these ideas into formal law. The fourth and final form of individual-
level leadership is directional, encouraging policymakers in other jurisdictions to adopt
analogous policies.
Instead of focusing on the actions of specific individuals involved in the policymaking
process, leadership in public policy can also be understood at the institutional level.
The habitual exercise of leadership by individuals embedded in incentive structures
consisting of rules and norms results in patterns of organizational behavior. Intellectual,
instrumental, and structural leadership affect the internal policymaking process by
influencing, respectively, the rate at which new ideas enter, rise up, and are selected
from the political agenda. Tracing intellectual and instrumental forms of leadership
is important for understanding the spread and evolution of a policy idea. However,
intellectual and instrumental leadership are challenging to observe directly because they
tend to lead to changes in discourse and attitudes. The latent consequences of intellectual
and instrumental leadership stand in contrast to structural and directional leadership,
which manifest in the formal, public behavior of policy adoption by the leader institution
and its follower institutions.
This discussion motivates a reconceptualization of policy leadership that comprises
an internal component of decisive action through the exercise of structural leadership
and an external component of inspiration of followers through directional leadership, all
while remaining firmly rooted in intersubjective observation. Accordingly, I propose the
following definition:
Policy leadership is the practice of 1) rapidly adopting new policies and 2)
substantially influencing the diffusion of new policies.
This definition aligns closely with the general understanding of leaders as political
actors who take decisive actions that inspire others to follow (Helms 2012). It defines
5The instrumental form of individual-level leadership is also sometimes referred to as policy
entrepreneurship Mintrom and Vergari (e.g., 1996).
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policy leadership as an institutional behavior consisting of an internal and external
component. The internal component of policy leadership is decisive action through
structural leadership, resulting in the increased likelihood and speed with which a
policy is proposed, negotiated, and successfully enacted (Young 1998). The observable
implication of the internal component of policy leadership is that policy leaders display
greater policy innovation, adopting new policies more quickly than other governments
(Boehmke and Skinner 2012). The external component is the inspiration of others through
directional leadership, resulting in the increased likelihood and speed with which policies
are enacted in other jurisdictions. The observable implication of the external component
of policy leadership is that policy leaders should be more likely to form persistent leader-
follower relations with policymakers in other jurisdictions (Torney 2019). Importantly,
governments are not leaders if they are only innovative or only influential. A policy leader
must simultaneously combine both of these elements.6
With this definition in hand, several observations and clarifications are in order.
First, the new definition echoes existing work by characterizing policy leaders as being
among the first to adopt new solutions (Andersen and Liefferink 1997) and attracting
followers (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017; Wurzel et al. 2017; Jänicke and Wurzel 2019).
But unlike ambition-based conceptualizations, it does not force the analyst to make
subjective judgments about the intentions of policymakers (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017).
Nor does it place any stipulations on the qualities of the policies a government adopts,
unlike stringency-based conceptualizations (Knill et al. 2012a). Instead, the definition
emphasizes the speed with which new policies are enacted once they become available,
a judgment amenable to intersubjective observation. Moreover, rapid policy adoption
requires the dedication of human and financial resources toward policymaking on a given
topic, aligning well with the literature’s insistence on “high ambition” (e.g., Wiering et al.
2018) without requiring judgments about the normative value of the policies adopted. The
external component of the definition also improves on lesson-drawing-based definitions
(e.g., Pacheco-Vega 2021) by articulating the leader’s effect on the outcome (policy
6For example, a factor that predicts whether a country is innovative without providing insight into
whether it is influential would only help distinguish laggards and influencers from inventors and leaders.
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change) rather than the mechanism, which may be a coordinated or uncoordinated form
of policy diffusion.
Of course, while my definition addresses many of the deficiencies in the existing
literature, it has its own limitations. One of these limitations is that countries can
affect policymaking in other countries by intentionally or unintentionally slowing or
even preventing the spread of a policy across jurisdictions. For example, a government
skeptical of climate change may encourage others to delay taking action to mitigate their
greenhouse gas emissions. While this could be expected to be relatively rare—promoting
a watered-down version of a policy would seem more likely than simply remaining silent
on an issue—it is certainly possible.7 The definition I propose only considers positive
influence (in the sense of increasing the likelihood of policy adoption), but future work
should engage with countries that exercise influence by slowing the adoption of policies.
Second, it is key to note that policy leadership manifests as a persistent state behavior
(Bernstein and Cashore 2000). Leader states do not adopt and spark the diffusion of just
one policy (Underdal 1994). Instead, policy leaders engage in a pattern of behavior in
which they are frequently among the first to adopt new policies and form leader-follower
influence relationships that persist over time. Policy leaders are engaged in ongoing
interactions with their followers, even as the personnel who work in these institutions
change. This perspective recognizes that the rules and norms of institutions have an
effect on politics that goes beyond simply aggregating instances of individual leadership
in policymaking (Simon 1947; March and Olsen 1984). Policy leadership treats episodes
of individual leadership as manifestations of a long-running, slowly evolving relationship,
rather than a series of independent events.
Third, as in other conceptualizations of policy leadership (e.g., Knill et al. 2012a;
Sommerer and Lim 2016), the behavior of interest in this context is policy adoption, not
policy implementation or effectiveness. While policies could be more likely to spread if
they are successfully implemented, policies could also spread because policymakers learn
that simply adopting these policies without implementation eases other pressures. For
7Underdal (1994) contests this negative view of leadership, claiming that leadership only describes
actions that enhance the actions of other actors toward a particular goal.
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example, policy leaders could acquire followers precisely because they adopt policies that
satisfy some external requirement (e.g., qualifications for financing from the International
Monetary Fund), whether or not those policies are actually implemented (Mukherjee and
Singer 2010). Moreover, policy effectiveness depends not only on government action but
on social and economic conditions that also shape behavior, rendering effectiveness a
frequently noisy indicator of policy leadership (Holzinger et al. 2008a; Knill et al. 2010).
Fourth, policy leadership is a dynamic behavior that evolves over time (Knill et al.
2012a) and across issue areas (Andresen and Agrawala 2002). Critically, policy leadership
is also relative to a specific reference group. This reference group may be a specific set of
peer governments (Holzinger et al. 2011; Steinberg et al. 2001), all governments within
a given region (Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Vogel 2018; Jänicke and Wurzel 2019), or
the entire world (Kim and Cha 2004; Torney 2019). Of course, these scope conditions
have implications for the data necessary to test claims regarding policy leadership. If
an analyst wants to consider policy leadership on a wide set of topics at a global level,
their data must include data on the adoption of policies from each of these topics by all
countries in the world.
Finally, although the incentives for environmental policy leadership generally favor
enhanced environmental protection, acting as a policy leader is not necessarily a good
outcome. By viewing policy leadership as a behavior, rather than adherence to a moral
or ethical standard, innovative and influence policymakers may nevertheless take actions
that are in fact harmful to the resolution of social problems or attainment of social
goals (Nye Jr 2008; Lipman-Blumen 2005). This perspective is particularly useful in
the environmental context, a policy domain in which there are ongoing debates over the
merits of technologies like biofuels and nuclear power (Knill et al. 2012a).
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2.3 Understanding policy leadership from a network
perspective
Policy leadership consists of an internal component—innovation—and an external
component—influence. Since countries can be stronger on one of these components than
the other, it is helpful to combine these two dimensions into a typology describing the
ideal-type roles governments can play in policy development (Table 2.1).8 Governments
that are both highly innovative and highly influential are leaders, frequently adopting
new environmental policies and attracting widespread attention for doing so. Countries
that are neither especially innovative nor influential are policy development laggards. In
these countries, environmental policies are enacted long after their invention, and their
adoption goes largely unnoticed by the rest of the world. Countries can also occupy
intermediate positions (Andersen and Liefferink 1997). A country that is inventive, but
generally fails to convince policymakers elsewhere to follow its example is an inventor,
while an influencer is a government that rarely invents new policies, but once it adopts a
policy, it exerts a strong influence over the policy’s subsequent diffusion. Countries can
move from one cell in this typology to another over time. As I argue in Chapter 3, one
reason countries move across this typology is due to transnational advocacy.





It is worthwhile to note that the opposite of a leader in this typology is not a follower,
but a laggard. Laggards are slow to take up new ideas and their actions do not inspire
others to do the same. If many countries are laggards, it suggests that countries are not
communicating effectively with each other and are not responding quickly to the advent
of new policy ideas. If policy leadership were to become more prevalent, then countries
8This typology is inspired by (Liefferink and Wurzel 2017).
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would follow each other’s actions more attentively and act more quickly in response to
each other. As noted in the previous section, whether this dynamic leads to normatively
better outcomes depends on the specific policy content (often policy settings) and the
analyst’s priorities and values.
2.3.1 Measuring innovation
Innovativeness is the tendency for a state to adopt new policies sooner than other states.
While being the first to adopt a policy is to invent the policy, policy innovation is the first
time a given policy is adopted in a particular jurisdiction (Walker 1969). This perspective
emphasizes a policy’s spread or entry into wider use, rather than its initial moment
of creation (invention) or subsequent effects (evaluation) (Jordan and Huitema 2014).
Importantly, a government with a high rate of innovation is not necessarily adopting good
or important policies. Instead, a high rate of environmental policy innovation indicates
that government policymakers have decided to devote a larger portion of their time and
effort to environmental issues—for better or for worse.
As per Boehmke and Skinner (2012), innovativeness can be measured as a rate
representing the proportion of policy adoption opportunities that a country takes
advantage of during a period of time. Innovativeness is a unit-level attribute that can be
measured directly, making comparisons between units straightforward. For example, if
country A enacts a higher proportion of unadopted policies in a given time period than
country B, then country A is more innovative than country B.
This approach to measuring innovation requires three assumptions. The first is that
all policies are assumed to be equally difficult to adopt. This assumption is unlikely to be
strictly true in practice, especially for transformational, costly, or cross-cutting policies.
One way to test the extent to which policy complexity matters is by varying the weight
afforded to the adoption of more complex policies.
The second assumption is that the adoption of each policy is independent within
a jurisdiction. This assumption is also unlikely to be strictly true, as the adoption
of one policy may substitute for the adoption of another. Such adoptions may be a
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direct substitution in the pursuit of a single policy goal. For example, the adoption of
renewable portfolio standards is known to substitute for the adoption of feed-in tariffs
for renewable energy (Busch and Jörgens 2005). Alternatively, policies may be indirect
substitutes via opportunity cost, with the adoption of one policy diminishing or enhancing
the effectiveness or desirability of another policy. This assumption can be addressed in
analyses of a small number of policies by explicitly accounting for the interdependencies
between policies. However, these interdependencies can be challenging to identify when
studying many policies, but if each policy’s adoption is thought to affect only a small
number of other policies, the bias generated by these interdependencies should decrease
as the number of policies studied increases.
The third assumption is that all states have at least a non-zero possibility of adopting
any policy instrument. One approach to addressing this problem is to examine each
policy and determine whether some states would never adopt them and then omit
those observations. This strategy is attractive on its face but challenging to implement
systematically. For example, although elephants are not native to the United Kingdom,
it is still illegal to kill elephants for sport. Similarly, a landlocked country can register
ocean-going vessels. An alternative approach described by Boehmke and Skinner (2012)
is to take a probabilistic approach, assuming that each state has some probability of being
able to adopt any given policy. I take the position that there are few, if any, policies that
a given government would simply never adopt, although there may be variation in each
government’s underlying probability of adopting policy instruments, an idea that could
be in statistical terms by, for example, country-level random effects.
2.3.2 Measuring influence
Influence describes the prevalence with which a government enters into leader-follower
relationships as the leader. A leader-follower policymaking relationship describes a
persistent interdependence in the policymaking of two governments, indicated by a
pattern in the timing of policy adoptions in which an adoption by the leader government
tends to be followed shortly thereafter by the same policy’s adoption by the follower
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government. Influence is a relational attribute, meaning that a given country’s influence
provides a summary of that country’s dyadic relations.
Estimating an individual government’s influence is a two-step process. The first step
is to detect a government’s persistent leader-follower influence relationships. I infer these
relationships from patterns in the relative timing of adoptions across multiple policies
using the NetworkInference (NetInf) algorithm described in Desmarais et al. (2015).9
The intuition underlying the NetInf algorithm is that when a leader-follower influence
relationship exists between two countries, the adoption of policies by the leader should
persistently predict the adoption of a similar policy by the follower shortly thereafter.
For a given point in time and relative to a specific set of policies, the existence of a
leader-follower influence relationship can be represented as a directional edge between
the two country nodes in the network, forming a directed dyad. To illustrate, if France
adopts policies just before the United Kingdom time and again, the NetInf algorithm
would indicate that France acts as a policy leader to the United Kingdom.
The second step is to summarize each country’s leader-follower relationships to make
comparable measurements. Since the concept of influence describes a tendency to lead
other countries, I measure policy leadership as the number of dyadic relations in which
the government is the leader node. This statistic corresponds to the network measure
out-degree. For example, country A is more influential than country B if country A is a
leader in more leader-follower influence relationships than country B.
There is an inherent relationship between innovation and influence because a
government cannot generate a pattern of policy adoption with other countries if it never
adopts any policies itself. However, for any country with non-zero policy adoptions, the
mechanistic relationship between innovation and influence weakens because the NetInf
algorithm includes a penalty for a lack of precision in the leader’s prediction of policy
9The NetInf algorithm (Gomez-Rodriguez et al. 2012; Desmarais et al. 2015) creates a network
in which the policy-adopting units are nodes and iteratively adds directed edges to the network that
make the largest improvement in the likelihood of a constrained maximization problem consisting of 1)
maximizing the number of times government i adopts policies before government j, 2) minimizing the
amount of time between government i’s adoptions and government j’s adoptions, and 3) maximizing the
precision with which government i’s adoptions predict government j’s adoptions. See Desmarais et al.
(2015), as well as Gomez-Rodriguez et al. (2012), the original creators of the NetInf algorithm, for more
details on the algorithm and the accompanying network inference procedure.
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adoption by the follower, accounting for jurisdictions that have a high rate of policy
innovation for internal reasons.
2.3.3 Calculating policy leadership
Combining the two attributes, the policy leadership of a government, Leadershipi, is a
function of its innovativeness, Innovativenessi, and a statistic summarizing its influence
over other governments, g(Influencei→j).10 More succinctly:
Leadershipi = f (Innovativenessi, g(Influencei→j))
The function f() combines the measures of innovation and influence into a single
leadership score. The functional form of f() depends on the analyst’s weighting of
innovation relative to influence. I opt to multiply innovation and influence together
using equal weights because both are individually insufficient and jointly necessary for
environmental policy leadership.
2.3.4 Representing policy leadership in a network graph
Using the typology of ideal-type roles as a point of departure, the components of
policy leadership, innovation, and influence are amenable to representation in a network
graph, facilitating the construction of measures that are comparable between and
within units while remaining firmly rooted in intersubjective observation. In a policy
leadership network, the nodes are governments and the edges are leader-follower influence
relationships. A government’s policy leadership is then a function of its innovativeness
(a nodal attribute) and a summary of its leader-follower influence relationships.
The main benefit of viewing policy leadership through the lens of network analysis
is to capture the close relationship between a country’s domestic policymaking, or nodal
attributes, and its influence on other countries, represented through the existence (and
potentially attributes) of directed edges to and from other nodes. A network perspective
10Since influence is a dyadic concept, it requires a summary statistic for use at the individual
(government) level.
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also brings to the fore the fundamentally relational nature of influence between a
leader and its followers, allowing the researcher to measure and explain variation in the
interdependence in different countries’ policymaking processes. By turning to network
analysis, I link the literature on policy leadership with other work on the role of networks
in policy change, in which the analysis of network graphs provides insight into the factors
that predict individual-level leadership in policymaking (Ingold and Leifeld 2016; Arnold
et al. 2017), the formation of leader-follower relationships in policy diffusion (Desmarais
et al. 2015; Boehmke et al. 2020), and the factors that predict followership (Torney 2019).
Figure 2.1 provides an example of a policy leadership network in which four countries
(A, B, C, D) are represented as nodes in a graph. The innovativeness of each country
is represented as the size of each node, with more innovative countries (A, D) being
larger than less innovative countries (B, C). Each leader-follower influence relationship is
represented by a directed edge linking the leader and follower countries. In this example,
country A influences policymaking in countries B and C and country C influences
policymaking in countries B and D. Note that, even though there are no reciprocal edges
in Figure 2.1, mutual relationships are both possible and perhaps to be expected.
By construction, each of the four countries in this example falls into one of the four
ideal-type roles described above. Country A is a leader due to its high innovativeness
and, as the leader in leader-follower relationships with two other countries, high influence.
Country B is a laggard, as it has low innovativeness and influences no other country’s
policymaking. Country C, with low innovativeness but a high amount of influence, plays
the role of an influencer. Country D is an inventor, quickly adopting many policies but
influencing no other countries in the policy leadership network.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter starts from the premise that leadership is the combination of decisive action
with the inspiration of others. Despite substantial and enduring scholarly attention

















Figure 2.1: Example policy leadership network for four countries.
Larger nodes indicate more innovative countries. Directed edges
indicate the presence of a leader-follower influence relationship.
Influence is calculated as the number of out-directed edges (out-
degree).
leadership. Existing definitions force scholars to rely on subjective judgments, rule
out normatively bad forms of leadership, and unnecessarily restrict the mechanisms by
which leaders may influence their followers. To address these shortcomings, I propose a
new conceptualization of policy leadership consisting of an internal component—rapid
policy adoption—and an external component—widespread influence on the diffusion
of new policies. This definition aligns with the analytical thrust of existing work on
policy leadership while emphasizing the concept’s empirically-based, value-neutral roots.
Finally, I convert the internal and external components into the language of network
analysis, providing a straightforward approach for creating a systematic and comparable




as a Catalyst of Policy Leadership
Of the international factors that affect policy change, one of the most important is
transnational communication. Unlike international agreements, which are often weakened
and delayed by the need for consensus (Barrett 2005), it is relatively straightforward to
communicate policy ideas across national borders. Policymakers can learn about other
countries’ policies through direct interactions with their peers or via indirect channels
brokered by go-betweens (Graham et al. 2013), who are often transnational advocacy
organizations. Direct interactions can be meaningful drivers of policy change (Kammerer
and Namhata 2018), but relative to indirect channels of transnational communication,
face-to-face exchanges between empowered policymakers—rather than negotiators—tend
to be infrequent, superficial, and thematically constrained, typically revolving around
issues posing international cooperation problems.
In this chapter, I focus on the indirect channel of transnational communication,
proposing a new theory of how and why transnational advocates act as drivers of envi-
ronmental policy leadership. I first define transnational advocacy and discuss in general
terms the emergence of transnational advocates, their range of organizational structures,
and what these advocates seek to achieve. Next, I build on the conceptualization of
environmental policy leadership described in Chapter 2 by providing an overview of pol-
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icymakers’ incentives for environmental policy leadership, followed by a novel theoretical
framework composed of the three primary types of strategies transnational advocates have
at their disposal for affecting policy change. I then lay out a set of hypotheses regarding
the effect of transnational environmental advocacy on policy leadership, as well as my
expectations about the circumstances under which these advocates’ efforts are most likely
to be successful. I conclude the chapter by focusing on the three most visible types of
transnational advocates: international environmental NGOs, international development
organizations, and multinational corporations. For each actor, I outline their interactions
with policymakers, explain how I measure their environmental advocacy activities, and
present data describing their advocacy activities across countries and over time.
3.1 The what and the why of transnational advocacy
Transnational policy advocates work across multiple countries to promote the adoption
and implementation of favored policies at the domestic and international levels. While
individuals can engage in transnational advocacy, most choose to work within organiza-
tions to leverage institutional resources (Haas 1992). To better understand transnational
advocacy, it is critical to consider how these transnational advocacy organizations are
structured, what they seek to achieve, and how they relate to domestic policy advocates.
3.1.1 What transnational advocates seek to achieve
There is a long history of people and organizations engaging in transnational advocacy.
Perhaps the earliest multinational corporation was the East India Company, which
engaged with local governments across the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere on trade,
manufacturing, and tax policy (Clegg 2017). As early as the 18th century, a transnational
advocacy network of Quakers coordinated anti-slavery campaigns in the United States
and the United Kingdom (David 2007). Transnational advocacy has rapidly expanded in
recent years, thanks in large part to modern forms of communication and the proliferation
of international conferences that have lowered the cost of international networking (Keck
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and Sikkink 1998).
Despite these developments, transnational advocacy is not always a major force on
all issues. Transnational advocacy tends to be more common for issue areas with high
stakes and high uncertainty, typically involving moral values, such as human rights (Risse-
Kappen et al. 1999) and violence against women (Keck and Sikkink 2014; Montoya
2013), or externalities, such as the environment (Pellow 2007; Pacheco-Vega 2015).
Multinational corporations may also be more likely to engage in transnational advocacy
on issues of trade, property rights, and regulations affecting their suppliers and customers
(Kim et al. 2019). In contrast, technical or peripheral issues may be dealt with primarily
through domestic processes, with little engagement from transnational advocates.
Transnational advocacy, like all policy advocacy, consists of two stages. In the first
stage, advocates seek to draw the attention of policymakers to the existence and urgency
of a problem and place it on the political agenda. Kingdon (1993) describes this process
as akin to surfers looking for a wave (typically, a focal event) to ride. When one comes
along, activists “paddle” to catch the wave’s momentum using a range of tactics, from
confrontational public campaigns and demonstrations to more collaborative lobbying and
capacity-building workshops. Having caught the attention of policymakers—legislators,
regulators, or judges (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2004)—advocates seek in the second
stage to shape the design, formation, and implementation of policies on their issues of
interest (Rietig 2016). In this setting, policy advocates seek to define the menu of policy
alternatives for time- and resource-limited policymakers and push for the selection of
their preferred options (Mintrom and Vergari 1996).
3.1.2 The organizational structure of transnational advocates
Transnational policy advocates define priorities and implement advocacy strategies in
multiple political contexts at the same time. Operating in a variety of jurisdictions
provides an opportunity for broad influence, but doing so risks incurring potentially high
coordination costs. To lower these costs, transnational advocacy organizations share
labor, funds, and information across national borders. The manner and extent to which
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a given organization coordinates its activities across jurisdictions depend on where its























































































































































































































































































At the centralized end of the spectrum, transnational advocates are embedded
in a single multinational organization consisting of a strong central body and weak
country-level representatives. These organizations may be established as for-profit
enterprises (multinational corporations, e.g., The Coca-Cola Corporation) or as not-for-
profit organizations (international NGOs, e.g., Conservation International). They may
also be government or intergovernmental institutions, such as the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) or the World Bank. In all these organizations,
strategic decisionmaking is largely centralized and subordinate peripheral bodies (i.e., the
field) are primarily tasked with providing information and feedback to the center (i.e.,
headquarters). As a result, the advocacy efforts of centralized transnational advocacy
organizations tend to be more targeted and the subject of extensive planning and
coordination.
At a more moderate degree of centralization, transnational advocates work as
multinational conglomerates. These organizations are structured with a weak central
body and strong peripheral bodies. Corporate groups may be organized in this fashion,
with corporate headquarters that delegate considerable authority to subsidiaries to such
a point that they operate as quasi-autonomous firms. For example, the ice cream
manufacturer Ben and Jerry’s is an independently operating subsidiary of Unilever, a
multinational consumer goods company. International NGOs, such as Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth, are also structured as multinational conglomerates. Multinational
conglomerates determine a minimal overall strategy, often through a collaborative process
with the active involvement of peripheral bodies. In practice, the central body delegates
many decisions regarding advocacy to the organization’s peripheral units, resulting in a
wider array of advocacy with a modest degree of coordination.
At the dispersed end of the spectrum, transnational advocates work as individuals
and organizations in political networks engaged in “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal
patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 91). These
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) lack a central body, functioning as fluid and
open collections of independent organizations. Some TANs have a formal designation,
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such as the Climate Action Network, a network of more than 1500 NGOs from 130
countries,1 while others are bound to each other only by shared values and informal
patterns of resource exchange. Flexible and porous structures, TANs attract a diverse
set of actors, from individual academics to domestic NGOs to multinational corporations,
seeking to promote ideas, norms, and policies that align with their shared values and
interests (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Zuin et al. (2019) describes an example of a TAN
in action, finding that NGOs, donors, practitioners, and academics contributed to the
spread of policies for integrated and community-led sanitation. The dispersed structure of
TANs means that their members engage in a broad array of loosely coordinated advocacy
activities.
Since my primary interest in this analysis is environmental policy leadership across the
full domain of environmental policy, I aggregate the activities of individual transnational
advocates within each type of actor. In so doing, I treat these organizations as components
of broad, informal transnational advocacy networks, reflecting the predilection for similar
organizations to coordinate and generate synergies while still allowing for variation in
advocacy activities across type.
3.1.3 Comparing transnational and domestic advocates
Transnational and domestic advocates both seek to influence policymakers, but they
differ in several ways. First, transnational advocates tend to be some of the most powerful
actors in their sector. Multinational corporations tend to be the largest exporters, employ
the most skilled workers, and be the most productive (Autor et al. 2020). Similarly,
international NGOs hold a dominant position over domestic NGOs in terms of resources
and access (Stroup and Wong 2017). Relative to international NGOs, “most of the
domestic NGOs in the developing world are weak, poorly funded, and hardly autonomous
catalysts of social change” (Longhofer et al. 2016, p. 1759). Consequently, transnational
advocates would appear more likely to effectively exercise influence over policy change
than domestic advocates.
1https://climatenetwork.org/, accessed April 28, 2021.
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The relationship between domestic and transnational advocates depends on the
extent to which they share values and policy preferences. If domestic and transnational
advocates share a common position, synergies may emerge, especially in the presence
of “bilateral activists” capable of facilitating resource and information flows between
transnational and domestic actors (Steinberg et al. 2001). For example, international
NGOs design programs with the explicit intent of empowering domestic NGOs with
aligned positions and helping them grow (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Longhofer et al.
2016). This relationship can be reciprocal, as domestic advocates can also enhance the
effectiveness of transnational advocates by providing legitimacy and adapting generic
advocacy strategies to local conditions. However, if transnational advocates hold different
policy preferences than domestic advocates, as is frequently the case for multinational
corporations (Kim and Milner 2021), they may eschew cooperation with their domestic
counterparts and compete with them for influence.
3.2 Policymaker incentives and disincentives for (envi-
ronmental) policy leadership
To understand why policymakers act as leaders in policy development, and environmental
policy in particular, I propose a theoretical framework that centers on the economic,
political, and problem-solving incentive structures in which policymakers operate.2 From
an economic perspective, rapidly adopting environmental policies and influencing policy
in other jurisdictions can reduce adjustment costs and increase macroeconomic stability
(Vogel 1997). Environmental policy innovation also creates economic co-benefits in
the form of employment, innovation, and productivity, as well as opportunities for
growth through international trade via technology export and stronger comparative
advantage in target markets (Héritier 1995; Jänicke and Wurzel 2019). Politically, policy
innovation provides opportunities for policymakers to claim credit for being proactive
(Harrison 1996), gain the esteem of their peers in other jurisdictions (Perkins and
2I focus in particular on environmental policy to make this discussion more concrete, but the incentives
and disincentives discussed here apply generally.
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Nachmany 2019; Busch and Jörgens 2005), and respond to policy demands from domestic
constituencies (Liefferink and Andersen 1998; Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2020) and from
peers abroad (Perkins and Nachmany 2019; Busch and Jörgens 2005). In terms of
problem-solving, policymakers may be genuinely motivated to ameliorate environmental
problems, exploring the solution space for optimal policies, overcoming coordination
problems inherent to transnational environmental problems, and even taking pleasure
in developing creative approaches to addressing problems (Héritier 1995).
However, policy leadership, especially policy innovation, does not come without
potential cost. Early policy adopters engage in trial-and-error when determining policy
settings, experiences from which later adopters can benefit (Parinandi 2020). New policies
can also be risky, with the potential for ineffectiveness or even failure—both in terms of
solving problems and providing political utility. In addition, policy innovation requires
human and financial resources, which are then not available for other purposes.
The costs of policy influence are less clear. While policy influence stems in part from
self-promotion (which requires resources, including reputational resources), influence also
comes from the learning and attention of other governments. Followers engage with
leaders to minimize their economic risk and maximize economic, political, social, and
environmental rewards (Torney 2019), as well as to reduce their search costs for effective
policies (Busch and Jörgens 2005). If the benefits of following are too low, would-be
leaders may fail to attract followers (Kushida 2011).
Whether the benefits of policy leadership outweigh the costs is an object of contention
among advocates for and against changes to the status quo, as this perception determines
political will for policy leadership (Héritier 1995; Jordan et al. 2003). When a
government decides not to pursue policy leadership on environmental issues, they may
re-allocate policymaking resources from environmental issues, for example by shrinking
the staffing and budgets of environmental ministries. Governments may also alter their
communications by removing references to environmental topics in their communications
(Davenport 2017) or even explicitly declaring their desire to act as a laggard on
environmental problems (Minnesma 2019). As described in greater detail in the following
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chapter, political will, in combination with information and capacity, determines whether
a country engages in policy leadership. If policymakers have sufficient information, are
capable of leading, and perceive the benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs, they will
pursue policy leadership. Otherwise, they will not.
3.3 Three levers connecting advocacy to policy change
Advocates have three types of strategies at their disposal to capture the attention and
shape the decisions of policymakers: information, capacity, and political will. These
strategies can be thought of as levers, or causal pathways that advocates selectively
activate according to their strategic incentives and political context. Transnational
advocates function similarly to domestic counterparts in their strategies and tactics
for policy change (Keck and Sikkink 1999), so much of the following applies to both
transnational and domestic advocates alike.
To activate the first lever, information, advocates capitalize on their expertise to
inform policymakers about problems and policy solutions. Many advocates employ
experts, both academics and experienced practitioners, who have specialized knowledge
of social and physical processes, the relationships between these processes, and the likely
consequences of policy alternatives (Haas 1992; Mattli and Woods 2009). These experts
share their knowledge with policymakers via reports, educational workshops, and direct
consultation to direct their attention to the existence of problems and an array of potential
policy solutions. For example, the international NGO Oceana released a widely-publicized
report in 2018 intended to sound the alarm about the practice of turning off ship-
tracking devices before entering protected areas to conceal illegal fishing (Malakry and
Lowell 2018). Policymakers often have too many demands on their time to develop deep
factual knowledge about the problems they are tasked with solving, so expert reports like
Oceana’s provide a valuable service for policymakers by drawing attention to problems,
simplifying complex decisions, defining policy alternatives, and explaining their relative
costs and benefits (Mintrom and Vergari 1996).
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To address the second lever, capacity, advocates work to build community and
institutional capacity for policymaking. Moving beyond simply providing information,
this approach aims to empower government policymakers by providing them with the
human and financial capacity to design and implement policy. Policymakers in many
countries may hesitate to enact complex policies, such as carbon pricing, if they lack
sufficient emissions monitoring and reporting tools (Eliasch 2008). To overcome these
deficits, advocates can transfer human and financial resources through grants and
technical workshops. A complementary approach is to build the capacity of domestic
advocacy organizations, strengthening these groups’ ability to define their priorities,
communicate their preferences, and hold recalcitrant policymakers to account (De Weijer
and Kilnes 2012).
In rare instances, advocates may even be invited to directly embed themselves in
government ministries. In Liberia, for example, the United Nations imposed an embargo
on timber exports during the Second Liberian War to weaken the regime of Charles
Taylor. At the end of the war, the United Nations agreed to lift the embargo if the
newly-installed government of Liberia created a new forestry law. To ensure the law met
international standards, the Government of Liberia invited the staff of an international
NGO, the Environmental Law Institute, to help design and implement their framework
forestry law.3 The sanctions were eventually lifted in 2006 following the enactment of the
new forestry law (Xu 2006).
To trigger the third lever, political will, advocates design pressure campaigns to
alter policymakers’ incentives to devote time, staff, and political capital to a particular
issue. These pressure campaigns may be pursued using the insider tactic of formal
lobbying of policymakers to persuade them to bring their preferences into alignment
(Brulle 2018). Although transnational advocates are often barred from lobbying
because of their foreign legal status (Steinberg et al. 2001; Bernstein and Cashore
2012), they often create local subsidiaries or designate allies to undertake this task
on their behalf (Lee 2020). An alternative approach is to wage an outsider campaign
3Interview on July 8, 2019 with Sandra Nichols Thiam, Environmental Law Institute
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via public communications that place pressure on policymakers (Kollman 1998), often
using confrontational naming-and-shaming tactics (Murdie and Davis 2012; Murdie and
Urpelainen 2015) and boycotts (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). When advocates have
limited direct access to policymakers, they may seek to mobilize external actors to bring
pressure on policymakers via international channels (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 1999). An
additional strategy available to advocates with sufficient resources, either individually
or in coalition with others, is to promise to make investments or threaten to withdraw
funding (Nye Jr 1974; Hunt et al. 2017; Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2020). Insider lobbying
tactics aim to persuade policymakers of the merit of advocates’ opinions, while outsider
tactics work indirectly, generating public support for advocates’ positions (Kollman 1998).
The lever advocates decide to use depends on their organizational characteristics (e.g.,
type, structure, history), the characteristics of the target policymaker (e.g., preference
alignment, resources, insulation from accountability), and the specific policy issue in
question (e.g., uncertainty, scale, potential consequences). Advocates may coordinate
their selection of tactics with others, with organizations adopting outsider tactics with the
intent of increasing the influence of insider allies (Aunio 2012). Advocates may even use
this insider/outsider strategy within a single organization. For example, organizations like
Greenpeace frequently stage confrontational public demonstrations while simultaneously
providing legal assistance to developing country governments at international climate
change negotiations.4
It is important to note that policy advocates are not always in favor of policy change.
In some instances, advocates instead want to convince policymakers to maintain the
status quo. Advocates may believe that a proposal is inappropriately stringent or,
conversely, insufficiently so. For example, opponents of policies mitigating climate change
in the United States include not only corporations that directly emit large amounts of
greenhouse gases, but also firms that buy and sell from carbon-intensive companies (Cory
et al. 2021).
These three levers provide a theoretical foundation for understanding how advocates
4Interview on November 13, 2017 with Caroll Muffett, Center for International Environmental Law.
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affect the policymaking process. It also provides the theoretical foundation for
building insights into circumstances under which advocates should be more or less
effective. Governments may be more sensitive to some levers than others – for example,
vulnerability to international pressure affects the effectiveness of naming-and-shaming
tactics (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015). Similarly, advocacy organizations have strategic
repertoires that they tend to use across different contexts (Stroup and Wong 2017). This
observation might lead to the expectation that, for example, advocates that prefer to work
via the political will lever may be less effective in isolated countries like North Korea or
Syria than organizations that use more collaborative strategies. While the three levers are
available to transnational advocates of all kinds, organizational structures, histories, and
missions may lead to variation in the use of different advocacy strategies across different
types of transnational advocates.
3.4 Hypotheses and enabling conditions for successful
transnational environmental advocacy
I anticipate that, in general, transnational environmental advocacy will catalyze envi-
ronmental policy leadership. In this section, I lay out my expectations for the impact
that international environmental NGOs, IDOs, and multinational corporations have on
environmental policy innovation and the creation of leader-follower relationships in en-
vironmental policymaking. I then consider the conditions under which transnational
environmental advocacy is likely to have a larger effect on environmental policy leader-
ship.
3.4.1 Hypotheses
I anticipate that governments will tend to display more environmental policy leadership
when there are more transnational environmental advocates present in a country because
these advocates will provide more information, build more capacity, and engage in more
pressure campaigns to raise political will. I also expect that governments will display
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higher levels of environmental policy leadership when countries that share transnational
environmental advocates in common have displayed higher levels of environmental policy
leadership in the past. These hypotheses can be expressed as:
H1a: States should display higher levels of environmental policy leadership
when transnational environmental advocates are more active.
H1b: States should display higher levels of environmental policy leadership
when states with transnational environmental advocates in common display
higher levels of environmental policy leadership.
Turning to the two dimensions of environmental policy leadership, I expect that
governments will tend to adopt environmental policies more quickly—raising their rate
of environmental policy innovation—when there are more transnational environmental
advocates present in their country. This hypothesis is motivated by the idea that when
there are more international environmental NGOs, IDOs, and multinationals present,
there are more actors providing policymakers with information, empowering policymakers
to enact policies, and attempting to convince policymakers to adopt advocates’ preferred
policies. This idea leads me to pose the following hypotheses:
H2a: States should be more innovative when more international environmen-
tal NGOs are active in that country.
H2b: States should be more innovative when IDOs provide more environ-
mental ODA funding in that country.
H2c: States should be more innovative when multinational corporations
engage in more environmental lobbying in that country.
Turning to environmental policy influence, I expect that countries will be more likely
to form leader-follower influence relationships when they share more ties via transnational
advocacy organizations. Transnational advocacy organizations need to be aware of policy
changes across multiple jurisdictions to be effective (Bernstein and Cashore 2012) and,
by way of their distinctive position of working in multiple jurisdictions at the same
51
time, transnational advocates are positioned to strategically stimulate policy diffusion
between countries. More specifically, transnational advocates can activate dynamics
of competition, learning, and socialization among policymakers by selectively sharing
examples of policies enacted by their peers abroad (Busch and Jörgens 2005).
The examples that transnational advocates choose to share with policymakers will
tend to be policies that align with their norms and values. Additionally, since
advocates typically seek to shape governance outcomes, they may also favor policies
that have a record of success in other jurisdictions. Even more pragmatically, given
that advocates face their own cognitive constraints, they may be particularly likely to
share policy examples in which their colleagues or peers work. Transnational advocates
play a distinctive role in amplifying governments’ international influence as go-betweens.
Accordingly, I pose the following hypotheses:
H3a: The more international environmental NGOs two states share in
common, the more likely they will be to develop a leader-follower influence
relationship.
H3b: The more environmental ODA funding that flows between two states,
the more likely they will be to develop a leader-follower influence relationship.
H3c: The more multinational corporations engaged in environmental lobby-
ing two states share in common, the more likely they will be to develop a
leader-follower influence relationship.
3.5 Enabling conditions for successful transnational
environmental policy advocacy
With the expectations described above in mind, the effectiveness with which transnational
advocates shape environmental policy is likely to depend on a variety of contextual
factors. One set of factors is the economic and political conditions in which transnational
advocates operate. It is not clear from the outset whether a country’s wealth enhances
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or diminishes transnational advocates’ effectiveness. On the one hand, analysts have
noted the importance of economic, human, and institutional capacity for environmental
policy leadership (Jänicke 2005; Lenschow et al. 2005). On the other hand, transnational
advocates may be more effective in poorer countries in which their expertise and resources
allow them to make a larger marginal impact on policy debates (Rajwani and Liedong
2015; Desbordes and Vauday 2007). Poorer countries may also be more vulnerable to
international pressure (Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2020). Steinberg et al. (2001) notes it
is “difficult to find a major conservation policy initiative of the past 35 years in [Costa
Rica or Bolivia] that did not receive significant support from overseas” (12). Local
political institutions also seem likely to matter, as they affect the strength of domestic civil
society (Bernstein and Cashore 2012), the access external actors have to the policymaking
process (Bonardi et al. 2005), and the difficulty with which policymakers can expropriate
investments made by multinational corporations (Jensen et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2015).
The existence of violent conflict may also matter for advocacy because it both makes it
more challenging for advocates to engage in their activities and the opportunity cost of
working on environmental issues (instead of, for example, security issues) may be higher
for policymakers.5
Transnational advocates may also vary in their effectiveness from one environmental
issue to another. Policymakers may be particularly open to engaging with transnational
advocates on issues that often have strong links to international trade, such as forestry
(Bernstein and Cashore 2012). Competition for influence over policy may be particularly
fierce on issues that involve highly concentrated sectors, such as energy. Complex issues
often struggle to capture the public’s interest (Bonardi and Keim 2005), narrowing the
set of constituencies that policymakers need to please and increasing the relative strength
of interested parties. However, issue complexity is usually related to the number of topics
it relates to, so more complex policies may require more veto players to agree and, due
to the wide range of interests involved, opposition may be more likely to arise.
The third set of factors relates to the nature of the activities in which transnational
5Interview on June 24, 2019 with Susan Lieberman, World Conservation Service
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advocates engage. Foreign actors are likely to suffer the “liability of foreignness” (Luo
and Mezias 2002) when they are new entrants to a political environment, so transnational
advocates are likely to be more effective when they have a longer history of working
in a country. Transnational advocacy organizations also have distinctive styles of
political engagement, often turning on their preference for insider tactics that are more
collaborative relative to outsider tactics that are more confrontational (Stroup and Wong
2017). The effectiveness of these tactics depends on the availability of access points
for weighing in on the policymaking process (Choi et al. 2015), the degree to which
policymakers are responsive to public opinion and tolerant of independent civil society
(Bernstein and Cashore 2012), and the presence and advocacy strategies of other advocacy
organizations (Hadden 2015; Hadden and Jasny 2019).
3.6 Tracing the activities of three types of transna-
tional environmental advocates
The three most prominent types of transnational advocacy organizations are large
international environmental NGOs, international development organizations (IDOs), and
large multinational corporations. In this section, I consider how each of these types of
advocates attempts to stimulate the adoption and spread of environmental policies using a
combination of strategic levers. I also describe how I measure the environmental advocacy
activities of these actors and present data describing their transnational environmental
advocacy activities over time. Despite the first-order importance of this question to
understanding the impact of transnational advocacy on policy change, I know of only
one prior work that has systematically collected data on the activities of a class of
transnational advocates over time.6
6Hicks et al. (2010) present and explain trends in the distribution of international environmental
development aid over time.
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3.6.1 International environmental NGOs
Scholars of transnational environmental advocacy have devoted considerable attention to
the activities of international environmental NGOs. They often occupy central positions
in transnational advocacy networks, working to harmonize values among network
members, create a common discourse and facilitate the distribution of information and
services (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Transnational environmental NGOs frequently and
explicitly take public positions in favor of increasing environmental policy leadership.
Greenpeace, for example, regularly releases press statements declaring their intolerance
for “apathy, excuses, and inaction from weak political leaders” (Greenpeace International
2019). Other NGOs, often those more reliant on maintaining the goodwill and funding of
governments, use less confrontational language to express support for the same goal. For
example, the World Wildlife Fund describes one of their core values as courage, explaining
“We demonstrate courage through our actions, we work for change where it’s needed, and
we inspire people and institutions to tackle the greatest threats to nature and the future of
the planet, which is our home.”7 Although international NGOs have disagreements about
the merits of specific environmental policies and desirable policy settings, they all seek
to foster greater environmental policy leadership, collaborate closely on environmental
policy issues, and attitudes toward these policies are similar enough to make general
observations about international environmental NGOs as a whole (Bomberg 2007).
International environmental NGOs are strategic actors in terms of both the locations
and topics on which they work. Obliged to seek funds from the public, philanthropy, or
government, environmental NGOs decide where to work and what to work on based on
a mix of their mission and opportunism.8 NGOs make every effort to work in locations
of core interest, but they are also willing to take advantage of opportunities to work in
new areas. For example, the Rainforest Alliance will make any effort necessary to find
funding for its work in rainforests, but also engages in places that are more tangential to
their mission, such as boreal forests in Canada.
7https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/our-values, accessed April 29, 2021.
8Interview on July 8, 2019 with Jessica Troell, Environmental Law Institute. Interview on June 17,
2019 with Lydia Slobodian, International Union for the Conservation of Nature.
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Environmental NGOs do not simply target easy countries with receptive and capable
governments. Instead, these NGOs tend to focus their efforts on filling in where they are
most needed, such as countries that repress domestic activism, have weaker institutions
for environmental governance, and struggle with environmental governance (Murdie and
Urpelainen 2015). Even the outbreak of violence does not necessarily force environmental
NGOs out of the country, although their activities may be curtailed.9 Some countries
have enacted legislation restricting or even banning the presence of international NGOs
(Musila 2019), so these organizations do not often report working in those jurisdictions—
but international environmental NGOs do sometimes nevertheless engage in activities in
such places, such as North Korea (World Wildlife Fund 2005).
Many environmental NGOs combine advocacy with service provision. For example,
Conservation International describes its work as “[c]ombining fieldwork with innovations
in science, policy, and finance.”10 In some countries, the local subsidiaries of international
environmental NGOs are formally registered with the government as lobbyists (e.g.,
World Wildlife Fund-US in the United States). These countries are typically wealthy,
so environmental NGOs tend to combine domestic policy advocacy with fundraising for
their international activities, either from government agencies or directly from the public.
In other, typically poorer, countries, these organizations engage in policy advocacy
indirectly, often couching their advocacy in terms of efforts to “strengthen the enabling
environment” for better providing their services.11 This rationale may reflect a true
de-prioritization of policy advocacy in these settings, or it may instead be a simple
consequence of the fact that it is illegal for foreign organizations to engage in formal
lobbying in many countries (Steinberg et al. 2001).
Despite considerable scholarship describing case studies of international environmental
NGO influence on domestic policy change (e.g., Steinberg et al. 2001; Hochstetler and
Keck 2007; Hrabanski et al. 2013), there are relatively few large-sample cross-national
analyses. Longhofer et al. (2016) finds that the number of international NGOs in a
9Interview on June 24, 2019 with Susan Lieberman, World Conservation Service
10https://www.conservation.org/about, accessed April 29, 2019.
11For example, Secretariat (2019) characterizes lobbying by NGOs against undesired policies as,
“drafting and pushing for policies that would enable them to fulfill their development tasks” (p. 5).
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country predicts the adoption of environmental framework laws, environmental impact
assessment (EIA) laws, and the creation of national environmental ministries. Frank et al.
(2007) comes to a similar conclusion, finding that countries with more international NGOs
adopted EIA legislation more quickly. Pacheco-Vega and Murdie (2020) finds that NGO
activity is related to environmental quality but does not examine whether this relationship
is due to policy change or alternative pathways, such as improved implementation or shifts
in public pro-environmental behaviors. I am aware of no previous quantitative analyses
of the role international NGOs may play as agents of policy diffusion, accelerating the
spread of policy ideas across the jurisdictions in which they work.
3.6.1.1 Approach to measuring the activity of large international environ-
mental NGOs
In this analysis, I focus on the largest international environmental NGOs, since these
organizations are the best-positioned to gain access to policymakers (Longhofer et al.
2016; Stroup and Wong 2017). I identify large international environmental NGOs as
those that, as of 2019, attract at least $10 million USD in 2019 annual revenue, are active
in more than ten countries, and engage in project-centered work programs (as opposed
to primarily product certification, for example). As indicated in Table 3.A.1, the eleven
qualifying international environmental NGOs are Conservation International, Flora and
Fauna International, Friends of the Earth, Global Witness, Greenpeace, The Nature
Conservancy, Oceana, Rainforest Alliance, World Conservation Society, World Resources
Institute, and the World Wildlife Fund. All these NGOs were established before the year
2000 except for Oceana, which was founded in 2001, and they are all are headquartered in
the Global North, specifically in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
To assess the effect of large international environmental NGOs on environmental
policy leadership, it is necessary to first understand where these organizations have
worked over time. The most widely used measure of international NGO activities is the
Union of International Associations’ Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of
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International Associations (UIA) 2021). However, the database has at least one significant
shortcoming: the Yearbook only asks where each organization has a permanent office or
members. This approach overlooks international NGOs’ common practice of working on
projects in countries in which they do not have a permanent office.12
Accordingly, I created an original longitudinal dataset of the activities of large
international environmental NGO activities. I measure each NGO’s activities using a
binary indicator of whether they claim to have implemented a campaign or project in
a given country in a given year. Campaigns are often designed with the explicit goal
of policy change, while projects typically consist of capacity building and/or technical
assistance components, both of which may make the adoption of environmental policies
more likely. To locate these claims, I examined nearly every annual report published by
each of the eleven qualifying international environmental NGOs between 2000 and 2019,
as well as versions of their websites cached on the Internet Archive (https://archive.org/).
Most of these documents contain a section entitled “Where we work” consisting of a map
or list of countries. In some cases, no single list of countries was available, so I was obliged
to search through narrative descriptions of their activities for mentions of the countries
in which they worked. With these data in hand, I aggregate to the country-year level by
counting the number of large international NGOs working in each country for each year
between 2000 and 2019.13 I also calculate the number of large international NGOs shared
between each country dyad-year.
For example, the 2013 annual report for Conservation International features a detailed
map indicating the location of its offices, national programs, subnational projects, and
investments via partners in a total of 71 countries.14. In these countries, Conservation
International conducted campaigns and programming to, among many others, expand
forest and marine protected areas, the conservation of indigenous lands, and support
sustainable coffee farming. Based on these data, I incremented by one the 2014 count
12NGOs often choose to manage projects from regional offices.
13Longhofer et al. (2016) and Pacheco-Vega and Murdie (2020) use a similar approach using a different
dataset of NGO activities.
14https://www.conservation.org/docs/default-source/japan-documents/ci_fy14_annualreport.pdf,
accessed June 23, 2021
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of active large international environmental NGOs for each of the 71 countries in which
Conservation International worked, as well as the 2014 count of shared NGOs for the
2,485 (71 ∗ 70/2) relevant dyads.
The main benefit of this approach is that it is likely to be an up-to-date and
comprehensive measure of the activities of large environmental NGOs. The staff writing
annual reports and designing the website are motivated to list every country in which
they work to better present an image of productivity to their Board of Directors, donors,
and the general public. Archived and cached versions of the reports provide a reliable
historical record and, by using a minimal definition of country activities, they provide
information that can be compared and aggregated. As a result, I more accurately measure
the geographic distribution of international NGO activity than more narrow measures,
such as the data collected by the Yearbook.
Of course, this approach is not without its drawbacks. Obtaining and reading
these materials is a time-intensive process, so I was only able to examine the largest
environmental NGOs. Also, most international NGOs only started publishing digital
versions of their annual reports and maintaining informative websites after the year 2000
and I was not able to access enough physical versions of these reports to the complete
collection of data for prior years. This limitation is unfortunate, as many international
environmental NGOs expanded rapidly in the 1990s (Olsen 1996). Additionally, as
is the case with the Yearbook, each organization’s activities are reduced to a simple
dichotomy of presence or absence, and the activities of each NGO and each year of
NGO presence are weighted equally. This binary measure fails to capture each NGO’s
distinctive characteristics, their varied legitimacy and sources of funding, and the extent
and nature of their advocacy activities, all of which may have important implications for
the NGO’s impact on policy change (Stroup and Wong 2017). Despite this limitation, a
binary presence indicator using data drawn from annual reports is the most reliable and
comparable metric available for the advocacy activities of international NGOs.
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3.6.1.2 The activity of large international environmental NGOs, 2000–2019
Figure 3.2 shows the average number of large international environmental NGOs present
per country between 2000 and 2019. Even though much of the growth in international
environmental NGOs is thought to have taken place in the 1990s, before the period
of analysis, there is still a modest increase in the activities of large international
environmental NGOs since 2000. Starting from an average of 2.29 NGOs per country
in 2000, this figure rose to a peak of 2.99 NGOs per country in 2011 before falling back
to between 2.55 and 2.79 NGOs per country.
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Figure 3.2: Average number of large international environmental NGOs present per
country, 2000–2019.
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Figure 3.3 displays the geographical distribution of international environmental NGOs
in 2019. As of 2019, there are 154 countries in which at least one large international
environmental NGO is active (an 11% increase over the total in 2000), 119 countries with
at least two NGOs active (an 18% increase over the total in 2000), and 41 countries in
which five or more NGOs are working (a 21% increase over the total in 2000). As a result,
there is now at least one large international environmental NGO present in approximately
80% of countries recognized by the United Nations. There are only a handful of countries
in which nearly all large environmental NGOs work; all eleven NGOs are present in
the United States and ten of the eleven are active in Brazil, Indonesia, and the United
Kingdom in 2019. There are also distinct regional trends, with tropical countries tending





































































































3.6.2 International development organizations
Foreign aid, broadly construed, has existed for centuries as a means of influencing the
policies and activities of other countries. Historical examples of foreign aid include
tributes Rome received from its allies for military protection, loans France extended
to Russia for the purchase of military equipment following their alliance in 1895, and a
small fund included in the first appropriation act of the United States Congress in 1789
for bribing foreign policymakers (Morgenthau 1962). However, the modern phenomenon
of international development is relatively new, originating with the 1948 Marshall Plan to
rebuild Europe following World War II (Hart 2010). As such, international development
has historically been organized by countries in the global North (Rowlands 2008),
facilitated by international organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank Group,
and the Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The core mission of international development organizations is to distribute official
development assistance (ODA), meaning grants or low-interest loans to accelerate
improvements in economic development and social welfare via targeted interventions
(OECD/DAC 2015).15 ODA can be provided either on a bilateral basis by dedicated
agencies of national governments (bilateral funders, such as Norway’s Agency for
Development Cooperation) or via international organizations (multilateral funders, such
as the World Bank). As observed by Bernstein et al. (2010), one of the primary purposes
of ODA is to encourage policy change: “the ultimate goal of many international and
transnational attempts to address global problems is to influence domestic policymaking
processes rather than simply to constrain or modify the external behavior of states” (p.
111).
IDOs engage in activities that target the levers of information, capacity, and political
will to improve welfare via changes in target countries’ enabling environment, or their
political institutions and policies. These activities range from educational and training
workshops to multi-stakeholder co-governance partnerships to technical assistance with
15In their aggregate, these interventions constitute a global project sometimes termed “big D”
Development, which should be distinguished from “little d” development, which describes the unfolding
and interconnected processes of economic creation and destruction (Hart 2010).
64
legislation, regulation, and implementation. While IDOs rarely engage in formal lobbying,
they attempt to buy direct access to the policymaking process by conditioning countries’
eligibility for projects on the adoption of specific policies (Bernstein and Cashore 2012).
For example, because the government of Sri Lanka was willing to enact a policy
authorizing public-private partnerships for infrastructure development in 1992, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided $10 million in technical
assistance to strengthen the law’s implementation (Appuhami et al. 2011).
Most ODA flows from countries in the Global North to the Global South, as
governments in Global South countries often lack sufficient human and financial resources
to design and implement development projects at scale (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).
The countries that receive ODA may genuinely be those most in need of assistance or
hold the most potential for improvement. Environmental conditions, for example, predict
which countries receive environment-specific ODA (Hicks et al. 2010). However, Hicks and
colleagues are careful to note that these problem-specific factors have a smaller impact
on the distribution of environment-specific ODA than generic economic factors, such as
trade ties, and political factors, such as colonial legacies.
Scholars have extensively studied the impact of IDOs on domestic policy change.
Although some analysts question the extent to which IDOs are successful in their attempts
to shape the political enabling environment (Gordon 1992), most studies find that IDOs
play an important role in stimulating policy change. Examples of instances of successful
policy promotion by IDOs include public-private partnerships (Appuhami et al. 2011),
the privatization of the electricity sector (Gore et al. 2019), the creation of environmental
ministries (Aklin and Urpelainen 2014), renewable energy policies (Baldwin et al. 2019),
and small-scale fisheries management (Hamilton et al. 2021). However, this literature
faces the lingering risk of selection bias. These studies examine only one or two policies
at a time and it seems likely that policy promotion efforts are deemed worthy of study
(and publication) in part due to these policies’ widespread adoption.
65
3.6.2.1 Approach to measuring the environmental activity of IDOs
In this analysis, I consider the aggregate activities of IDOs reporting to the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The thirty bilateral donors that are members
of the DAC, along with closely aligned multilateral organizations like the World Bank,
constitute the mainstream official development community (McEwan and Mawdsley
2012).16 While the DAC does not direct donor practices, it coordinates development
activities via a series of agreements among bilateral and multilateral aid donors (McEwan
and Mawdsley 2012).17 Perhaps the most high-profile DAC initiative of recent years was
the High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, which took place between 2003 and 2011
and produced a set of principles and quantified targets for aid effectiveness. Through
these efforts, while each IDO retains distinctive priorities and approaches, all DAC
members agree on a common set of ‘best practice” recommendations and targets on
topics like gender, environment, participatory development, democratic governance, and
peacebuilding (Inada 2013). As such, the development activities of DAC members can
be viewed as manifestations of a single overarching model of international development
(Kondoh et al. 2015).18
ODA typically takes the form of discrete projects, which direct funds to pay for the
personnel and materials necessary to produce a specified set of outputs (programmatic
activities) and outcomes (changes in behavior or institutions) in the pursuit of an
objective (economic, social, and environmental development goals). Each project is
designed to unfold over a given period of time (typically three or five years), although
projects are often renewed or revised. To illustrate, a development organization could
allocate $5 million over five years at a rate of $1 million per year to pay for the construction
16See Table 3.A.2 for the set of DAC-reporting countries included in this analysis.
17These agreements include the DAC New Development Strategy in 1996, Rome Declaration on
Harmonization in 2003, the Memorandum of the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Results in
2004, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, and Busan
Outcome in 2011.
18Official providers of international development funds that do not contribute to the OECD DAC
are Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa. China and
India approach international development differently from DAC countries, emphasizing state-directed
commercial investment, trade-related concessional financing, and cultural exchange. Using the DAC’s
definition of official development assistance, the largest non-OECD DAC funders are China ($4.4 billion
USD in 2018) and India ($1.2 billion USD in 2018) (OECD 2020). The other non-DAC development
funders adhere more closely to the DAC model (Kondoh et al. 2015).
66
of bicycle paths (an output) to increase the number of people commuting by bicycle (an
outcome), leading to a reduction of air pollution (an objective). IDOs may also establish
programs that coordinate activities across related projects.
I measure the environmental activity of IDOs as the amount of committed ODA
funding for environmental projects or programs by DAC-reporting IDOs per capita in a
country in a given year. I use the volume of funding rather than the number of projects
to account for variation in project size. I define an environmental project as any project
or program that IDOs designate as addressing environmental issues as a principal or
important secondary objective. To locate these projects, I examined OECD’s Creditor
Reporting System-Aid Activity (CRS-AA) database. The CRS-AA database provides a
compilation of all individual ODA projects and programs by IDOs reporting to the DAC.
Each entry represents a unique project and contains a variety of financial and descriptive
information, including indicators of objectives relating to climate change adaptation,
climate change mitigation, biodiversity, desertification, or local environmental issues.
From these indicators, I construct a binary environmental project variable set to one if a
project’s primary or important secondary objective relates to any environmental issue and
zero otherwise. Using this measure, I then calculate committed funds for environmental
projects per capita across all IDOs for each country-year.19 For developing countries,
this measure is all incoming funds for environmental ODA. For developed countries, this
measure is all outgoing (and incoming, if any) funds for environmental ODA. I also
calculate the amount of environmental ODA funding committed from funder to recipient
at the country-dyad year level.20
Extending the hypothetical bicycle paths example introduced above, the CRS-
AA would record the project and indicate its environmental content using the local
19I omit projects that do not have specific recipient countries listed, such as regional projects. I
also omit debt relief and humanitarian aid, as these expenditures are not interventions likely to lead
to environmental policy change. I use commitments instead of disbursements because the CRS-AA has
incomplete data on disbursements for screened projects. If the database indicated funds disbursed but
not funds committed, I use funds disbursed instead.
20Although IDOs tend to be agencies of developed country governments and work in developing
countries, they do not always do so. Between 2002 and 2019, DAC donors spent $2.9 billion USD
on environmental projects in 15 developed countries, including Chile, Saudi Arabia, and Slovenia.
Accordingly, I treat all dyads as potentially non-zero observations.
67
environmental issue indicator. This project would then increase the environmental ODA
in the recipient country by $1 million for each year during the project’s five-year lifetime.
It would also increase the directed dyad between the IDO’s host country and the recipient
country by $1 million for each of the project’s five years.
This approach has several benefits. It uses project-level data, allowing me to
distinguish between environment and non-environment ODA. Additionally, it includes
both projects that have environmental issues as a primary objective and projects in which
environmental issues have been mainstreamed into project design as important secondary
objectives, an increasingly common practice that has been an important limitation of prior
data on environmental aid (e.g., Hicks et al. 2010). Finally, by aggregating over all IDOs,
I account for the frequent collaboration among DAC donors, who typically endeavor to
create synergies and avoid creating duplicate projects. For example, a combination of
multilateral development banks (International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank) and USAID successfully induced Sri Lanka to embrace public-
private partnerships for infrastructure development (Appuhami et al. 2011). At the same
time, by measuring the volume of environmental ODA funding flowing between each
funder-recipient dyad, I treat bilateral IDOs as instruments of foreign policy for donor
governments that are likely to create leader-follower policymaking relations (Bernstein
et al. 2010; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).
There are three main drawbacks to this measurement approach. First, CRS-AA only
includes data on the IDOs that choose to report to the DAC, omitting the activities of
Chinese and Indian IDOs that do not report to the DAC. This omission is unfortunate
because, while only a relatively small proportion of China and India’s foreign aid can
be classified as ODA (OECD 2020), their use of state-directed commercial investment,
trade-related concessional financing, and cultural exchange is substantial and is likely
to generate policy change as a result.21 Second, the number of organizations reporting
to the DAC has increased over time. This changing set of IDOs hinders longitudinal
21While some databases exist that compile Chinese and Indian ODA (e.g., https://www.aiddata.org/),
it is challenging to use these data in conjunction with CRS-AA data because they generally do not use
the CRS-AA environmental indicators.
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comparisons, although this challenge can be addressed by subtracting each country-year
value by the relevant year’s average value (in the context of a statistical regression, this
calculation is equivalent to year fixed effects). Third, the CRS-AA database ramped up its
screening projects for environmental objectives over time, rising from 27% of ODA funding
screened for at least one environmental indicator in 2002 to 60% in 2019. This change
means that not only does the measure assume the proportion of environmental projects in
unscreened projects equals the proportion of environmental projects in screened projects,
but it also assumes that this proportion is constant over time. That being said, the
project-level DAC data provides an unparalleled picture of environmental ODA spending
and its evolution over time. Moreover, it is possible to run extreme bounds sensitivity
tests to understand the extent to which results change with different assumptions about
the prevalence of environmental objectives in unscreened projects.
3.6.2.2 The environmental activity of IDOs, 2002–2019
Figure 3.4 shows the amount of funding for environmental ODA projects, funding screened
for environmental content, and overall ODA funding for each year between 2002 and 2019
(all values in constant 2019 USD). All three variables have shown steady growth over this
period. In terms of relative growth, while overall ODA funding increased by 75% over
this period, environmental ODA increased by 350%. However, this difference in growth
rates may be due in part to the increasing percentage of ODA screened for environmental
content. In 2002, only 38% of ODA was screened for environmental content, rising to
66% in 2019. During this period, the percentage of screened ODA with environmental
objectives varied from approximately 20% in 2004–2008 to more than 40% in 2017–2019.
The maps below display the geographical distribution of environmental ODA funding
per capita in 2019 for donors (Figure 3.5) and recipients (Figure 3.6). In 2019, the
CRS-AA database recorded $47.4 billion USD in committed funds for environmental
ODA projects and programs. Bilateral IDOs committed $40.9 billion USD (86%) of all
environmental ODA funding, led by Japan ($13.3 billion USD, 33% of the total), France
($10.8 billion USD, 27% of the total), and Germany ($6.3 billion, 15% of the total). 143
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Figure 3.4: Overall ODA funding, funding screened for environmental content, and
environmental ODA funding, 2002–2019.
Overall ODA funding in black, environment-screened ODA in grey, and environmental
ODA in green. The figure for recipients omits debt forgiveness and humanitarian
assistance, as well as ODA from non-DAC reporting organizations, such as India and
China.
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countries received environmental ODA funding, but 43% of environmental ODA funding
was directed to just 10 countries. India and Bangladesh received the most environmental
ODA funding in 2019. India’s largest environmental ODA project was a $537 million
USD concessional loan from Japan for a public transit project in Mumbai. Bangladesh’s
largest environmental ODA project was a $287 billion USD concessional loan from Japan























































































































































































































































































































Multinational corporations (MNCs) are profit-seeking firms that own or control the
production of goods or services in at least two countries at the same time (Kim and
Milner 2021). Estimates vary, but there are at least 80,000 non-financial multinational
corporations with more than 230,000 foreign subsidiaries, accounting for 23% of all
employment and 33% of global output (De Backer and Miroudot 2018). Relative to
domestic firms, multinationals tend to be larger, more productive, employ more skilled
workers, and spend more on research and development (Bernard et al. 2009; Autor et al.
2020). For the largest corporations, firms with $1 billion USD in annual revenue or more,
42% of all sales take place outside of their home country (Manyika et al. 2018).
Corporations engage in political activity to influence the decisions of government
policymakers, who set rules and control resources that shape the markets in which
firms compete (Baron 1995; Coen 1997). Since multinationals frequently opt to create
specialized subsidiaries and form global value chains spanning multiple jurisdictions
(Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990), they have a particularly strong incentive to engage
proactively with policymakers, secure favorable regulations, and ensure smooth operations
across borders (Baysinger 1984; Sundaram and Black 1992; Hillman and Wan 2005).
Employees at multinational corporations may also believe it to be their duty to use their
positions to promote social welfare out of a sense of corporate citizenship (Crane et al.
2008; Scherer et al. 2013). For these reasons, multinationals are more likely than their
domestic counterparts to engage with policymakers about political issues, spend more on
lobbying expenditures, and lobby on a more diverse set of issues (Kim and Milner 2021;
Kim et al. 2019).
Outside of their home country, multinationals are obliged to lobby via their
subsidiaries (Lee 2020). The subsidiaries of multinationals face challenges to acting as
effective advocates if they are perceived to be foreign entities (Luo and Mezias 2002) or
if they lack local political knowledge and contacts (Yan and Chang 2018). Corporate
headquarters may try to devise universal approaches to political activities (Mahini
1988) that collide with the reality of varied government structures, issue relevance,
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and strategy effectiveness (Blumentritt and Nigh 2002). However, these challenges
are relatively small compared to the advantages enjoyed by multinationals (Wöcke and
Moodley 2015). In addition to substantial economic resources and a skilled workforce,
multinationals can make credible threats of relocation and, at the corporate level, have
deep experience working with public officials (Desbordes and Vauday 2007). Moreover,
most governments, especially those in developing countries, are enthusiastic supporters of
multinationals, often in the belief that multinationals accelerate economic development
by more productively exploiting national resources than domestic firms and providing
financial resources for investment that governments lack (Desbordes and Vauday 2007;
Iftinchi et al. 2018). As a result, the subsidiaries of multinationals are some of the most
powerful actors in the countries in which they operate (Jensen et al. 2012).
Firms have three primary strategies at their disposal to advocate for favored policies
(Hillman and Hitt 1999). The most direct strategy is to change purchase access to
the policy process and alter political will by providing policymakers with campaign
contributions, political action committees, government membership on company boards,
and bribes (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Lawton et al. 2013).22 A somewhat more nuanced
approach is to engage in formal lobbying and informal consultation, offering their
technical expertise to inform policymakers and empower policymakers by reducing their
uncertainty about the consequences of different policy alternatives (Young 2012). The
least direct strategy is to wage political campaigns via the media (Bonardi and Keim
2005), allied civil society organizations (Beyers and De Bruycker 2018), and the public
(Kollman 1998). Multinationals can also use a “boomerang” advocacy strategy (Keck
and Sikkink 1998) by inducing politically powerful multilateral institutions to weigh in
on their behalf (Nose 2014).
Multinationals are well-positioned to act as agents of policy diffusion (Rajwani and
Liedong 2015). Confronted with a different set of regulatory requirements in each
country, they have a strong incentive to pursue regulatory uniformity across jurisdictions
to maximize operational efficiency (Vogel 1997; Yaziji 2004). While this dynamic does
22Desbordes and Vauday (2007) notes that the 1997 OECD Anti-bribery convention likely reduced the
use of bribery by multinationals and increased the use of conventional lobbying activities.
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not imply convergence in specific policy settings—multinationals are likely to reflect the
diversity of policy positions of their home countries (Prakash and Potoski 2007)—it does
indicate that multinationals should hasten the adoption and shape the spread of policy
ideas among the jurisdictions in which they work.
Beyond the core issues of free trade, investment protections, and capital mobility
(Milner 1988; Frieden 1991; Osgood et al. 2017), multinationals actively seek to
shape regulations affecting their global value chains (Kim et al. 2019), such as labor
practices (Scherer and Palazzo 2007) and environmental protection (Garcia-Johnson
2000). Garcia-Johnson (2000) points out that, despite popular perceptions to the
contrary, multinationals often favor more proactive governance, especially in developing
countries. Most multinationals are based in Global North countries with long histories of
environmental policymaking (De Backer and Miroudot 2018). Since multinationals are
often expected to follow the rules, or at least the spirit of the rules, of their home countries
when operating abroad (Doorey 2011), firms have an incentive to lobby host governments
to level the playing field by enacting similar policies. Multinationals from these countries
are also already adapted to meeting relatively stringent environmental standards, placing
them in an advantageous position relative to domestic firms if host governments adopt
similar laws. This dynamic has been described in the domestic United States context as
the “California effect” (Vogel 1997, 2018). Of course, this logic likely does not extend to
countries that already have stringent environmental regulations, as domestic firms will
have adapted and become more competitive relative to their multinational counterparts.
In these contexts, multinationals may act to minimize their policy exposure by lobbying
in favor of the status quo (Brulle 2018; Cory et al. 2021), stymieing attempts to adopt
new policy ideas and weakening environmental policy leadership.
Multinationals are strategic in choosing the countries in which they work. The
opportunity to enter large consumer markets, access natural resources, knowledge, and
specific technologies, and benefit from favorable financial and tax legislation is thought
to impact these decisions (De Backer and Miroudot 2018). Firms also prioritize their
ability to protect their investments from punitive and capricious government policies
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(Vernon 1971; Henisz 2000). Toward this end, multinationals tend to favor countries that
have more convoluted policymaking processes, with the idea that systems with more veto
players will both have more difficulty in expropriating investments and offer more access
points to influence policy (Choi et al. 2015). Similarly, multinationals may seek out allies
in civil society to raise the political cost of expropriation (Jensen et al. 2012). However,
this strategy comes at a cost, as giving more space to interest groups makes the market
for influence over policymaking more competitive (Bonardi et al. 2005).
While there is substantial work on the advocacy efforts of multinationals, the
determinants of their strategies, and the process by which these strategies are selected,
there is less work on the implications of corporate political advocacy for policy outcomes.
Although Rajwani and Liedong (2015) conclude that corporate political activity aimed at
inducing policy outcomes is generally successful, the dependent variable in many of these
studies is firm self-reports of advocacy efficacy (e.g., Desbordes and Vauday 2007; Choi
et al. 2015) rather than intersubjective observations of policy change. Moreover, there are
few, if any, studies that consider outcomes across a wide range of policies, raising the risk
of selection bias. Similarly, while the policies promoted by multinationals’ subsidiaries
are thought to be interdependent across countries, there is little systematic evidence of
this effect (Puck et al. 2018).
3.6.4 Approach to measuring the environmental advocacy activ-
ity of multinational corporations
In this analysis, I focus on the lobbying activities of the multinational firms listed as
components of the S&P 500.23 These corporations are some of the largest firms in
the world, with a total capital value of more than $33 trillion USD. I measure each
firm’s environmental lobbying effort in terms of the country-firm-issue-year, meaning the
amount of money each firm spent lobbying a given country on a given issue in a given
year. The procedure for constructing this measure consists of two parts: what firms
lobby on and where they work. To my knowledge, this is the first global measure of
23As of May 7, 2021, 497 of the 500 S&P 500 firms operate in at least two countries.
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multinational political advocacy.
To establish what firms lobby on, I turn to the LobbyView database, which compiles
official disclosure forms filed by organizations lobbying the United States government
(Kim 2018).24 For each firm in the S&P 500, I calculate how much each multinational
firm spent lobbying the United States governments on fifteen environmental topics for
each year between 2000 and 2019. I then aggregate this spending into lobbying on
either traditional environmental issues or secondary environmental issues, with the latter
relating primarily to natural resource use rather than flora, fauna, and environmental
media.25 I make three key assumptions at this stage: 1) firms’ distribution of issue
importance does not vary across countries, 2) firms’ distribution of issue importance is
independent of what other firms lobby on, and 3) firms that do not file lobbying disclosures
in the United States do not engage in lobbying elsewhere. Although these assumptions are
unlikely to be strictly true, they are reasonable in the absence of additional cross-national
data on corporate environmental lobbying.
To establish where firms work, I use the Orbis database, a product published
by the Bureau van Dijk.26 The Orbis database contains information on nearly 400
million companies worldwide, including location, estimated size, and corporate ownership.
Table 3.1 summarizes the four categories for estimated firm size, consisting of Small (<1
million EUR per year), Medium (>1 million EUR per year), Large (>10 million EUR
per year), or Very large (>100 million EUR per year).
Table 3.1: Categories and examples of Orbis firm size estimates
Category
Estimated revenue
(EUR per year) Example
Small < 1 million Kimberly-Clark Zimbabwe (Private) Limited
Medium > 1 million Clorox Uruguay S.A.
Large > 10 million Cisco Systems Capital Korea Ltd.
Very large > 1000 million IBM Danmark ApS
24https://www.lobbyview.org/, accessed May 4, 2021
25Of the fifteen topics, ten are traditional environmental issues—air & atmosphere, energy, environmen-
tal procedures (e.g., environmental impact assessment), fisheries, forestry, land & soil, mineral resources,
waste & hazardous substances, water, wild species & ecosystems—and five are secondary environmental
issues—agricultural & rural development, cultivated plants, food & nutrition, livestock, marine issues.
26https://orbis.bvdinfo.com/, accessed on May 4, 2021.
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For each firm-year, I use data from Orbis to identify the estimated size of the largest
corporate group member (ultimate owner, subsidiary, or branch) in each country. For
this step, I assume that firms lobby in proportion to their financial presence in a country.
Using the Orbis database, I establish the date at which each subsidiary entered the current
corporate group either through incorporation or acquisition. Due to data limitations in
Orbis, I only consider firms that are current corporate group members and omit firms
that have been sold in the past.
Next, I combine what firms lobby on and where they work into a single measure. I first
estimate the amount of money each firm spends on lobbying in a given country by scaling
the firm-year lobbying expenditure on traditional and secondary environmental issues in
the U.S. by the estimated size of the largest subsidiary in the focal country relative to the
estimated size of its largest U.S. subsidiary. This step produces estimates of the funds
each firm spent lobbying each country on both traditional and secondary environmental
issues in each year between 2000 and 2019. I express these estimates in terms of dollars
of lobbying expenditure per billion dollars of the host country’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) to better represent the influence of multinational lobbying relative to the size
of the local economy. As a result, I treat a dollar spent by multinationals lobbying in
countries with strong domestic firms, such as the United States or the United Kingdom,
as less than a dollar spent by multinationals in countries with weaker competition for
lobbying influence by domestic firms, such as Singapore or Ireland. As a dyadic measure,
I take the straightforward approach by counting the number of multinationals working
in both countries and engaged in any amount of environmental lobbying.
As an illustrative example, consider a hypothetical company that is classified as a
Very large company in the United States, with revenues in excess of 100 million EUR
per year. In 2015, this company spent $8 million (80%) on energy issues. This company
has a Large Canadian subsidiary, meaning it has revenues greater than 10 million EUR
(but less than 100 million EUR). Since the Canadian subsidiary is approximately one-
tenth (using minimum break points between size classes) as large as the U.S. subsidiary, I
estimate that the Canadian subsidiary spent $800,000 lobbying the Canadian government
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on energy issues in 2015. The dyadic measure would indicate that the US and Canada
share one multinational corporation in common that engages in environmental lobbying.
To understand why I undertook this measurement approach, it is helpful to consider
some alternative methodologies. First, I could scale lobbying expenses by the overall
revenue of the ultimate owner instead of using the estimated size of the largest country
subsidiary. This option aligns with Lee’s (2020) observation that small subsidiaries
of large firms engage in outsize lobbying in the United States, but it does not allow
firms to vary in their lobbying intensity across countries within a firm-year, an essential
characteristic for a satisfactory measure of multinational lobbying activities. Second, I
could scale lobbying expenses by the count of subsidiaries or branches in a country, which
provides a rough proxy for how much business a firm engages in with a given country
while allowing differentiation in geographical presence within a firm-year. However, this
approach assumes the size of each subsidiary is equal, which seems like an untenable
assumption. Third, I could scale lobbying expenses by the sum of subsidiary revenues
in each country. In theory, this strategy would be capable of representing each firm’s
aggregate presence, rather than just its largest representative. Unfortunately, reported
revenues for subsidiaries are rarely reported in Orbis and these revenues are inconsistently
reported as a mix of unconsolidated and consolidated (corporate group-level) revenue
reports.
A strength of this measure is that nearly every firm in the Orbis database has an
estimated size, allowing for differentiation in geographical presence within a firm-year.
Alternative, more precise measures, such as subsidiary revenue, are only sporadically
reported. Another strength of this measure is that it considers variation in the size of
multinationals’ subsidiaries, rather than the overall size of the corporation. It reflects the
idea that the characteristics of multinationals’ subsidiaries matter for their effectiveness
as policy advocates. For example, large subsidiaries often have more resources, more
political clout, higher visibility, and stand to gain larger benefits from policy advocacy
(Vernon 1971; Deephouse 1996; Schuler et al. 2002). A third benefit of restricting the
sample to the S&P 500 is that most of these firms are based in the United States, meaning
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they are more likely than most multinationals to engage in lobbying for policy and less
likely to use more ad hoc forms of advocacy, such as bribery (Yu and Lee 2021).
There are several weaknesses with this measurement approach. First, it underweights
firms with many small subsidiaries in a country, which would be challenging to aggregate
using the relatively blunt size measure. A second, related challenge is that Orbis does
not provide estimates of how certain it is about its size estimates, so it is not clear
how much error exists in the database. A more substantive, third concern with this
approach is that it does not account for the increasingly prevalent practice of substituting
corporate affiliates with independent contractors (De Backer and Miroudot 2018). A
notable example of this practice is Apple’s contracts with the Taiwanese firm Foxconn
to manufacture iPhones in China (Liang 2016). Fourth, the measure does not include
activities by trade associations, which can be important venues for collective action by
firms (Cory et al. 2021). However, this gap is offset by evidence that multinationals are
more likely than domestic firms to engage in political activities on their own instead of
relying on coalitions (De Figueiredo and Richter 2014). A fifth and final drawback is the
risk that multinational firms may take opposing positions on enacting policies, leading
to an underestimate of their true influence (Hillman et al. 2004). However, it should be
noted that the firms would need to disagree on the merit of enacting any kind of policy,
rather than specific policy settings, for offsetting effects to appear. More generally, despite
these shortcomings, my approach provides plausible estimates of corporate environmental
lobbying around the world and over time, the first of their kind. If and when comparable
data on corporate environmental lobbying become available, these estimates could be
even further improved.
3.6.4.1 The environmental advocacy activity of multinational corporations,
2000–2019
Figure 3.7 shows the total estimated amount of money spent on lobbying by multinational
S&P 500 firms across all countries and on traditional and secondary environmental issues
in each year between 2000 and 2019. Environmental lobbying accounts for an average of
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14.8% of all lobbying expenses over this period, with the traditional environmental issues
attracting 72% more expenditures than secondary environmental issues.27 Multinationals
have varied their environmental lobbying activities substantially over this period, rising
from just over $600 million USD in 2000 to a peak of just under $2 billion USD in 2009
before falling to $1.2 billion USD in 2019. Given the lack of comparable lobbying data
from other countries, it is challenging to discern whether this evolution primarily reflects a
change in environmental lobbying demand in the United States (e.g., driven by proposed
climate legislation in 2009) or if it reflects changing lobbying conditions more broadly.
Figure 3.7: Overall estimated environmental lobbying expenditures across all topics per
year, 2000–2019.
27An average of $90.3 million USD per traditional environmental issue and $52.4 million USD per
secondary environmental issue.
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Figure 3.8 displays the geographical distribution of environmental advocacy activities
by multinational S&P 500 firms in 2019. Countries are colored according to the estimated
total amount of lobbying funds spent on all environmental issues across all firms per
$1 billion of GDP.28 The median estimated amount of lobbying funds spent was $1883
USD per million GDP, but this distribution was highly skewed.29 Just ten countries,
led by Singapore, New Zealand, and Ireland, account for 39% of the global estimated
total of environmental lobbying funds. Similarly, 20% of countries receive 74% of all
environmental lobbying funds. The regions with the least environmental lobbying are
North Africa, Central Africa, and Central Asia.
28S&P 500 firms that have performed corporate tax inversions have small outposts in tax havens, likely
inflating lobbying estimates in these countries. This tendency is most clear with the lobbying estimates
for Luxembourg, which are an order of magnitude larger than any other country. Accordingly, I omit
Luxembourg from the calculations provided in this section.
29The distribution of firms’ estimated environmental lobbying expenditures is also skewed. 90% of
multinationals’ spending on environmental lobbying comes from 60 firms in the S&P 500, with 50% of
spending generated by just eleven firms. From 2000 to 2019, the top spenders on environmental lobbying



































































































































































3.6.5 Relationships between and among transnational advocates
Transnational advocacy organizations engage in their advocacy activities strategically,
taking into account the actions of other advocates. With this observation in mind, I
aggregate the activities of transnational advocates within each type (NGO, IDO, and
multinational) because I expect advocacy to have a larger impact on policy leadership
when more advocates are present. When more international environmental NGOs
and IDOs are in a country, they are likely to specialize and engage policymakers on
a broader set of topics. Both NGOs and IDOs maintain ongoing dialogue among
their counterparts to facilitate coordination. And when there is a strong presence of
multinational corporations in a country, the amount of information flows across countries
and potential for coordination in advocacy seems likely to strengthen. In the context of
environmental policy, these actors have disagreements with each other about the merits
of specific environmental policies and desirable policy settings. However, they all share
the common objective of fostering greater environmental policy leadership. In Chapter
5, I will examine the potential for these within-type synergies (i.e., non-linearities).
There is also clear potential for cross-type synergies. International environmental
NGOs and IDOs frequently collaborate, such as when the United Kingdom, Norway,
and The Nature Conservancy worked together to build capacity for forest governance in
Indonesia in the early 2000s (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). There is also potential for
“bootlegger and Baptist” coalitions among civil society and private sector organizations
on topics like illegal logging (DeSombre 2000). There are even initiatives that bring
all three types of transnational advocates together under a single banner, such as the
World Resources Group 2030, an initiative promoting access to water co-founded by,
among others, PepsiCo, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the
World Wildlife Fund.30 In Chapter 5, I will examine the potential for these cross-type
interactive effects.
30https://www.2030wrg.org/about-us/partners/, accessed on November 1, 2019
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3.7 Conclusion
The point of departure for this chapter is the idea that transnational advocates are
agents of policy change, affecting both the adoption and diffusion of public policy.
Embedded in a variety of organizational structures, these advocates seek to affect
policymaking through activities that provide policymakers with information, build the
human and financial capacity of governments to design and implement policy, and attempt
to persuade policymakers to act through lobbying and pressure campaigns. In the
context of environmental policy, three of the most high-profile transnational advocates
are large international environmental NGOs, international development organizations,
and multinational corporations. Over the past twenty years, these organizations have
engaged in environmental advocacy activities in nearly every country. I anticipate that
when transnational environmental advocacy activities are more intense, governments tend
to adopt environmental policies more quickly and the countries in which these advocates
work are more likely to form leader-follower environmental policymaking relationships.
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Appendix 3.A List of large international NGOs
Table 3.A.1: Largest international environmental NGOs by revenue.
Name 2019 revenue (millions USD)
The Nature Conservancy $1,055.6
World Conservation Society $263.9
World Wildlife Fund $230.3





Flora and Fauna International $32.2
Friends of the Earth >30.0∗
Global Witness $11.3
Total > $2,130.3
All figures from 2019 annual reports or IRS Form 990s. Foreign currencies converted to USD
on June 23, 2021. ∗ Only includes revenues for international secretariat and Australia, United
States, and United Kingdom chapters.
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Table 3.A.2: Countries reporting development aid spending to the OECD DAC
Country DAC status Country DAC status
Australia Member Lithuania Non-member
Austria Member Luxembourg Member
Azerbaijan* Non-member Malta* Non-member
Belgium Member Netherlands Member
Bulgaria Non-member New Zealand Member
Canada Member Norway Member
Croatia* Non-member Poland Member
Cyprus Non-member Portugal Member
Czechia Member Qatar Non-member
Denmark Member Romania Non-member
Estonia Non-member Russia Non-member
Finland Member Saudi Arabia* Non-member
France Member Slovakia Member
Germany Member Slovenia* Non-member
Greece Member South Korea Member
Hungary Member Spain Member
Iceland Member Sweden Member
Ireland Member Switzerland Member
Israel Non-member Thailand* Non-member
Italy Member Turkey* Non-member
Japan Member United Arab Emirates Non-member
Kazakhstan* Non-member United Kingdom Member
Kuwait Non-member United States Member
Latvia Non-member
∗ Country also received development aid funds between 2002–2019. The European Union,
Taiwan, and Timor-Leste also report to the DAC, but are omitted from this analysis.
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Table 3.A.3: Multinational corporations in the S&P 500 (as of May 7, 2021)
Firm name Firm BvD ID Firm name Firm BvD ID
3M COMPANY US410417775 INVESCO LTD BM40671R
A. O. SMITH CORPORATION US390619790 IPG PHOTONICS CORPORATION US043444218
ABBOTT LABORATORIES US360698440 IQVIA HOLDINGS INC. US271341991
ABBVIE INC. US320375147 IRON MOUNTAIN INC US232588479
ABIOMED INC US042743260 J. M. SMUCKER COMPANY (THE) US340538550
ACCENTURE PUBLIC LIMITED COM-
PANY
IE471706 J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES,
INC.
US710335111
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC. US954803544 JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC US954081636
ADOBE INC US770019522 JOHNSON & JOHNSON US221024240
ADVANCE AUTO PARTS, INC. US542049910 JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNA-
TIONAL PLC
IE543654
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES INC US941692300 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO US132624428
AES CORPORATION (THE) US541163725 JUNIPER NETWORKS INC US770422528
AFLAC INC. US581167100 KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN US440663509
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC US770518772 KELLOGG COMPANY US380710690
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC US231274455 KEYCORP US346542451
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC US043432319 KEYSIGHT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. US464254555
ALASKA AIR GROUP, INC. US911292054 KIMBERLY CLARK CORP US390394230
ALBEMARLE CORP US541692118 KIMCO REALTY CORP US132744380
ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUI-
TIES INC
US954502084 KINDER MORGAN, INC. US260238387
ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC US133648318 KLA CORPORATION US042564110
ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC US943267295 KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY (THE) US462078182
ALLEGION PLC IE527370 KROGER CO US310345740
ALLIANT ENERGY CORP US391380265 L BRANDS, INC. US311029810
ALPHABET INC. US611767919 L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. US340276860
ALTRIA GROUP, INC. US133260245 LABORATORY CORP OF AMERICA
HOLDINGS
US133757370
AMAZON.COM, INC. US911646860 LAM RESEARCH CORP US942634797
AMCOR PLC GBJE126984 LAMB WESTON HOLDINGS, INC. US611797411
AMEREN CORP US431723446 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP. US270099920
AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP INC. US751825172 LEGGETT & PLATT INC US440324630
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COM-
PANY INC
US134922640 LEIDOS HOLDINGS, INC. US203562868
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY US134922250 LENNAR CORP US954337490
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP
INC.
US132592361 LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP US351140070
AMERICAN TOWER CORPORATION USMA1AD8 LINDE PLC IE602527
AMERICAN WATER WORKS COM-
PANY, INC.
US510063696 LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC. US203247759
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC. US133180631 LKQ CORPORATION US364215970
AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP US233079390 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP US521893632
AMETEK INC US141682544 LOEWS CORP. US132646102
AMGEN INCORPORATED US953540776 LOWE’S COMPANIES, INC. US560578072
AMPHENOL CORP US222785165 LUMEN TECHNOLOGIES, INC. US720651161
ANALOG DEVICES INC US042348234 LYONDELLBASELL INDUSTRIES N.V. NL24473890
ANSYS INC US043219960 M&T BANK CORPORATION US160968385
ANTHEM INC. US352145715 MARATHON OIL CORPORATION US250996816
AON PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY IE604607 MARATHON PETROLEUM CORPORA-
TION
US271284632
APPLE INC. US942404110 MARKETAXESS HOLDINGS INC. US522230784
APPLIED MATERIALS INC US941655526 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC US522055918
APTIV PLC GBJE108188 MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES
INC
US362668272
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COM-
PANY
US410129150 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC US561848578
ARISTA NETWORKS, INC. US201751121 MASCO CORP US381794485
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ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & CO. US362151613 MASTERCARD US134172551
ASSURANT INC. US391126612 MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS INC US942896096
AT&T INC. US431301883 MCCORMICK & CO INC US520408290
ATMOS ENERGY CORP US751743247 MCDONALD’S CORPORATION US362361282
AUTODESK INC US942819853 MCKESSON CORPORATION US943207296
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC US221467904 MEDTRONIC PUBLIC LIMITED COM-
PANY
IE545333
AUTOZONE INC US621482048 MERCK & CO., INC. US221918501
AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES INC US770404318 METLIFE INC. US134075851
AVERY DENNISON CORPORATION US951492269 METTLER TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL
INC
US133668641
BAKER HUGHES COMPANY US814403168 MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL US880215232
BALL CORP US350160610 MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC US860629024
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION US560906609 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC US751618004
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON COR-
PORATION
US132614959 MICROSOFT CORPORATION US911144442
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC US360781620 MID AMERICA APARTMENT COMMU-
NITIES INC
US621543819
BECTON, DICKINSON AND COMPANY US220760120 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC US521604305
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. US470813844 MOLSON COORS BEVERAGE COM-
PANY
US840178360
BEST BUY CO, INC US410907483 MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC. US522284372
BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC US941381833 MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC. US770466789
BIOGEN INC. US330112644 MONSTER BEVERAGE CORPORA-
TION
US471809393
BLACKROCK, INC US320174431 MOODY’S CORPORATION US133998945
BOEING COMPANY (THE) US910425694 MORGAN STANLEY US363145972
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. US061528493 MOSAIC COMPANY (THE) US201026454
BORGWARNER INC US133404508 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC. US361115800
BOSTON PROPERTIES INC US042473675 MSCI INC. US134038723
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP US042695240 NASDAQ, INC. US521165937
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY US220790350 NETAPP, INC. US770307520
BROADCOM INC. US352617337 NETFLIX, INC. US770467272
BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLU-
TIONS, INC.
US331151291 NEWELL BRANDS INC. US363514169
BROWN FORMAN CORP US610143150 NEWMONT CORPORATION US841611629
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC. US411883630 NEWS CORPORATION US462950970
CABOT OIL & GAS CORPORATION US043072771 NEXTERA ENERGY, INC. US592449419
CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC US770148231 NIELSEN HOLDINGS PUBLIC LIMITED
COMPANY
GB09422989
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC. US463657681 NIKE INC US930584541
CAMPBELL SOUP CO US210419870 NISOURCE INC US352108964
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORA-
TION
US541719854 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP US521188014
CARDINAL HEALTH INC US310958666 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION US362723087
CARMAX INC US541821055 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORA-
TION
US800640649
CARNIVAL CORPORATION PA16585RPP NORTONLIFELOCK INC. US770181864
CARRIER GLOBAL CORP US834051582 NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS
LIMITED
BM45125R
CATALENT, INC. US208737688 NOV INC US760475815
CATERPILLAR INC US370602744 NRG ENERGY, INC. US411724239
CBOE GLOBAL MARKETS INC. US205446972 NUCOR CORP US131860817
CBRE GROUP, INC. US943391143 NVIDIA CORP US943177549
CDW CORP US260273989 NVR INC US541394360
CELANESE CORPORATION US980420726 NXP SEMICONDUCTORS N.V NL34253298
CENTENE CORP US421406317 O REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC US440618012
CENTERPOINT ENERGY, INC. US740694415 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPO-
RATION
US954035997
CERNER CORP US431196944 OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE INC US560751714
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CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS, INC. US202697511 OMNICOM GROUP INC US131514814
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION,
THE
US943025021 ONEOK INC US731520922
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. US841496755 ORACLE CORP US542185193
CHEVRON CORPORATION US940890210 OTIS WORLDWIDE CORP US833789412
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC. US841219301 PACCAR INC US910351110
CHUBB LIMITED CHCHE114425464 PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA US364277050
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO INC US134996950 PARKER HANNIFIN CORP US340451060
CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP. US310746871 PAYCHEX INC US161124166
CINTAS CORP US311188630 PAYCOM SOFTWARE, INC. US800957485
CISCO SYSTEMS INC US770059951 PAYPAL HOLDINGS, INC. US492989869
CITIGROUP INC US521568099 PENN NATIONAL GAMING INC US232234473
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP INC. US050412693 PENTAIR PUBLIC LIMITED COM-
PANY
IE536025
CITRIX SYSTEMS INC US752275152 PEOPLE’S UNITED FINANCIAL, INC US208447891
CLOROX CO US310595760 PEPSICO INC US131584302
CME GROUP INC US364459170 PERKINELMER INC US042052042
CMS ENERGY CORP US382726431 PERRIGO COMPANY PLC IE529592
COCA-COLA COMPANY (THE) US580628465 PFIZER INC US135315170
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY SOLU-
TIONS CORP
US133728359 PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL
INC.
US133435103
COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO US131815595 PHILLIPS 66 US453779385
COMCAST CORPORATION US270000798 PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP US860512431
COMERICA INCORPORATED US381998421 PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO US752702753
CONAGRA BRANDS, INC. US470248710 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP
INC
US251435979
CONOCOPHILLIPS US010562944 POOL CORPORATION US363943363
CONSOLIDATED EDISON, INC. US133965100 PPG INDUSTRIES INC US250730780
CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC. US160716709 PPL CORP US232758192
COOPER COMPANIES INC US942657368 PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC US421520346
COPART INC US942867490 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO US310411980
CORNING INC US160393470 PROGRESSIVE CORP US340963169
CORTEVA, INC US824979096 PROLOGIS, INC. US943281941
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP US911223280 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC. US223703799
CROWN CASTLE INTERNATIONAL
CORP
US760470458 PTC INC. US042866152
CSX CORP US621051971 PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE
GROUP INCORPORATED
US222625848
CUMMINS INC. US350257090 PUBLIC STORAGE INC US953551121
CVS HEALTH CORPORATION US050494040 PULTEGROUP, INC. US382766606
D.R. HORTON, INC. US752386963 PVH CORPORATION US131166910
DANAHER CORP US591995548 QORVO, INC. US465288992
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC US593305930 QUALCOMM INC US953685934
DAVITA INC. US510354549 QUANTA SERVICES INC US742851603
DEERE & CO US362382580 QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPO-
RATED
US161387862
DELTA AIR LINES, INC. US580218548 RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION US132622036
DENTSPLY SIRONA INC. US391434669 RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC US591517485
DEVON ENERGY CORP US731567067 RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES CORPO-
RATION
US060570975
DEXCOM, INC. US330857544 REALTY INCOME CORP US330580106
DIAMONDBACK ENERGY, INC. US454502447 REGENCY CENTERS CORP US593191743
DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC. US260081711 REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS
INC
US133444607
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES US362517428 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION US630589368
DISCOVERY, INC. US352333914 REPUBLIC SERVICES INC US650716904
DISH NETWORK CORPORATION US880336997 RESMED INC US980152841
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP US610502302 ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC. US941648752
DOLLAR TREE, INC. US262018846 ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. US251797617
DOMINION ENERGY, INC. US541229715 ROLLINS INC US510068479
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DOMINO’S PIZZA, INC. US382511577 ROPER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. US510263969
DOVER CORPORATION US530257888 ROSS STORES INC US941390387
DOW INC. US301128146 ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LIM-
ITED
LR30002MX
DTE ENERGY CO US383217752 S&P GLOBAL INC. US131026995
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION US202777218 SALESFORCE.COM, INC. US943320693
DUKE REALTY CORP US351740409 SBA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORA-
TION
US650716501
DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC. US811224539 SCHLUMBERGER LIMITED CW30390NU
DXC TECHNOLOGY COMPANY US611800317 SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
IE480010
EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO US621539359 SEALED AIR CORP US650654331
EATON CORPORATION PUBLIC LIM-
ITED COMPANY
IE512978 SEMPRA ENERGY US330732627
EBAY INC US770430924 SERVICENOW, INC. US202056195
ECOLAB INC US410231510 SHERWIN WILLIAMS COMPANY
(THE)
US340526850
EDISON INTERNATIONAL US954137452 SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC US046268599
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORP US364316614 SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS, INC. US042302115
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC US942838567 SNAP-ON INCORPORATED US390622040
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY US350470950 SOUTHERN CO US580690070
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO US430259330 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. US741563240
ENPHASE ENERGY, INC. US204645388 STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. US060548860
ENTERGY CORP US721229752 STARBUCKS CORP US911325671
EOG RESOURCES INC US470684736 STATE STREET CORPORATION US042456637
EQUIFAX INC US580401110 STERIS LIMITED GB09257343
EQUINIX INC US770487526 STRYKER CORPORATION US381239739
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL US133675988 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP US911962278
ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST INC US770369576 SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL US510483352
ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES INC.
(THE)
US112408943 SYNOPSYS INC US561546236
ETSY, INC. US204898921 SYSCO CORP US741648137
EVEREST RE GROUP LTD BM26918R T-MOBILE US, INC. US200836269
EVERGY, INC US822733395 T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC US522264646
EVERSOURCE ENERGY US042147929 TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFT-
WARE INC.
US510350842
EXELON CORPORATION US232990190 TAPESTRY INC US522242751
EXPEDIA GROUP, INC. US202705720 TARGET CORP US410215170
EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF
WASHINGTON INC
US911069248 TE CONNECTIVITY LIMITED CHCHE114934754
EXTRA SPACE STORAGE, INC. US201076777 TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INCOR-
PORATED
US251843385
EXXON MOBIL CORP US135409005 TELEFLEX INC US231147939
F5 NETWORKS INC US911714307 TERADYNE INC US042272148
FACEBOOK, INC. US201665019 TESLA, INC. US912197729
FASTENAL COMPANY US410948415 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC US750289970
FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT
TRUST
US520782497 TEXTRON INC US050315468
FEDEX CORP US621721435 THE ALLSTATE CORP. US363871531
FIDELITY NATIONAL INFORMATION
SERVICES, INC.
US371490331 THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SER-
VICES GROUP INC.
US133317783
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP US310854434 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC. US042209186
FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION US341843785 TJX COMPANIES INC US042207613
FISERV INC US391506125 TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY US133139732
FLEETCOR TECHNOLOGIES, INC. US721074903 TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC IE469272
FLIR SYSTEMS INC US930708501 TRANSDIGM GROUP INCORPO-
RATED
US510484716
FMC CORP US940479804 TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC. US410518860
FORD MOTOR CO US380549190 TRIMBLE INC. US942802192
FORTINET INC US770560389 TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION US560939887
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FORTIVE CORPORATION US475654583 TWITTER, INC. US208913779
FORTUNE BRANDS HOME & SECU-
RITY, INC.
US621411546 TYLER TECHNOLOGIES INC US752303920
FOX CORPORATION US831825597 TYSON FOODS INC. US710225165
FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. US132670991 UDR, INC. US540857512
FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC. US742480931 ULTA BEAUTY, INC. US384022268
GAP INC US941697231 UNDER ARMOUR, INC. US521990078
GARMIN LTD. CHCHE115417272 UNION PACIFIC CORP US132626465
GARTNER INC US043099750 UNITED AIRLINES HOLDINGS, INC US362675207
GENERAC HOLDINGS INC. US205654756 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC US582480149
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP US131673581 UNITED RENTALS INC US061522496
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY US140689340 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC. US411321939
GENERAL MILLS INC US410274440 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES INC US232077891
GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY US270756180 UNUM GROUP INC. US621598430
GENUINE PARTS CO US580254510 US BANCORP US410255900
GILEAD SCIENCES INC US943047598 V. F. CORPORATION US231180120
GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC US582567903 VALERO ENERGY CORP US741828067
GLOBE LIFE INC. US630780404 VENTAS, INC. US611055020
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC US134019460 VERISIGN INC US943221585
HALLIBURTON CO US752677995 VERISK ANALYTICS, INC. US262994223
HANESBRANDS INC. US203552316 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC US232259884
HASBRO INC US050155090 VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INCOR-
PORATED
US043039129
HCA HEALTHCARE, INC. US273865930 VIACOMCBS INC. US042949533
HEALTHPEAK PROPERTIES, INC. US330091377 VIATRIS INC. US834364296
HENRY JACK & ASSOCIATES INC US431128385 VISA INC US260267673
HENRY SCHEIN, INC. US113136595 VORNADO REALTY TRUST US221657560
HERSHEY COMPANY (THE) US230691590 VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY US208579133
HESS CORPORATION US134921002 W. R. BERKLEY CORP US221867895
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE
COMPANY
US473298624 W.W. GRAINGER, INC. US361150280
HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS INC. US274384691 WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC., US471758322
HOLLYFRONTIER CORPORATION US751056913 WALMART INC. US710415188
HOLOGIC INC US042902449 WALT DISNEY COMPANY (THE) US830940635
HOME DEPOT INC US953261426 WASTE MANAGEMENT INC US731309529
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC US222640650 WATERS CORP US133668640
HORMEL FOODS CORP US410319970 WEC ENERGY GROUP, INC. US391391525
HOST HOTELS & RESORTS, INC. US530085950 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY US410449260
HOWMET AEROSPACE INC. US250317820 WELLTOWER INC. US341096634
HP INC. US941081436 WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES,
INC.
US231210010
HUMANA INC. US610647538 WESTERN DIGITAL CORP US330956711
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC US310724920 WESTERN UNION CO. (THE) US204531180
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES,
INC.
US900607005 WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE TECH-
NOLOGIES CORP
US251615902
IDEX CORP US363555336 WESTROCK COMPANY US371880617
IDEXX LABORATORIES INC US010393723 WEYERHAEUSER CO US910470860
IHS MARKIT LTD. BM48610R WHIRLPOOL CORP US381490038
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC US361258310 WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC US730569878
ILLUMINA INC US330804655 WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
IE475616
INCYTE CORPORATION US943136539 WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED US460484987
INGERSOLL RAND INC. US462393770 XCEL ENERGY INC. US410448030
INTEL CORP US941672743 XILINX INC. US770188631
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE,
INC.
US462286804 XYLEM INC. US452080495
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MA-
CHINES CORP
US130871985 YUM! BRANDS, INC. US133951308
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & FRA-
GRANCES INC
US131432060 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORP US362675536
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INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO US130872805 ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS, INC. US134151777
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COMPA-
NIES INC
US131024020 ZIONS BANCORPORATION, NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION
US870189025
INTUIT INC US770034661 ZOETIS INC. US460696167
INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC US770416458
497 of the 500 firms listed had at least one member of their corporate group in a different country from






Transnational environmental policy advocates work around the world, so a full under-
standing of their impact on environmental policy leadership requires a global-level per-
spective. Such a perspective necessitates, in turn, data on environmental policy change
at the global level. This task is a difficult one. It requires conceptual clarity about what
counts as an environmental policy, creating comparable measures of environmental policy
change across countries, and access to data on the policy actions of government around
the world and over time.
In this chapter, I begin by describing what satisfactory data look like for studying
environmental policy leadership. I then consider prior work in this area, presenting the
results of a systematic literature review of the topical, geographical, and temporal extent
of existing data on environmental policy change. Based on this review, I determine
that a new dataset of environmental policy adoptions is needed to study environmental
policy leadership at the global level. I then describe “policy extraction,” a new approach
to measuring environmental policy adoptions. Rather than following the conventional
process of first defining a set of policies and then searching for instances of their
adoption, I begin with a set of laws and regulations and proceed to extract latent
policy ideas contained within these documents. I apply this methodology to the Food
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and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) FAOLEX database, the largest compilation of
national environmental laws and regulations in existence. In the final section of this
chapter, I operationalize the concept of policy leadership and its constituent components
of innovation and influence, presenting descriptive data on the distribution and evolution
of environmental policy leadership from 1960 to 2019.
4.1 Three criteria for a satisfactory dataset of national
environmental policies
Over the past two decades, researchers have repeatedly sought to create a database of
national environmental policy adoptions as the empirical foundation for describing cross-
national patterns of environmental policy change. I argue that for such a database to
be fit for its purpose, it must meet three primary criteria: broad topical scope, global
geographic breadth, and long temporal coverage. In this section, I explain each of these
criteria, how they can be interpreted, and the consequences for failing to meet these
criteria.
4.1.1 Topical scope
The first criterion is broad topical scope. In this context, the range of potential topics to
include hinges on the researcher’s understanding of the concept of “environmental policy”.
Environmental policy is a compound concept consisting of two parts: “environmental” and
“policy.” Starting with the second, more general term, I turn to Hall’s (1993) typology
of policy change. The most common kind of policy change is the selection of policy
settings, which are incremental changes in how a policy is designed or implemented. A
less common, but still concrete form of policy change is the selection of policy instruments,
in which a government changes its approach to solving a problem but continues to act
in the service of the same goal. The rarest and most fundamental type of policy change
is a “paradigm shift,” in which a government pursues a new set of overarching objectives
that it is attempting to achieve through public policy, creating subsequent changes in
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policy instruments and their settings. To illustrate the relationship between these types
of policy change, consider a policy paradigm in which the government’s objective is to
reduce pollution via price mechanisms. To accomplish this goal, the government may
select the policy instrument of carbon taxes, which may be designed with the policy
setting of $15 per ton of carbon emitted.
For a global policy database, it is often most appropriate to focus on policy
instruments and, if possible, policy settings because policy paradigms primarily describe
policymakers’ thoughts and intentions, which are more difficult to measure systematically
than explicit and specific policy actions. A database that includes policy settings provides
the substantial benefit of enabling comparisons not just of policy adoption but also policy
stringency. However, this strategy can be difficult to realize in practice because creating
comparable measures of policy settings across jurisdictions requires detailed knowledge
of how each policy works. For example, it is not clear how to compare the stringency of
a traditional legal standard over more flexible, market-based approaches, such as permit
trading schemes (Knill et al. 2012a). Policy instruments, in contrast, are well-suited to
making comparisons because the adoption of a policy instrument is explicitly described in
the text of a law and can be summarized via binary judgments that require less detailed
knowledge than determining policy settings.
The second component of “environmental policy” is the term “environmental”.
Environmental policy can be defined as “tools, techniques, programs, instruments, plans,
and ideas associated with the governance of ecosystems and their interactions with
society” (p. 387 Pacheco-Vega 2021). This understanding takes an expansive view of what
counts as an environmental issue, implying that “Every policy is environmental insofar
as most policies have to deal in one way or another with natural resources, extraction,
access, and conservation” (388). Thus, environmental policies include topics as diverse as
coal-fired power plants, landscape restoration, and slaughterhouse hygiene. It is critical
for datasets to include many different policies to account for both the probabilistic nature
of policy relevance, since policies may vary in their relevance to any given government’s
context (Boehmke and Skinner 2012), and the probabilistic nature of advocacy, since
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even the most assiduous efforts to influence policy will only work some of the time.
4.1.2 Geographic breadth
The second criterion for a satisfactory database of national environmental policy
adoptions is broad geographic breadth. If the researcher aims to describe and assess
global-level claims about national policymaking, it is appropriate to collect data from
a broad, representative set of countries to accumulate cases of adoption for the same
policy (Busch and Jörgens 2005). However, the pursuit of breadth can generate both
logistical and conceptual challenges. A logistical hurdle not to be underestimated is
that of language, both in terms of the dozens of languages in which policies are written
and in terms of the many ways in which concepts are expressed even within the same
language. For example, policies relating to artisanal farming may use terms like “peasant
farming,” “subsistence agriculture,” “family farms,” and “small-scale agribusiness” to refer
to the same economic activity. Such a proliferation of terminology can make it difficult
to identify similar policies.
Conceptually, the ramifications of enacting any given policy depend on formal
institutions and informal policymaking styles. This dynamic can be seen in policymakers’
tendency to design relatively narrow or broad policies. When governments create narrow
and specific rules, even routine adjustments to policy settings require formal policy
changes. In one such instance, the Belgian government was obliged to amend its policy on
maximum pesticide residues on food no less than 24 times between 2000 and 2008.1 When
governments create broad and vague rules, they give regulators the flexibility to change
policy settings, and even adopt policy instruments, without requiring formal regulatory or
legislative action. Perhaps the most famous example of such a law in the environmental
context is the United States’s Clean Air Act, which has been interpreted to empower
agencies to act on climate change in the absence of climate-specific enabling legislation.
In considering such a wide array of policymaking processes, the researcher needs to be
aware that laws and regulations, and the frequency with which they change, can have
1The original policy was adopted on March 13, 2000 as the “Royal decree fixing the maximum levels
for pesticide residues authorized on and in foodstuffs.” The policy was repealed in 2008.
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different meanings in different countries. Of course, the alternative of collecting data from
fewer jurisdictions would require the researcher to make stronger assumptions about the
extent to which their results can be attributed to other contexts.
4.1.3 Temporal coverage
The third criterion is that information is collected over a long period of time. A database
of environmental policies must not only include laws and regulations currently in force,
but also policies that were amended and repealed. As a result, current statutes and
regulations provide only an incomplete picture of policy change. A further complication
is that laws can continue to have effect from one political regime to the next. These
holdover policies may be especially likely to be the case for more technical aspects of
resource management and manufacturing, as such issues tend to be relatively low profile.
It can also be challenging to access the actual policy texts, both old and new. Some
countries have not completely digitized their policy archives, and others do not have
complete collections of even their current laws and regulations on the web. In the context
of policies regulating the manufacture and distribution of plastic bags, for instance, I
successfully located online versions for only 88 of 149 relevant policies. These dynamics
mean that researchers face a substantial risk of selection bias, since wealthier countries
may be more willing to pay the cost of digitization and maintenance of online policy
archives. Researchers may also be driven to higher-profile (and thus unusual) policies,
such as policies on climate change, that are more likely to be accessible online.
4.2 A systematic assessment of the topical, geographic,
temporal scope of existing data on national envi-
ronmental policies
Researchers have conducted many comparative studies of environmental policy change
over the past several decades, but it remains difficult to collect data on environmental
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policy adoptions across a wide range of topics, countries, and time periods. Early studies
on environmental policy innovation examine case studies of developed European countries
like Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (e.g., Héritier 1995; Andersen and Liefferink
1997) or subnational governments in the United States, especially California (Vogel
1997). Over time, scholars have broadened the geographical scope of their analyses, first
comparing among developed countries (e.g., Kern et al. 2001; Tews et al. 2003; Busch
and Jörgens 2005) and then to Eastern Europe and rapidly industrializing countries
(Holzinger et al. 2008a; Liefferink et al. 2009; Sommerer and Lim 2016). As a result
of this progression, the bulk of the literature has focused, and continues to focus, on
developed countries, especially those in Western Europe (Sommerer and Lim 2016). In
recent years, scholars have started to move toward analyses at the global level, but these
studies are still restricted to the analysis of only one or a few policies (e.g., Saikawa 2013;
Stadelmann and Castro 2014).
To assess the extent to which existing cross-national databases on environmental
policy meet the criteria of broad topical, geographic, and temporal breadth, I conducted
the first systematic review of data used in quantitative multi-country studies of national
environmental policy adoption. In my review, I identified 28 relevant studies in a two-
step process. First, I conducted keyword searches on Google Scholar using permutations
of the search: “policy” AND “environmental” AND “national” AND “adoption” AND
(“leadership” OR “diffusion” OR “convergence” OR “transfer”). I retained studies that
examined the adoption of one or more specific environmental policies in at least nine
countries as a key dependent or independent variable. Second, I supplemented these
results by following citations to other relevant studies. I reached saturation in my
data collection, meaning that conducting more searches would no longer yield additional
relevant results. A list of studies included in the review is provided in Appendix 4.A.
I then coded each article according to the number of environmental topics addressed,
the number of countries included, and the number of years examined. Finally, I merged
duplicate and near-duplicate policies, yielding 120 unique environmental policies studied
in 195 unique countries for varying periods between 1945 and 2019.
100
4.2.1 Existing data have limited topical scope
Comparative research on environmental policy adoption has been “particularly prone
to scrutinizing cases of explosive diffusion” (p. 62 Knill et al. 2014). Market-based
instruments like greenhouse gas cap-and-trade schemes and taxes have been particularly
popular objects of study (Jordan et al. 2003; Tews et al. 2003; Bomberg 2007), as have
environmental ministries, access to environmental information laws, and other basic
environmental procedures and frameworks (e.g., Frank et al. 2000; Tews et al. 2003;
Prakash and Potoski 2006). Many scholars do not justify or explain the extent to which
the policies examined are faithful representations of other kinds of environmental policies.
For example, Frank et al. (2000) study the adoption of environmental ministries and
extrapolate from their results to conclusions regarding all of the natural environment.
Figure 4.1 shows the count of unique environmental policies in existing datasets by
topic area.2 A handful of topics have received most of the attention in existing cross-
national studies of environmental policy change, generally relating to issues of pollution.
Of 120 unique environmental policies, 60 address air or energy policy (or both), the
categories that include policies to mitigate climate change. Other topics with a relatively
large number of policies include waste, water, and general environmental policies (i.e.,
institutions, procedures, and frameworks). The ten remaining topics in the environmental
policy domain have received little or no attention in prior work. Several traditional
environmental policy issues, including mineral resources, fisheries, and agriculture, are
not addressed by any of the studies identified in this review.
The most frequently studied policies tend to be high-profile and potentially transfor-
mational relative to most environmental policies. Policies like feed-in tariffs for renewable
energy (included in 12 papers) and renewable portfolio standards (11 papers) are often
the subject of exceptional levels of attention and drama, so their policymaking and dif-
fusion processes are likely to be unusual, as well (Torney 2019). In light of the narrow
topical breadth of the existing literature, it is not clear whether conclusions based on
examinations of high-profile issue areas, such as air pollution, climate change, energy,
2I use the fifteen environmental topics provided by the FAO’s FAOLEX database.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of existing environmental policy data by topic.
120 policy innovations collected from 28 papers on environmental policy adoption. Counts
do not add to 120 because some policies relate to multiple topics.
and environmental institutions and procedures, extend to other topic areas, such as land
use, fisheries management, and agriculture. Should an analyst attempt to use the data
collected in existing work to draw conclusions about environmental policy as a whole, it
seems likely that there would be a high risk of sample bias.
4.2.2 Existing data have limited geographical scope
Existing data on national environmental policy adoptions are of relatively limited geo-
graphic scope. The most widely used environmental innovation database is ENVIPOL-
CON (Heichel et al. 2008). Of the 24 countries in the ENVIPOLCON dataset, 21 are
European and 21 have high-income economies. The successor database to ENVIPOL-
CON, and the largest such database to date, is GRACE (Duit and Sommerer 2013).
GRACE consists of 25 policies adopted by 37 countries, of which 22 are European and
28 have high-income economies. Despite this expansion, the GRACE dataset contains
no countries from Central American and the Caribbean, one country from the Middle
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East and North Africa (Israel), one country from South Asia (India), and one country
from Sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa). It also contains only two lower-middle-income
countries and zero countries with low-income economies. The most recent addition, the
CONSENSUS database (Fernández-i Marín et al. 2021), dramatically expands the num-
ber of policies considered (see discussion in the following section), but only for 21 countries
in the OECD.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the geographic coverage of existing datasets, with each country
colored according to its number of unique environmental policy observations. A policy
is deemed to have been “observed” if the authors of at least one study in the review
investigated whether it was adopted in the focal country at any given point in time.3
Considering researchers’ data collection efforts across all 120 unique environmental
policies, I find a strong overrepresentation of developed countries, especially those in
Europe. Developed countries, defined as member states of the OECD in 2021, average 81
of 120 possible policy observations (68%). At least one study included Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom for nearly every policy (116/120,
97%). In contrast, developing countries (non-OECD members) average only 15 of 120
possible policy observations (13%). Even large countries like Egypt and India are included
in data collection efforts for only 12 and 13 unique environmental policies, respectively.
The geographic limitations of existing data on environmental policy mean that
relatively little is known about the prevalence and structure of environmental policy
leadership outside of high-income countries (Jordan et al. 2010). This lacuna is
troubling because some countries, such as Greece, Poland, and Mexico, have received
low marks for their environmental policy leadership (Knill et al. 2012a), often without
acknowledging that their performance could exceed many developing countries that
were never evaluated. Moreover, there is a long-running debate about developing
country governments’ environmental policy leadership (e.g., Ayres 1995; Desai 1998;
Steinberg et al. 2001), a debate that is difficult, and likely impossible, to resolve without
systematic observation of their environmental policymaking across a wide range of topics.
3It should be noted that this approach measures the geographical scope of researchers’ data collection
for each policy, not whether the policy was actually adopted.
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With so little known about the dynamics of environmental policymaking in developing
countries, and the potential that these processes work differently from developed countries
(Baldwin et al. 2019), attempts to use existing data sources to draw conclusions about








































































































































4.2.2.1 Existing data have satisfactory temporal scope
The criterion on which existing datasets perform best is temporal scope. The original
ENVIPOLCON dataset was limited to observations at just four time points (1970, 1980,
1990, and 2000), but its successor, GRACE, provides an annual temporal resolution from
1970 to 2010. Even though many industrialized countries enacted early versions of their
resource management and pollution control laws before 1970,4 starting data collection in
1970 accounts for most of the period of modern environmental governance.
Figure 4.3a displays the number of unique policies for which any data was collected in
each year between 1945 and 2019. The 28 studies in the review have expanded temporal
coverage during the period 1980–2005, although there is only one year in which all 120
unique policies are observed (2000). The spikes in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2005, and 2005 reflect
intermittent observations by the ENVIPOLCON dataset. Although temporal coverage
decreases in recent years, it is likely an artifact of the time required for researchers
to access new data and relatively long publishing timelines. Figure 4.3b shows the
distribution of data collection periods. The average policy has a duration of 33 years,
while the median and modal duration is 30 years. Approximately one-third of policies
have data collection periods of 40 years or more.
In addition to considering the temporal scope of existing research, it is worthwhile to
note that most studies do not explain their data collection process, leaving unclear how
the authors selected their policy set and identified instances of policy adoption. Authors
who do provide information on how they collected data on policy adoptions, such as
Holzinger et al. (2008b) and Massey et al. (2014), primarily rely on expert surveys. This
dependence on secondary data sources may explain why the time resolution for these
datasets is at most annual, even though policies are introduced and enacted on specific
dates. Further, no study explicitly considers whether policies from one regime continue
to the next. This shortcoming is likely due in large part to the literature’s overwhelming
4Examples of significant laws enacted before 1970 include land use planning in the United Kingdom
(Town and Country Planning Act of 1947), national parks in France (Law of July 22, 1960 creating
national parks), and a flurry of landmark legislation in the United States in the 1960s on topics including
wilderness areas (the Wilderness Act of 1964), air emissions standards (the National Emissions Standards
Act of 1964), solid waste disposal (the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965), and environmental impact
assessment (the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969).
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(a) Count of environmental policies with one or more policy observations by year, 1945–2019.
(b) Histogram of data collection durations for 120 environmental policies.
Figure 4.3: Temporal coverage of existing environmental policy data
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focus on late-20th century European states, which have had few instances of regime
change.5
4.2.2.2 Summary
In this systematic literature review, I examined the topical, geographic, and temporal
scope of 28 cross-national studies of environmental policy change. I conclude that
existing work exhibits a topical bias in favor of policies relating to pollution prevention
(energy, air, water, and waste), overlooking policies relating to resource conservation,
extraction, and production. I also find that prior studies have a geographical bias in
favor of developed countries, especially those in Western Europe, with little data collected
on environmental policymaking in the developing world. The temporal scope of the
literature is generally acceptable, often starting in the 1970s or 1980s—but even this data
collection period means some significant policies are omitted. Overall, the deficiencies in
existing data on national environmental policy change mean that simply combining all
existing environmental policy data into a single database would not be satisfactory.6 An
alternative dataset is necessary to measure environmental policy leadership on the full
range of the environmental policy domain, at a global scale, and over a long period of
time.
4.3 A new global dataset of environmental policy
adoptions
To overcome the geographical and topical limitations of existing data, I propose a new
approach to creating a global database of environmental policy adoptions, which I call
policy extraction. Conventionally, researchers have built their databases by first defining
a set of policies of interest and then searching through each country’s laws and regulations
for a match. I reverse the order of these steps by starting with a large collection of laws
5These datasets do not indicate policy continuation even among late-20th century European states
that experienced regime change, such as Portugal in 1974 and Spain in 1975.
6Boehmke et al. (2020) have undertaken a similar task in the context of American politics, but with
a set of existing datasets of much broader topical and temporal scope.
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and regulations and then identifying, or “extracting,” the policy idea(s) latent in each
document. I explain this procedure in further detail below and then describe the new
dataset, which consists of 3,000 environmental policy adoptions from 195 countries from
1887 to 2019.
4.3.1 Policy extraction: A method for transforming a collection
of laws and regulations into a database of policy adoptions
To create a new dataset with broad geographic, topical, and temporal scope, I acquired
data on a large number of environmental laws and regulations, hand-coded a subset of
documents to identify policy components, and then conducted a sophisticated keyword
search to identify the earliest adoption of each policy for each country. Figure 4.4 provides
an overview of this procedure.
The raw data for my dataset is the Food and Agriculture Organization’s FAOLEX
database.7 FAOLEX is the most comprehensive multi-jurisdictional archive of environ-
mental policy, and possibly of public policy, in existence. The database contains more
than 170,000 environmental laws and regulations from nearly every country relating to
issues across the broad spectrum of environmental policy.8 It is regularly maintained
by subject- and country-matter experts, who examine national legislative gazettes and
create database entries consisting of a policy abstract, full text, and metadata containing
keywords, subjects, and cross-references to related policies. While the full texts are in
many different languages and formats, the abstracts are written in English, Spanish, or
French by FAOLEX staffers. Although there is variation among abstracts in length and
format, their common authorship makes them easier to compare. Using Google Translate,
I translated all document titles and abstracts into English.
I improve on the existing literature by proposing a novel conceptual framework for
defining environmental policies. I propose that all policies consist of three components:
1) a policy instrument (e.g., tax, strategic plan, permitting scheme), 2) a regulated
7http://faolex.fao.org/. Accessed May 14, 2021. Data acquired March 17, 2020.
8Note that the database does not contain executive orders or other regulatory actions that are not
reported in legislative gazettes.
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Raw data from FAOLEX
171,927* policies
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first adoption of each policy































*As of March 17, 2020
Figure 4.4: The policy extraction approach, applied to the FAOLEX database
110
activity (e.g., hunting, manufacturing, emitting), and 3) a regulated object (e.g., salmon,
genetically-modified organisms, greenhouse gases). Each of these components may consist
of one or more sub-components. For example, the object “marine protected areas”
consists of the sub-components “marine” and “protected areas.” Using this framework,
a policy is defined as the combination of a policy instrument, a regulated activity, and
a regulated object (see Figure 4.5). I applied this coding scheme to progressively larger
random samples of policies in the FAOLEX database and stopped once the discovery
rate for sub-component codes fell below one in ten documents (N = 624). The set of all
possible combinations of instrument, activity, and object codes accounts for (nearly) all
environmental policies in the FAOLEX dataset.
Figure 4.5: Illustration of policy components
Fernández-i Marín et al. (2021) propose a similar scheme consisting of policy
instruments and policy “targets,” which combines regulated activities and regulated
objects under a single heading. My scheme differs from that of Fernández-i-Marín and
colleagues, which I learned of only after having devised my own, in that I separate
regulated activities and regulated objects. This step allows me to identify a broader set of
potential policies, which can then be inspected to ensure that only sensible combinations
of activities and objects remain.
Next, I conducted a sophisticated keyword search of each document’s title and abstract
to identify instances of policy instrument-activity-object tuples. I prepared the text
for analysis by combining the title and abstract, removing numbers and punctuation,
lemmatizing and stemming each word, and then tokenizing each document into sentences.
Each document consisted of, on average, 5.73 sentences. To ensure that the search
would include different expressions of the same latent concept, I linked each keyword
with its synonyms, which I identified by calculating word vectors (Řehůřek and Sojka
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2010), calculating cosine differences for each word vector relative to the focal term, and
examining the twenty most similar words for conceptually similar terms.
For a given policy to be present in a document, its instrument, object, and activity
tuple (or their synonyms) had to occur within the same sentence. Since sentences
could reference multiple policies at once, I determined which components went together
by determining whether all activities or objects in a sentence preceded or followed
instruments, as this ordering was generally consistent within a sentence. I linked policy
components together if an instrument immediately followed (preceded) an activity or
object before the next instrument or the end of the sentence. For example, consider the
sentence, “This law bans the hunting of wolves and moose, in addition to requiring licenses
for hunting game animals.” Since the instrument ”ban” comes first, instruments precede
activities and objects in the sentence. Accordingly, the sentence contains the policies
“ban-hunting-wolves,” “ban-hunting-moose,” and “licenses-hunting-game animals.”
The keyword search yielded a very large number of policies, many of which were quasi-
duplicates or illogical. I took several steps to identify and remove such policies. First, I
removed rare policies that occurred fewer than twelve times, a cutoff determined using a
variant of the “elbow method.”9 Second, I removed policies that appeared in exceedingly
similar sets of documents (cosine similarity above 0.9). Third, I examined all remaining
policies and removed illogical policy component combinations. I deemed a policy illogical
only if it was conceptually impossible (e.g., a policy cannot subsidize the slaughter of
national parks because national parks are not alive). Fourth, considering my interest
in national-level policymaking, I also removed policy adoptions under colonial rule and
all documents missing their dates of enactment.10 I also assigned policies enacted via
international agreements or regional organizations, such as the European Union, to their
respective signatories.11 In a final step, I identified each country’s first adoption (if any)
9The elbow method is a heuristic for determining the optimal number of clusters (Thorndike 1953).
I implement this approach as the first instance in which the second derivative of the count of a given
number of policies becomes negative as the cutoff increases.
10As noted earlier, some colonial-era laws remained in force after a country’s independence. I account
for this possibility in regression analyses by noting the identity of a country’s colonizer and incorporating
country-level random effects.
11A future analysis could use the alternative approach of attributing policy adoption to the date of
treaty ratification, rather than the date of treaty signature.
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for 3,000 unique policies.
4.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the policy extraction approach
This procedure for creating a dataset of environmental policy adoptions has several
benefits relative to conventional techniques. First, by using an inductive approach, I
avoid setting arbitrary limits on the kinds of policies I can find. Rather than relying
on my own capacity to imagine what policymakers might do, I focus on understanding
the actions they take. Second, the approach uses primary source data—the laws and
regulations themselves—to identify instances of policy change, rather than relying on
second-hand sources like expert surveys. Third, provided the researcher has access to a
sufficiently large set of laws and regulations, there are considerable economies of scale
relative to other techniques. I can measure the adoption of thousands of environmental
policies across nearly every country over a long period of time. Fourth, the keyword search
procedure is more appropriate than better-known classification approaches, such as topic
modeling, which are not suited to identifying fine distinctions between documents.12
While this approach is effective at extracting latent policy ideas from a large and
diverse collection of documents, it is not without its weaknesses. First, the external
validity of this approach depends on the extent to which the FAOLEX database truly
contains the universe of environmental laws and regulations. The creators of FAOLEX
endeavor to provide comprehensive, reliable, and up-to-date information, but it is
challenging to know whether FAOLEX realizes those objectives. I attempted to estimate
how comprehensive FAOLEX is for one particular policy, restrictions on the use of plastic
bags, and found that FAOLEX lists 70 of the 88 policies that could be found anywhere
online. While 80% coverage for online policies may be satisfactory, it is important to
remember that there is actually a total of 149 plastic bag policies, so FAOLEX’s true
coverage for plastic bag restrictions is only 47%. While this example only looks at one
12For example, a topic model could be expected to identify that a given policy is about forests in
general, but it would struggle to identify that the policy is a license for extracting timber. One potential
avenue for improving the keyword search is to identify instruments, activities, and objects using a pre-
trained question-and-answer program, such as BERT-QA. As of summer 2021, I am currently exploring
the BERT-QA approach in collaboration with Patrick Wu.
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particular policy, it suggests that FAOLEX does not necessarily contain the full universe
of environmental policy.
A second, related consideration is that I only evaluate each policy using its title
and abstract. In principle, this approach means that the most important parts of each
document are provided in a single paragraph. In practice, titles and abstracts vary in
length and level of detail. This variation should bias the estimated date of first adoption
closer to the present because undetected policy adoptions only matter if take place before
the adoption that is detected.
Third, despite automating the search process to a large degree, I was still obliged
to manually identify appropriate synonyms and examine approximately 5,600 tuples of
policy components to remove nonsensical combinations. It also relies on the elbow method
to remove illogical or duplicate combinations, but this approach uses an arbitrary heuristic
and has the undesirable effect of removing rarely observed, but perfectly sensible policies.
Despite these limitations, there are clear benefits to using the policy extraction
approach. It proposes a methodology that is replicable, scalable, and easily adapted
to other policy domains. As such, it allows researchers to pursue research questions
relating to policy change at a greater scale than previously possible.
4.3.3 Describing a new dataset of environmental policy adoptions
Using the policy extraction methodology on the FAOLEX database, I identified each
country’s earliest date of adoption for 3,000 policies. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution
of these 3,000 policies by topic. Of the fifteen topics in FAOLEX, the most common are
Wild species & ecosystems (23.4%), General environmental frameworks/procedures/plans
(13.2%), and Agricultural & rural development (11.3%). The average number of policies
per issue area is 4,542 and 13 of the 15 topic areas have at least 1,000 policies, except for
Air & atmosphere (314 policies, 0.5%) and Minerals (198 policies, 0.3%).13
13The FAOLEX dataset treats the Air & atmosphere and Minerals topics somewhat inconsistently. For
example, Air & atmosphere is not listed as a separate topic on the front page of the FAOLEX website,
but it is listed in policy metadata. Similarly, Minerals is combined with Energy on the front page of the
FAOLEX website, but separated in policy metadata.
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Table 4.1: FAOLEX policies by topic
Issue type Number of policies Percent of total
Wild species & ecosystems Traditional 15940 23.4%
Environment general Traditional 9009 13.2%
Agricultural & rural development Secondary 7669 11.3%
Food & nutrition Secondary 6575 9.7%
Waste Traditional 5179 7.6%
Livestock Secondary 5044 7.4%
Cultivated plants Secondary 4691 6.9%
Water Traditional 3050 4.5%
Energy Traditional 2723 4.0%
Fisheries Traditional 2648 3.9%
Marine affairs Secondary 2521 3.7%
Land & soil Traditional 1329 2.0%
Forestry Traditional 1208 1.8%
Air & atmosphere Traditional 314 0.5%
Minerals Traditional 198 0.3%
The 3,000 policies were adopted by 195 countries from 1887 to 2019.14 The policy
extraction procedure only retained policies that occurred at least twelve times in the
FAOLEX dataset, but each policy was not necessarily adopted by at least twelve different
countries. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of country adoptions by policy. This
distribution is positively skewed, with each policy was adopted by an average of 23
countries and a median of 16 countries. 24% of policies were adopted by 10 or fewer
countries and 14% were adopted by 40 or more countries. Only 34 policies were adopted
by more than 100 countries and, likely reflecting the limitations of the FAOLEX dataset,
no policies were adopted by all countries. Table 4.B.1 lists the five most widely adopted
policies by topic.
The dataset includes policy adoptions as early as 1887, but the bulk of environmental
policy invention and adoption occurs in the second half of the 20th century (Figure 4.7).
The rate at which policymakers created new environmental policies increases starting in
the 1950s, with a notable peak in 1991–1996 coinciding with the 1992 Earth Summit.
The cumulative number of environmental policies also starts to rise in the 1960s and
experiences a sharp upward inflection in the early 1990s. After the year 2000, relatively
14Policy adoptions before independence are omitted from this dataset, but they are retained through
subsequent regime changes.
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Figure 4.6: Number of adopting countries per environmental policy
few policies are invented while adoptions continue to increase. This trend suggests there
was a rush of new environmental policies in the 1990s but, while these policies have
continued to spread, the pace of environmental policy invention has since slowed to a
trickle.
Figure 4.7: Number of new environmental policies, 1900–2019.
Figure 4.8 shows “diffusion curves,” or the cumulative percentage of adopting units
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over time, by topic.15 Looking first at the average for all policies (top panel), the curve
shows the conventional S-shape (Rogers 2003). In the first ten years after initial adoption,
policies tend to spread slowly in a phase of early adoption. In the following 35 years,
policies spread rapidly, with a peak at about eighteen years. Policies then slow their
spread in the final phase of late adoption. Approximately 50 years after a policy’s initial
adoption, very few countries choose to adopt a policy that they have not done so already.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.8 displays variation in diffusion curves across topics.
Some policy topics, such as Air & atmosphere and Fisheries reach the third phase of late
adoption relatively quickly, while others, such as Land & soil and Forestry, continue to
add new countries many years after their first adoption. There is no clear difference in
the shape of the diffusion curves for policies relating to pollution prevention (e.g., air,
energy, water, waste) relative to policies relating to resource conservation, extraction,
and production.
Reversing perspective to focus on variation by country, Figure 4.9 shows the average
percentage of existing policies that countries have adopted over time by region.16
Countries started to adopt more policies in the second half of the 20th century, with
an inflection point in the 1990s. European countries have adopted more environmental
policies than countries in other regions; as of 2019, Europe’s regional average was twice
that of any other region.
15These curves show the spread of a policy across potential adopters. I follow Rogers (2003) in calling
these curves “diffusion” curves. Despite their name, these curves do not imply anything about whether
mechanisms of policy diffusion are driving the spread of these policies.
16Since FAOLEX contains relatively few policy adoptions before 1960, the figure only shows the years
1960–2019.
117
Figure 4.8: Average number of adoptions by years since first adoption.
Top panel shows the average diffusion curve for all policies. Bottom panel shows the
average diffusion curves by topic.
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Figure 4.9: Average percentage of existing policies adopted by region, 1960–2019.
A question that has been the subject of several analyses is whether country
environmental policy portfolios have become more similar over time (e.g., Holzinger
et al. 2008b; Schaffrin et al. 2014). A policy portfolio is the set of policies country
governments have adopted at a given point in time. Following the “pair method” described
by Sommerer and Lim (2016), I calculate the proportion of policies adopted by either
country that have been adopted by both countries for each pair of countries for each
year between 1900 and 2019.17 Figure 4.10 shows the average similarity of country policy
portfolios between 1960 and 2019 by region, as well as the global and within-region
average portfolio similarity.18 Overall, countries’ environmental policy portfolios have
grown more similar over time, with any given pair of countries sharing approximately 9%
of environmental policies in common as of 2019. Countries have consistently tended to
17I exclude countries before their dates of independence.
18Since FAOLEX contains relatively few policy adoptions before 1960, the figure only shows the years
1960–2019.
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be more similar to countries within their geographic region. Comparing across regions,
European countries have long had the most similar environmental policies, largely as a
function of Europe-wide policies enacted through regional groupings like the European
Union.19 Short-term spikes in regions’ environmental policy similarity are generally due
to regional agreements.
Figure 4.10: Global, within-region, and regional environmental policy portfolio similarity,
1960–2019.
4.4 Environmental policy innovation, influence, and
leadership
Equipped with a global dataset of environmental policy adoptions across a wide variety
of environmental topics and a long period of time, I now turn to creating a dynamic
measure of environmental policy leadership, and its constituent components of innovation
and influence. As discussed in Chapter 2, environmental policy leadership is the
combination of innovation and a summary statistic of influence, such as the count of a
country’s followers. In the following chapter, I conduct a suite of analyses to understand
19International agreements have been important influences on countries’ environmental policy port-
folios. Figure 4.C.1 displays policy portfolio scores with only domestic policies, yielding lower overall
similarity scores, especially for European countries.
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the relationship between transnational advocacy and variation in environmental policy
leadership, innovation, and influence over time.
My approach to measuring environmental policy leadership is summarized in Fig-
ure 4.11. The dataset provides the dates at which governments first adopted (if ever) a
variety of environmental policies. I start by calculating policy innovation rates for each
country in each year. I separately calculate influence by inferring persistent policymaking
relationships between pairs of countries and then counting each country’s number of fol-
lowers. Finally, I combine the two measures into a single environmental policy leadership




























































Figure 4.11: Procedure for measuring policy leadership.
4.4.1 Trends in environmental policy innovation
Policy innovation is the rate at which a government adopts available policies (Boehmke
and Skinner 2012). The denominator for this rate is the set of policies available for
adoption. In this context, a policy adoption is the first time a policy is enacted into law
in a jurisdiction and policies are available if 1) the policy has not been adopted by the
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focal government in prior years and 2) at least one other country has already adopted in
the focal or prior years. The numerator is the number of policies that a government adopts
in the focal year.20 This approach focuses on the speed with which governments take up
new policy ideas, rather than rewarding governments that are particularly inventive or
governments that have already adopted many policies. I calculate innovation rates on a
rolling biennial basis (i.e., including adoptions in the current and prior year) to account
for policymaking processes that last for more than a single calendar year. I smooth
innovation rates in the following figures using a three-year rolling average to facilitate
interpretation and calculate standard errors using 1200 bootstrap replicates.
Figure 4.12 shows the overall rate of innovation in environmental policy between 1960
and 2019.21 This plot represents the annual rate at which countries enact environmental
policies they have not already adopted, with values on the y-axis indicating the proportion
of available policies that all governments enacted in each year. For example, an innovation
rate of 0.5% in a given year would mean that the governments of the world adopted
0.5% of all the policies they could have, but had not yet, adopted. The figure presents
an overall trend of increasing environmental policy innovation over the past 70 years,
marked by two distinct phases. Before the 1990s, the rate of environmental policy
innovation was relatively stagnant, hovering around 0.2%. However, environmental policy
innovation started to pick up in the 1990s, coinciding with an uptick in policymaker
interest in environmental issues marked by global events like the Rio Earth Summit
in 1992. Increases in environmental policy innovation continued into the 21st century,
reaching a peak in 2016 at 0.7%, more than three times its earlier rate. Since 2016, the
rate has fallen off to some extent, but it is too early to tell if this trend is a genuine decrease
or a reflection of FAOLEX’s ongoing data collection. Figure 4.C.2 generally replicates
these global-level trends when split into traditional and secondary environmental issues,
with relatively little difference between the two categories for much of the time period.
Figure 4.13 displays three factors that may lead to systematic differences in countries’
20Following Boehmke and Skinner (2012), I omit policies that started diffusing before each focal
country’s date of independence.
21Since FAOLEX contains relatively few policy adoptions before 1960, the figures in this section only
display the years 1960–2019. Values are smoothed using a 3-year rolling average for presentation purposes.
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Figure 4.12: Environmental policy innovation rate for all countries combined, 1960–2019.
environmental policy innovation rates: wealth, democracy, and conflict. Starting with
wealth, Figure 4.13a compares environmental policy innovation rates for OECD member
states, which tend to be wealthy, and non-OECD member states, which tend to be poor.
OECD member states initially had a similar rate of environmental policy innovation as
non-member states but started to increase rapidly in the late 1980s and into the 1990s.
Environmental policy innovation rates for OECD member states have generally hovered
around 1% since the early 1990s, with lower rates in the late 1990s and the mid-2000s.
In contrast, the poorer non-OECD member states have slowly but steadily increased
their rates of environmental policy innovation. When non-OECD environmental policy
innovation peaked in 2017 at 0.6%, it was at the same level as the average OECD state
in 1989.
Figure 4.13b compares environmental policy innovation by countries’ level of electoral
democracy, measured using the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project’s Polyarchy
index (Teorell et al. 2019; Coppedge et al. 2021). States of varying levels of democracy
adopted environmental policies at similar rates until the mid-1970s, when the most
democratic states increased their policy innovation rates. Other countries increased
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(a) By OECD membership
(b) By electoral democracy
(c) By armed conflict
Figure 4.13: Environmental policy innovation rate by OECD membership, electoral
democracy, and armed conflict, 1960–2019.
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their rate of environmental policymaking more slowly, but by the mid-2000s, a positive
correlation had emerged between a country’s electoral democracy and its government’s
environmental policy innovation rate. As of 2019, the most democratic states adopt
environmental policies at approximately twice the rate of the least democratic states.
Finally, Figure 4.13c compares environmental policy innovation rates in states
currently experiencing major armed conflict and those that are not. Following the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, countries experience “major armed conflict” when
they are host to 1000 or more battle deaths in which one side is a state actor (Gleditsch
et al. 2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020). Countries at war have tended to adopt
environmental policies at a slower rate than countries at peace. The one time countries at
war exceeded countries at peace was in the mid-1990s, when Russia, a country with high
rates of environmental policy innovation, engaged in a conflict in Chechnya. In recent
years, peaceful countries have adopted environmental policies at about 1.5 times the rate
of countries at war.
Table 4.C.1 shows the 5 most innovative countries in each decade. Both developing
and developed countries can be found among the most innovative states. China, the
United States, and Russia have been the three most innovative states over the past two
decades.
4.4.2 Trends in environmental policy influence
Policy influence is a government’s tendency to attract policy followers, meaning that
its decisions persistently impact the policymaking processes of other governments. When
these relationships persist, influential countries adopt policies ahead of their followers time
and again, creating patterns in the timing of policy adoptions. Such relationships can be
uncovered by looking for interdependencies in policy adoptions across many policies. I
summarize a country’s influence by counting the number of countries to which it acts as
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a leader.22 To illustrate, if Country A serves as a leader to five countries and Country B
serves as a leader to ten countries in a given year, Country B would be twice as influential
as Country A.
Figure 4.14 shows the evolution of the average country’s influence between 1960
and 2019, calculated as the average number of follower countries per country in
the environmental policy influence network. I infer dynamic environmental policy
influence networks using the NetInf algorithm over a rolling 40-year window (Linder
and Desmarais 2017; Boehmke et al. 2020).23 As with environmental policy innovation,
environmental policy influence has generally increased over the past 60 years. In 1960,
the average country’s environmental policymaking influenced just one other country.
Today, countries influence an average of approximately 19 other countries through
their environmental policymaking. The trajectory of influence scores over time has
an inflection point in the mid-1990s, again coinciding with a sharp increase in policy
innovation rates. This trajectory is repeated when influence scores are broken down
by traditional and secondary environmental issues (Figure 4.C.3), although influence
scores for traditional environmental issues increased slightly earlier and more rapidly
than secondary environmental issues.
Part of the reason for the steady increase in countries’ environmental influence policy
scores is that the number of policies in each window has increased over time (Figure 4.7).
As a result, more recent years have provided governments with more occasions to exercise
influence.24 It is also worthwhile to note that the distribution of influence at any given
time tends to be positively skewed, with a small number of countries (most notably
Russia and China in recent years) influencing a very large proportion of countries and
many governments that have only a handful of followers, if any.
22One drawback of this approach is that it only considers leadership among the nodes in the
policymaking network, countries in this case. In theory, such an approach could be extended to include
international, supranational, and subnational jurisdictions, which can be important policy leaders across
levels of government (Pacheco-Vega 2021). In practice, it would be difficult to compile a comparable and
suitably comprehensive/representative database of environmental policy adoptions for so many different
levels of government, especially in light of the complex relationship between lower and higher levels of
government (Shipan and Volden 2006).
23See Appendix 4.D for details on the procedure used to determine optimal window size.
24Increasingly frequent policy adoption has also made it easier to detect influence relationships.
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Figure 4.14: Environmental policy influence for all countries combined, 1960–2019.
Figure 4.15 shows how countries differ in their influence by wealth, democracy, and
conflict. For wealth, the comparison of OECD member states with non-member states
in Figure 4.15a indicates that the wealthy OECD member states experienced a rapid
increase in influence starting in the mid-1980s that continues up to the present, whereas
the poorer states that are not part of the OECD have seen their influence grow much
more slowly. As of 2019, the average member of the OECD influences the environmental
policymaking of twice as many states as the average non-member.
Figure 4.15b compares countries’ environmental policy influence by their level of
democracy. The most democratic states started to become more influential than less
democratic states in the 1990s and have an average of approximately 27 followers in 2019,
nine more than both modestly and much less democratic countries. Unlike environmental
policy innovation, there is no significant difference between modestly and less democratic
states.
Turning to conflict, Figure 4.15c indicates that there was little difference in
environmental policy influence for countries at war and countries at peace until the early
2000s, when conflicts in India (Kashmir) and Russia (Chechnya) flared up. However, in
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(a) By OECD membership
(b) By electoral democracy
(c) By armed conflict
Figure 4.15: Environmental policy innovation rate by OECD membership, electoral
democracy, and armed conflict, 1960–2019.
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the years since, countries at war have tended to be less influential than countries at peace.
As of 2019, peaceful countries have about twice as many followers as countries at war.
As with innovation, Table 4.C.2 shows that both developing and developed countries
can be found among the 5 most influential countries in each decade. Russia, the United
Kingdom, and, perhaps surprisingly, Italy have been among the most influential countries
for environmental policy over the past thirty years. In the period 2010–2019, Russia,
China, and Italy were the three most influential countries for environmental policy.
4.4.3 Trends in environmental policy leadership
As I have argued, two preconditions to measuring environmental policy leadership are
the measurement of environmental policy innovation and influence. Environmental policy
innovation measures the rate at which governments adopt new policy ideas, reflecting
their tendency to take decisive action on environmental issues. Environmental policy
influence measures the impact that domestic environmental policy changes have on
the policymaking processes of other countries. In the preceding sections, I described
how to capture these important concepts, which are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for environmental policy leadership. Here, I consider the two concepts together,
combining innovation and influence to create a unified measure of environmental policy
leadership.
Since policy leadership requires both rapid policy innovation and widespread influence,
I multiply each country’s percent rank innovation against its percent rank influence.25 In
Figure 4.16, I calculate percent rank for environmental policy leadership scores over the
period 1960 to 2019. In parallel with the trends in environmental policy innovation and
influence, the average country has increased in environmental policy leadership over time.
Since countries did not often develop influence relationships relating to environmental
policy until the last several decades, policy leadership remained relatively low until
the 1990s, when it rapidly began to climb to a peak in the mid-2010s. This trend is
25Percent rank provides a convenient method for making different measures comparable, calculating
the rank of each value in a vector as the percentage of all values in that vector of an equal or lesser value.
Percent rank ranges from 0 to 1, with a percent rank of 0.5 representing the median value.
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generally replicated when leadership scores are considered by traditional and secondary
environmental issues, with little difference in the trajectory of the two policy categories
(Figure 4.C.4).
Figure 4.16: Environmental policy leadership for all countries combined, 1960–2019.
To better grasp how the components of environmental policy leadership combine in
the past twenty years, Figure 4.17 plots each country’s percent rank innovation against
its percent rank influence to produce an average environmental policy leadership score
for the period 2010–2019. The plot’s background color indicates how the influence and
innovation dimensions combine to produce the highest policy leadership score in the
top-right-hand corner of the plot. Due to the large number of countries, I only label a
representative selection of forty countries.
The average country’s environmental policy leadership score in 2010–2019 is 30 with
a standard deviation of 28. The distribution is positively skewed (skewness = 0.81),
indicating that most countries receive policy leadership scores that fall below the average
and a relatively small number of countries exercise a high level of environmental policy
leadership. Countries’ ranks in innovation and influence have a correlation of ρ = 0.69,
indicating both that innovative countries also tend to be influential and that a fair number
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Figure 4.17: Environmental policy leadership by country (2010-2019 average).
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of countries receive substantially higher scores on one dimension than the other.
Overall, many of the countries that score lowest and highest in environmental policy
leadership conform to common wisdom. For example, China, the United States, and the
United Kingdom are found among the environmental policy leaders of the 2010s, while
South Sudan, Brunei, and Eritrea are among the laggards. However, some countries
receive scores that may seem surprising, such as Japan ranking among the laggards
and developing countries like Vietnam and Colombia found among the leaders. Fewer
countries can be found off the leader-laggard diagonal, with only a handful of countries
joining Israel and Cuba among the influencers and Georgia, Sweden, and the Netherlands
among the inventors.
Figure 4.18 displays the geographic distribution of average environmental policy
leadership scores between 2000 and 2019. As with policy portfolios, there is noticeable
clustering of environmental policy leadership by region. Countries in North America
and the Amazon countries tend to score highly, in contrast to relatively low scores in
North Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia. There can also be sharp differences
between neighboring regions. For example, countries in Southern and Eastern Africa






















































Figure 4.19 compares environmental policy leadership by wealth, democracy, and
conflict. Starting with wealth, the relatively rich countries that are part of the OECD
initially had slightly higher leadership scores than relatively poor non-member countries,
but this gap opened slightly in the 1970s and then to a larger extent from the 1980s to
mid-2000s. However, the rate of growth in environmental policy leadership for OECD
member states decreased markedly in the 1990s. In contrast, non-member states of the
OECD saw their environmental policy leadership, previously stagnant, start to climb in
the 1990s and the size of the gap between rich and poor states in more recent years has
shrunk back to its 1970s-era equivalent. In 2019, the non-member of the OECD displays
as much environmental policy leadership as the average OECD member state in 1990.
With democracy, there was initially little difference between more and less democratic
states in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 4.19b). But by the mid-1990s, the most democratic
states had separated themselves from the pack and have consistently demonstrated more
environmental policy leadership than other countries since then. The environmental
policy leadership of less democratic countries has also grown, albeit less quickly, such
that the difference in policy leadership between the most and least democratic states has
become considerably less since the mid-1990s.
In terms of conflict, states at war have generally demonstrated less environmental
policy leadership than states at peace over the past 60 years (Figure 4.19c). The
only period when this gap closed was from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, a period
when highly innovative and influential countries like Russia and India were engaged in
major armed conflicts. As of 2019, countries at peace display approximately 50% more
environmental policy leadership than countries at war.
Finally, Table 4.C.3 shows the countries with the five highest environmental policy
leadership scores in each decade. In recent decades, environmental policy leaders have
tended to be either large (e.g., China and Russia) or wealthy (e.g., Italy, Canada, and
the United Kingdom). For 2010–2019, the highest-scoring countries were China, Russia,
Peru, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Perhaps surprisingly, the United States is not
among the top five in any decade, although it just misses out at position six for 2010–2019.
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(a) By OECD membership
(b) By electoral democracy
(c) By armed conflict
Figure 4.19: Environmental policy leadership by OECD membership, electoral democ-
racy, and armed conflict, 1960–2019.
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4.5 Conclusion
I started this chapter by describing three key characteristics for measuring environmental
policy leadership: broad topical scope, wide geographic breadth, and long temporal
coverage. I then presented the results of a systematic literature review in which I measured
the topical, geographic, and temporal characteristics of existing data on environmental
policy adoption. I found that scholars have tended to focus on pollution-centric topics
like energy, air, and waste while ignoring traditional environmental issues like minerals,
fisheries, and agriculture. I also discovered that very few comparative analyses of
environmental policy include observations from large portions of the developing world,
especially countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South and South-East Asia.
With these limitations in mind, I introduced policy extraction, a new method for
identifying policy adoption events through a sophisticated keyword search of a large
collection of laws and regulations. I then proceeded to apply this methodology to the
FAOLEX dataset, yielding a dataset on environmental policy adoptions that is two
orders of magnitude larger than the most widely used environmental policy datasets. I
concluded the chapter by calculating environmental policy leadership and its constituent
components of environmental policy innovation and influence. In the following chapter, I
use these measures as the foundation for evaluating the extent to which the activities of
transnational environmental policy advocates explain variation in environmental policy
leadership.
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Appendix 4.B Top five most widely adopted policies in
FAOLEX by topic
Table 4.B.1: Top five most widely adopted environmental policies in FAOLEX by topic
Subject Policy Min Max N(countries)
Agricultural & rural dev. promote|develop|agricultural production 1963 2018 169
Agricultural & rural dev. promote|develop|agricultural product 1948 2018 150
Agricultural & rural dev. promote|develop|farm 1948 2019 127
Agricultural & rural dev. promote|develop|rural employment 1951 2018 122
Agricultural & rural dev. promote|produce|agricultural production 1962 2019 106
Air & atmosphere standard|deplete|ozone 1988 2018 60
Air & atmosphere promote|develop|emissions trading 2009 2014 30
Air & atmosphere promote|restore|greenhouse gas emission 1993 2019 27
Air & atmosphere standard|emit|limit value 1990 2018 23
Air & atmosphere licence|emit|air pollution 1984 2015 22
Cultivated plants promote|develop|seed 1937 2018 101
Cultivated plants standard|apply|pesticide 1971 2019 92
Cultivated plants standard|import|seed 1966 2018 83
Cultivated plants ban|apply|pesticide 1972 2019 71
Cultivated plants standard|trade|seed 1977 2019 71
Energy promote|develop|energy efficiency 1985 2018 90
Energy standard|distribute|electricity transmission 1924 2019 75
Energy licence|distribute|electricity transmission 1981 2019 66
Energy cooperation|apply|nuclear energy 1972 2016 64
Energy promote|develop|renewable energy 1986 2019 61
Environment gen. manage|conserve|environmental protection 1974 2018 172
Environment gen. promote|conserve|environmental protection 1969 2018 167
Environment gen. promote|restore|environmental protection 1974 2018 143
Environment gen. promote|develop|climate change 2001 2019 141
Environment gen. promote|develop|environmental protection 1974 2018 138
Fisheries promote|develop|aquaculture 1981 2018 107
Fisheries standard|produce|fish processing facility 1982 2019 107
Fisheries promote|produce|fish processing facility 1981 2018 105
Fisheries collect data|produce|fish processing facility 1996 2019 68
Fisheries ban|fishing|fishing equipment 1957 2018 63
Food & nutrition promote|develop|food safety 1968 2018 163
Food & nutrition promote|develop|food security 1987 2018 125
Food & nutrition promote|develop|food additives 1958 2019 102
Food & nutrition standard|apply|food additives 1962 2019 90
Continued on next page
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Table 4.B.1: Top five most widely adopted environmental policies in FAOLEX by topic
Subject Policy Min Max N(countries)
Food & nutrition standard|produce|food safety 1966 2017 73
Forestry promote|develop|wood product 1968 2019 68
Forestry standard|trade|wood product 1929 2017 47
Forestry promote|conserve|deforestation 2000 2018 46
Forestry promote|trade|wood product 1973 2019 46
Forestry manage|produce|wood product 1978 2017 42
Land & soil standard|graze|pastoral land 1953 2019 87
Land & soil ban|graze|pastoral land 1950 2018 66
Land & soil promote|graze|pastoral land 1953 2019 62
Land & soil promote|develop|economic development zone 1994 2018 52
Land & soil subsidize|graze|pastoral land 1923 2017 52
Livestock licence|produce|animal feed 1973 2019 61
Livestock standard|apply|veterinary medicine 1983 2019 57
Livestock standard|import|animal feed 1956 2017 57
Livestock standard|import|cattle 1973 2018 57
Livestock inspection|produce|animal feed 1962 2018 56
Mineral resources standard|conserve|radioactive mineral 1996 2017 34
Mineral resources standard|transport|radioactive mineral 1996 2019 25
Mineral resources licence|transport|radioactive mineral 1994 2019 20
Mineral resources licence|package|radioactive mineral 1996 2002 18
Mineral resources licence|import|radioactive mineral 1967 2018 13
Sea standard|transport|vessel 1960 2019 105
Sea inspection|transport|vessel 1974 2019 87
Sea licence|transport|vessel 1960 2019 82
Sea manage|transport|vessel 1972 2019 78
Sea registration|transport|vessel 1960 2019 66
Waste & hazardous subst. promote|develop|sanitation service 1961 2019 84
Waste & hazardous subst. standard|transport|hazardous chemical 1980 2018 72
Waste & hazardous subst. promote|develop|waste management 1994 2018 70
Waste & hazardous subst. licence|emit|wastewater 1973 2019 68
Waste & hazardous subst. standard|apply|hazardous chemical 1983 2019 65
Water manage|conserve|surface water 1973 2018 58
Water promote|develop|surface water 1977 2019 58
Water standard|conserve|ocean 1979 2017 54
Water manage|develop|water supply 1974 2018 53
Water manage|conserve|ocean 1987 2018 51
Wild species & ecosystems promote|develop|conservation research 1947 2019 136
Wild species & ecosystems standard|conserve|wildlife 1935 2019 133
Wild species & ecosystems promote|conserve|biodiversity 1972 2019 127
Continued on next page
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Table 4.B.1: Top five most widely adopted environmental policies in FAOLEX by topic
Subject Policy Min Max N(countries)
Wild species & ecosystems promote|conserve|wildlife 1964 2018 117
Wild species & ecosystems manage|conserve|wildlife 1964 2018 116
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Appendix 4.C Additional tables and figures
Figure 4.C.1: Global, within-region, and regional environmental policy portfolio similar-
ity, 1960–2019 (domestic policies only).
Figure 4.C.2: Environmental policy innovation rate for all countries combined by
traditional and secondary environmental issues, 1960–2019.
Values are smoothed using a 3-year rolling average for presentation purposes.
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Figure 4.C.3: Environmental policy influence score for all countries combined by
traditional and secondary environmental issues, 1960–2019.
Values are smoothed using a 3-year rolling average for presentation purposes.
Figure 4.C.4: Environmental policy leadership for all countries combined by traditional
and secondary environmental issues, 1960–2019.
Values are smoothed using a 3-year rolling average for presentation purposes.
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Table 4.C.1: Top five highest environmental innovation rates by decade
1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989
1 Kenya (3.2%) Papua New Guinea (1.1%) Italy (1.5%)
2 Eswatini (2.1%) Bangladesh (1.0%) Greece (1.0%)
3 Lesotho (1.4%) Italy (1.0%) Spain (0.9%)
4 Tanzania (1.0%) United Kingdom (0.7%) Ireland (0.9%)
5 Mauritius (1.0%) Ireland (0.7%) United Kingdom (0.8%)
1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019
1 Russia (4.3%) Russia (2.1%) China (2.1%)
2 Italy (2.1%) United Kingdom (2.0%) United States (2.0%)
3 Spain (1.9%) China (1.8%) Russia (1.8%)
4 United Kingdom (1.8%) France (1.8%) Peru (1.8%)
5 Portugal (1.8%) Latvia (1.5%) Ecuador (1.7%)
Table 4.C.2: Top five highest environmental influence scores by decade
1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989
1 Sudan (1.8) Mali (11.7) Italy (17.2)
2 Egypt (1.7) Panama (9.0) Panama (8.4)
3 Madagascar (1.7) Qatar (8.5) Pakistan (8.1)
4 Israel (1.6) Senegal (7.8) Morocco (7.8)
5 Pakistan (1.6) Morocco (4.2) Greece (7.5)
1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019
1 Italy (50.2) Russia (140.7) Russia (180.8)
2 Russia (38.0) Italy (95.5) China (130.3)
3 Greece (33.8) Spain (71.6) Italy (104.9)
4 Spain (29.0) United Kingdom (66.6) United Kingdom (96.1)
5 United Kingdom (26.3) China (57.8) Spain (85.7)
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Table 4.C.3: Top five highest environmental policy leadership scores by decade
1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989
1 Kenya (96.9) Italy (92.9) Italy (100.0)
2 France (90.9) Pakistan (92.9) Greece (98.1)
3 Pakistan (89.2) France (91.7) United Kingdom (91.9)
4 Madagascar (86.5) United Kingdom (91.0) Spain (91.2)
5 India (84.3) Israel (88.9) France (90.7)
1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019
1 Italy (99.5) Russia (100.0) China (99.5)
2 Russia (99.5) United Kingdom (97.9) Russia (99.0)
3 Spain (97.4) China (96.9) Peru (95.4)
4 United Kingdom (96.3) Italy (95.4) Canada (93.9)
5 Greece (94.8) Spain (94.3) United Kingdom (93.4)
Appendix 4.D Procedure for determining optimal win-
dow size for dynamic network inference
I estimate the primary network of interest by pooling across all topics, although I also
estimate separate influence networks for each topic. To measure these networks over
time, I use a 40-year sliding window. The length of the window was determined, as per
Desmarais et al. (2015), by comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion statistics for
pooled discrete-time event-history models that estimate policy adoption as a function of
the cumulative number of states to have already adopted the policy, the number of a
state’s leaders in the network to have adopted a policy previously, and a policy-specific
intercept. The two other parameters in the NetInf algorithm, the total number of edges in
the network and a rate parameter for penalizing the time gap between policy adoptions,
were determined automatically via an iterative Vuong-style test check for whether each
edge significantly improved the network fit and as the midpoint between the inverse
averages of the minimum and maximum diffusion times across all cascades, respectively




Effect on Environmental Policy
Leadership
In this chapter, I assess the extent to which transnational environmental advocates cat-
alyze environmental policy leadership. I begin by evaluating the overall relationship
between environmental policy leadership and the activities of large international envi-
ronmental NGOs, environmental programming by IDOs, and lobbying on environmental
issues by multinational corporations over the past two decades. Next, I break up pol-
icy leadership into its constituent dimensions of innovation and influence to understand
whether different types of transnational advocates have a stronger relationship with one
component than another. I then consider the conditions under which transnational ad-
vocates tend to be more successful in spurring environmental policy leadership, as well
as the efficacy of different strategies of advocacy and the potential for synergies among
various types of transnational advocates. Finally, I examine whether the relationship
between transnational environmental advocacy and policy leadership varies by issue and
policy complexity.
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5.1 Transnational advocacy and environmental policy
leadership
As discussed in Chapter 2, leaders in environmental policy development are both innova-
tive, quick to adopt new environmental policies, and influential, inspiring policymakers
in other countries to adopt similar policies. In other words, environmental policy leaders
both “walk the walk” and “talk the talk” in environmental policy. In Chapter 3, I focused
on transnational advocates who inform, support, and pressure policymakers to spend
their time and resources working on environmental issues. Transnational advocates play
a dual role in environmental policymaking, contributing to transnational communication
by conveying information about the actions of other policymakers while simultaneously
encouraging policymakers to adopt favored policies. Accordingly, I anticipate that coun-
tries display higher levels of environmental policy leadership when transnational environ-
mental advocates are more active (H1a) and when these states are connected through
transnational advocates with other states that display high levels of environmental policy
leadership (H1b). In Chapter 4, I introduced a novel measure of environmental policy
leadership constructed from the combination of a country’s rate of environmental policy
innovation and its number of followers. In this section, I assess the extent to which vari-
ation in environmental policy leadership is explained by the activities of transnational
advocates.
To account for the dual role of transnational advocates as both proponents of
environmental policy (a direct effect) and as agents of transnational communication,
I use a temporal network autocorrelation model (TNAM). Like other spatial models, a
TNAM allows the researcher to specify a connectivity matrix composed of elements set to
a value greater than 0 if there is a dependency between a given pair of units (Plümper and
Neumayer 2010). These dependencies reflect communication channels between countries
that form due to the transnational coordination of environmental policy advocacy. TNAM
is a spatial autoregressive model, meaning that the outcome is affected by outcomes
in connected units, with stronger dependencies (i.e., more communication) producing
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stronger effects. The temporal aspect of the TNAM allows both the connectivity matrix
and variables of interest to vary over time and include time lags (Franzese Jr and Hays
2007).
The TNAM in this analysis takes the following form:
yit ∼ βitX + ρ1Eyit + ρ2Dyit + ρ3Myit + γZyit + εit
The dependent variable, yit, is the leadership score (Leadershipi,t) for country i in year
t. The term X is a vector containing country-level covariates, including three explanatory
variables of interest: 1) NGOsi,t, the number of large international environmental NGOs
present in a country i in year t, 2) IDOsi,t, the amount of environmental ODA per
capita spent or received by all IDOs reporting to the OECD DAC in a country i in
a year t, and 3) MNCsi,t, the estimated amount spent (as a percentage of GDP) on
environmental lobbying by all multinational corporations in a country i in a year t.
These variables capture the catalytic effect of transnational advocates on environmental
policy innovation. X also contains a set of control variables accounting for policymakers’
access to information, resources and capacity, and political will, discussed in detail
below. E, D, and M are time-varying connectivity matrices representing, respectively,
the number of large international environmental NGOs, environmental ODA funding by
IDOs, and the number of environment-lobbying MNCs each pair of countries share at
time t. Z represents connectivity matrices for other control variables, described below.
By multiplying these matrices by the policy leadership of other countries, these network
autocorrelation terms capture how transnational advocates amplify the influence of the
countries with which they work.1
5.1.1 Control variables
Since this analysis relies on an observational research design, it is important to account
for other factors that might affect the relationship between transnational environmental
1This model specification shares elements in common with Kammerer and Namhata (2018), who
examine how intergovernmental climate cooperation inspires climate policy change.
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advocacy and environmental policy leadership. These variables can be grouped into
three sets of covariates representing factors affecting policymakers’ access to information,
resources and capacity, and political will to engage in environmental policy innovation.
Table 5.1 lists these variables and their data sources.
Table 5.1: Control variables
Type Variable Source
Information
Domestic environmental NGOs Longhofer et al. (2016)
CSO consultation index Coppedge et al. (2021)
KOF globalization index Gygli et al. (2019)
Resources/capacity
GDP per capita PPP World Bank (2021b)
Environmental ministry Aklin and Urpelainen (2014)
Number of veto points Cruz et al. (2021)
Political will
Institutions
Polyarchy index Coppedge et al. (2021)
Federalism Henisz (2017)
EU membership Head et al. (2014)
OECD membership Author
Parties
Left-wing control of executive Cruz et al. (2021)
Green party Author
Issue salience
Greenhouse gas emissions Climate Watch (2021)
Natural resource rents (% GDP) World Bank (2021c)
Agricultural land (% land area) World Bank (2021a)
Major armed conflict Pettersson and Öberg (2020)
Peers
Colonial relationship Head et al. (2014)
Common language Head et al. (2014)
Contiguity Head et al. (2014)
Regional Trade Agreement Head et al. (2014)
Trade flows Head et al. (2014)
History
Leadership (lag) Author
The first set, access to information, centers on the ability of policymakers to learn
about environmental problems and potential policy solutions through other channels.
Information is a precondition to adopting any policy because policymakers need to
appreciate the relevance and appropriateness of the policy options at hand (Dolowitz and
Marsh 2000). Domestic civil society organizations can play an important role in keeping
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policymakers informed about environmental issues (Steinberg et al. 2001; Kim and Cha
2004). I measure the strength of domestic civil society in terms of the logged number
of domestic environmental NGOs (Longhofer et al. 2016) and the opportunities these
organizations have to influence policymaking via the V-DEM civil society organization
consultation index (Bernhard et al. 2015; Coppedge et al. 2021). Integration into global
economic, political, and cultural activities, as measured via the KOF globalization index
(Gygli et al. 2019), is also important for policymakers to stay about new policies and to
inform others about their own changes in environmental policy. I expect increases in all
these factors to be positively related to environmental policy leadership.
The second set of covariates, resources and capacity, speaks to the economic and
human resources that policymakers have at their disposal for environmental policymaking
because policymakers should be more likely to adopt policies when they believe successful
implementation is feasible.2 A generic measure of these resources is logged Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita purchasing power parity, 2021 international dollars,
World Bank (2021b)). The existence of an environmental ministry provides a more
specific measure of the resources available for working on environmental issues and
building international environmental influence (Aklin and Urpelainen 2014; Aamodt
2018). Another component of capacity is the feasibility of successfully enacting changes in
environmental policy, which is affected by the number of veto points in the policymaking
process (Madden 2014; Cruz et al. 2021). I anticipate that countries that are wealthier and
that have environmental ministries will tend to demonstrate more environmental policy
leadership, while countries with more veto points will tend to find it more challenging to
act as environmental policy leaders.
Once policymakers have sufficient information and capacity, the third and final
obstacle to the exercise of environmental policy leadership is political will. Policymakers
need to be motivated to devote their limited time and political capital to environmental
issues. I identify four subsets of factors affecting political will: institutions, parties,
2It may also happen that governments adopt infeasible, but popular policies as signaling devices
(Simmons et al. 2006; Liefferink et al. 2016). To the extent this signaling occurs, it should weaken the
relationship between implementation capacity and leadership.
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issue salience, and peers. Starting with institutions, the existence of electoral democracy,
measured via V-DEM’s polyarchy index (Teorell et al. 2019; Coppedge et al. 2021), is
thought to foster political attention to environmental problems (Neumayer 2002; Bättig
and Bernauer 2009). Since this analysis focuses on national-level policy, federalism should
affect policy leadership because national governments in unitary political systems have
more policymaking responsibility than national governments in federal systems (Henisz
2017).3 Countries that are members of the European Union and/or members of the
OECD may also tend to demonstrate more environmental policy leadership through their
implementation of group-level environmental initiatives.
Turning to parties, governments led by left-wing political parties may be more
responsive to social ills like pollution and resource degradation (Neumayer 2003). The
existence of a national-level Green party may also help push environmental issues higher
up the political agenda (Knill et al. 2010). I collected original data on Green party
creation and destruction through internet searches based on lists of Green parties
maintained by Global Greens4 and the World Ecological Parties organizations.5
For the third subset, resources, policymakers may also devote more effort to
environmental issues when such issues are more important, which can be thought of
in terms of both problem pressure, measured as log greenhouse gas emissions (Climate
Watch 2021), and issue salience, using measures like natural resource rents as a proportion
of GDP (World Bank 2021c) and agricultural land as a proportion of land area (World
Bank 2021c). The salience of environmental issues also depends on the other topics
competing for policymakers’ attention. For example, policymakers may pass less attention
to environmental issues when their country is the site of major armed conflict, measured
as more than 1000 battle deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020).
Finally, policymakers’ political will to act as leaders on environmental policy may
also be a function of the environmental policy leadership of their peers in other states.
3Conversely, Schaffer and Bernauer (2014) observe that federalism is positively associated with the
adoption of renewable energy policies, a finding they explain with reference to the opportunities for
policy experimentation at the sub-national level.
4https://GlobalGreens.org (accessed June 2, 2021).
5https://www.w-e-p.org (accessed June 2, 2021).
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Policymakers may consider their counterparts in other jurisdictions to be peers based on
a variety of cultural, political, and economic linkages, including colonial relationships,
Hicks et al. (2010), common language (Holzinger et al. 2008b), geographical contiguity
(Simmons and Elkins 2004), regional trade agreements,6 and trade flows (Schaffer and
Bernauer 2014). I measure regional trade agreements, colonial ties, contiguity, trade
(BACI) using the CEPII Gravity database (Head et al. 2014).
In addition to covariates on information, resources, and political will, I account for
the autoregressive nature of environmental policy leadership using lags of environmental
policy leadership. I control for unobserved country-level heterogeneity via country
fixed effects and unobserved year-level heterogeneity via year fixed effects. These
steps account for potentially relevant time-invariant country characteristics, such as
biodiversity, and events of global significance for environmental policy, such as the Paris
Climate Agreement. Table 5.A.1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in
the primary analyses. All covariates are centered and scaled for ease of interpretation.
5.1.2 Is advocacy endogenous to leadership?
Before presenting the results of this analysis, I pause to reflect on the threat posed
by endogeneity in this circumstance. Policy advocacy is a strategic behavior and, since
exogenous shocks that affect only advocacy and not policymaking are exceedingly difficult
to find, I am obliged to use an observational approach. As a result, there is a risk
of endogeneity—that is, that transnational advocates choose to work in places where
governments are already innovative and influential and so are epiphenomenal to policy
leadership rather than acting as agents of change.
While endogeneity is indeed a risk, there are theoretical reasons to believe these
concerns are not as serious as they appear at first glance. As discussed in Chapter 3,
the missions of environmental NGOs, as well as IDOs, should lead them to focus their
6Most work on the effect of regional trade agreements focuses specifically on the European Union.
These studies include, among many others, Héritier and Knill (2001), Mattli and Plümper (2004),
Liefferink and Jordan (2005), Oberthür and Roche Kelly (2008), Knill and Tosun (2009), Jordan et al.
(2010), Knill et al. (2012a), Wurzel and Connelly (2011), Wurzel et al. (2017), and Jänicke and Wurzel
(2019).
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efforts on jurisdictions in which their efforts are most needed. For example, Murdie and
Urpelainen (2015) finds that environmental NGOs are more likely to work in places where
governments are repressive and lack the institutional infrastructure for environmental
governance. Similarly, Hicks et al. (2010) observes that trade and colonial ties are among
the most important influences on where bilateral IDOs work, far outweighing problem-
specific considerations. Multinational corporations primarily decide to work in countries
according to market size and access to resources (De Backer and Miroudot 2018), as well
as the perceived risk of the state expropriating their investments (Choi et al. 2015). After
accounting for the economic, political, and geographic factors that attract advocates, any
remaining risk of endogeneity would tend to be in the direction of working in more difficult
policy settings.
I also take statistical measures to mitigate concerns of endogeneity. To account
for the potential that transnational advocates anticipate when a country will enact
policies and increase its leadership, I include lagged measures of the dependent
variable. Certain countries may also attract transnational advocates according to
their governments’ idiosyncratic and longstanding reputations for environmental policy
leadership, a possibility that I account for by including country-level fixed effects.
5.1.3 Estimation procedure
I prepare the data for analysis by calculating network autocorrelation variables using the
tnam package in R (Leifeld et al. 2017), taking the mean environmental policy leadership
of each country’s sources to reflect the average alter effect. I impute missing data using the
R package Amelia (Honaker et al. 2011). I estimate the TNAM as a dynamic panel model
for the years 2002–2019. Dynamic panel models contain one or more lags of the dependent
variable on the right side of the model (Arellano 2003). Such lags are appropriate because
policy leadership is likely to be autoregressive, meaning a country’s policy leadership in
one period will directly affect subsequent values of policy leadership (e.g., by building a
reputation among its followers). I use the Breusch-Pagan test, Durbin-Watson test, and
Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation in fixed effect panels to determine the optimal
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number of lags (see Wooldridge 2010).
Panel data in observational research designs tend to exhibit idiosyncratic variation
by its unit of observation (country) and time (year). To account for these idiosyncratic
sources of variation, I include country and year fixed effects. I adjust the conventional
OLS estimates according to the White method using a heteroskedasticity and serial (cross-
sectional) correlation-robust error matrix (Arellano et al. 1987). I center and scale all
continuous covariates for interpretability.
When country fixed effects are used in dynamic panel models, their demeaning
operation produces Nickell bias by inducing correlation between the centered lagged
dependent variable and the centered error term and forcing parameter estimates toward
zero (Nickell 1981). Nickell bias is of the order 1
T
, where T is the number of time periods,
meaning this bias should be relatively small for a panel of moderate length (Beck and
Katz 2011). Since my data comprise a total of 20 years (before lags), the bias should
be relatively small. Accordingly, I report unadjusted OLS estimates as my main results,
which are robust to alternative specifications that account for Nickell bias.7
5.1.4 Leadership analysis results
Figure 5.1 displays coefficient estimates and 90% and 95% confidence intervals for the
relationship between transnational advocacy and environmental policy leadership.8 For
dynamic panel models, regression estimates can be calculated both in terms of short-
run effects, an immediate change in a variable, and long-run effects, the cumulative sum
of effects assuming a stationary process with effects asymptotically declining to zero
over time (Wooldridge 2015; Pickup 2014).9 I center and scale the dependent variable,
7Specifically, I address Nickell bias by applying the orthogonal reparameterization approach imple-
mented in the OrthoPanels package in R (Pickup et al. 2017). The orthogonal reparameterization
approach separates the likelihood functions for the fixed effects from other parameters such that the
former are informationally orthogonal to the latter and no longer lead to correlated regressors and error
terms (Pickup and Hopkins 2020). Through the orthogonal reparameterization approach, I can generate
unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters of interest using a dynamic panel model with fixed
effects over a short duration as N →∞ (Lancaster 2002). The results of these orthogonal panel models
are labeled “OPM (bias-adjusted)” in the tables at the end of this chapter.
8The full results for environmental policy leadership are presented in tabular form in Table 5.B.1.
9Long-run effects can be calculated as β/(1 −
∑i
i∈I ρi), where ρi is the autoregressive parameter of
lag i (see Chudik et al. (2018), eq. 9).
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environmental policy leadership, for ease of interpretation.
The results demonstrated strong support for the effect of large international envi-
ronmental NGOs on environmental policy leadership. For every one-standard-deviation
increase in the number of international NGOs present in a country (approximately 2.5
NGOs), environmental policy leadership increases in the short run by 7.22 (SE = 2.27,
p < 0.01) percent of a standard deviation and in the long run by 14.09 (SE = 4.44,
p < 0.01) percent of a standard deviation. However, the network autocorrelation (NAC)
term for international environmental NGOs fails to obtain conventional levels of statistical
significance.
In contrast to international environmental NGOs, the activities of other transnational
advocates do not appear to be systematically related to environmental policy leadership.10
Neither of the estimates for environmental spending by international development
organizations and lobbying expenditures on environmental issues by multinational
corporations attain statistical significance, nor do the estimates for their NAC terms.
Among the covariates, environmental policy leadership is positively and statistically
significantly related to the log number of domestic environmental NGOs, membership
in the European Union, rents from natural resource extraction, the existence of a green
party (at the 90% confidence level), as are the first and second lagged environmental
policy leadership scores. Contrary to expectations, environmental policy leadership in
countries with a shared language has a negative relationship with environmental policy
leadership, albeit only at the 90% confidence level.
These results provide support for the proposition that states display higher levels of
environmental policy leadership when transnational environmental advocates are more
active (H1a), at least for the activities of international environmental NGOs. However,
the results do not supportH1b, the expectation that states would display higher levels of
environmental policy leadership when states with transnational environmental advocates
in common display higher levels of environmental policy leadership. This result suggests
that international environmental NGOs affect environmental policy leadership primarily
10This result is robust to specifying the NAC terms with zero, one, or two years of lag between the
environmental policy leadership in source and recipient state (results not shown).
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due to their advocacy efforts, rather than due to their role as go-betweens linking
policymakers in different jurisdictions.
Figure 5.1: Short-run and long-run model estimates for transnational advocacy by
large international environmental NGOs, international development organizations, and
multinational corporations (DV: Environmental policy leadership).
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust confidence intervals (90% and 95% levels)
for direct and network autocorrelation (NAC) terms.
Given the observational design of this analysis, causal interpretations of these results
rely on the assumption of no unobserved confounding. To understand the robustness
of these results to violations of this assumption, I calculated the impact that one or a
combination of omitted variables would need to have to cause the relationship between
international environmental NGOs and environmental policy leadership to lose statistical
significance at the 95% confidence level. For this task, I used the sensitivity analysis tools
developed by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) and implemented in R in the sensemakr package
(Cinelli et al. 2020). Figure 5.2 shows that the positive direction of the effect is robust
to confounding as much as thirteen times stronger than one of the strongest observed
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covariates, EU membership. The plot demonstrates that the effect for international
environmental NGOs on environmental policy leadership would still be statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level in the presence of confounders even thirteen times
as influential as EU membership. In light of what is known about the determinants of
environmental policy change, such an important unobserved confounder is unlikely to
exist.
I conducted an array of additional analyses to assess the robustness of these results
to alternative model specifications. As shown in Table 5.B.2, the orthogonal panel
models with Nickell bias-adjusted estimates are consistent with the unadjusted OLS
estimates. The main conclusions about the relationships between transnational advocates
and environmental policy leadership also hold when three, four, or even five additional
lags are included in the model. Further, as shown in Table 5.B.3, the results are robust
when I replace the environmental policy leadership score with its year-on-year difference,
when I allow for non-linearities in the relationships between transnational advocates and
environmental policy leadership, and when I use a broader definition of environmental
lobbying by multinational corporations.11 Table 5.B.4 shows that the results are also
robust to replacing the measure of IDO activity with the log count of projects per capita
or with the log count of IDO organizations per capita and to replacing the measure of
MNC activity with the log count of MNC firms present in each country-year. The primary
variables of interest retain their sign and statistical significance (or lack thereof) across
all specifications.
5.1.5 Summary
Overall, the results indicate that large international environmental NGOs play a
substantively large, statistically robust role in catalyzing increases in environmental
policy leadership. In particular, these organizations primarily affect environmental
policy leadership through direct advocacy, rather than simply serving as a means
11For example, this broader measure attributes lobbying on economic development to the Agricultural
& rural development topic, even if a lot of economic development policies are not specifically intended
for rural areas.
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Figure 5.2: Sensitivity of relationship between international environmental NGOs and
environmental policy leadership to unobserved confounders.
The unadjusted estimate is the black triangle and the red diamonds represent the estimate
in the presence of an unobserved confounder that explains five, ten, and thirteen times
as much variance in the treatment (international environmental NGOs) and outcome
(environmental policy leadership) as EU membership. The contour lines represent t-
values.
158
of communicating information about policy changes enacted in other countries. In
contrast, environmental spending by IDOs and environmental lobbying by multinational
corporations do not appear to have, on average, a systematic effect on environmental
policy leadership.
5.2 Transnational advocacy and environmental policy
innovation and influence
Looking beyond the overall relationship between transnational advocacy and environ-
mental policy leadership, I consider whether transnational advocates have a stronger or
weaker relationship with the constituent components of environmental policy leadership,
innovation and influence. As described in Chapter 3, I expect that states have a higher
rate of environmental policy innovation when more international environmental NGOs
are present (H2a) and when they are the recipient of ore environmental ODA funding by
IDOs (H2b) and more environmental lobbying from multinational corporations (H2c).
Similarly, I anticipate that a country is more likely to serve as a policy leader to another
when the two states share more international environmental NGOs in common (H3a),
the leader country sends more environmental ODA to the follower via an IDO (H3b), and
the two states share more multinational corporations in common (H3c). In the remain-
der of this section, I present results for the analyses of environmental policy innovation
and influence in turn.
5.2.1 Innovation
Starting with innovation, I run a dynamic panel model with the same specification as for
environmental policy leadership, but I replace the dependent variable with each country-
year’s environmental policy innovation rate. As described in Chapter 3, the environmental
policy innovation rate is calculated as the proportion of environmental policies adopted
out of the set of policies that were available but had not already been adopted by each
government in each year. I center and scale the innovation rate for ease of interpretation.
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Figure 5.3 displays coefficient estimates and 90% and 95% confidence intervals for the
relationship between transnational advocacy and environmental policy leadership.12
Like the results for environmental policy leadership, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the number of international environmental NGOs in a country leads to an increase
of 6.63 (SE = 3.31, p < 0.05) percent of a standard deviation in environmental policy
innovation in the short-run and a 12.80 (SE= 6.38, p < 0.05) percent increase in the long-
run. Environmental spending by international development organizations also appears to
have a positive effect on environmental policy innovation, with a one-standard-deviation
increase in environmental spending by IDOs leading environmental policy leadership to
increase by 5.70 (SE= 1.93, p < 0.01) in the short-run and by 11 (SE= 3.72, p < 0.01) in
the long-run. Lobbying on environmental issues by multinational corporations does not
appear to have a systematic relationship with environmental policy innovation, nor do
the network autocorrelation terms for the three transnational advocates. EU membership
is a strong predictor of environmental policy innovation, while OECD membership is
negatively related to environmental policy innovation.
These analyses support the proposition that environmental policy innovation should
increase in the presence of international environmental NGOs (H2a) and with environ-
mental spending by IDOs (H2b). However, there is little evidence in favor of the hypoth-
esis that policy innovation would increase with environmental lobbying by multinational
corporations (H2c).
In alternative model specifications presented in Tables 5.C.2 and 5.C.3, the relation-
ships between environmental policy innovation and international environmental NGOs
and IDOs are maintained in most, but not all, model specifications. The coefficient for
international environmental NGOs is positive and statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level for the model specifications with four years of lags and a broader measure
of environmental lobbying by multinational corporations, at the 90% confidence level for
OPM, first-difference, and non-linear model specifications, and fails to reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in models with three and five years of lags. The coefficient
12The full results for environmental policy leadership are presented in tabular form in Table 5.C.1.
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Figure 5.3: Short-run and long-run model estimates for transnational advocacy by
large international environmental NGOs, international development organizations, and
multinational corporations (DV: Environmental policy innovation).
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust confidence intervals (90% and 95% levels)
for direct and network autocorrelation (NAC) terms.
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for IDO environmental spending is positive and statistically significant at the 95% confi-
dence level for the non-linear and a broader measure of corporate environmental lobbying,
as well as the models with three, four, five years of lags. Finally, I note that the risk of
collinearity among the measures of transnational advocacy is low, as the single highest
bivariate correlation among the three measures is ρ = 0.43.
5.2.2 Influence
As discussed in Chapter 2, environmental policy influence is a network-based concept in
which policy adoptions in leader (source) countries persistently affect the probability of
policy adoptions in follower (receiver) countries. Accordingly, I estimate a temporal expo-
nential random graph (TERGM) model with bootstrapped pseudolikelihood estimation,
a statistical model designed for network analysis to assess whether countries are more
likely to develop a leader-follower environmental policymaking relationship when they
share more transnational advocates. TERGMs model the probability of observing a par-
ticular arrangement of ties between nodes at a given point in time as a function of node-,
dyad-, and network-level exogenous covariates, endogenous features of the network, and
temporal dependencies (Leifeld et al. 2018).
I estimate variants of the following model:
yi→j,t ∼β1SharedNGOsi,j,t + β2IDOSpendingi→j,t + β3SharedMultinationalsi,j,t+
δγDyadicCovariatesi,j,t +NodalCovariatesi+j,t+
αEndogenousCovariatesN,t + φTemporalDependenciesN,t + εit
The dependent variable, yi→j,t, is a binary indicator for the existence of a leader-
follower environmental policymaking relationship from country i to country j at time t.
SharedNGOsi,j,t is the number of large international environmental NGOs present in
both country i and country j at time t. IDOSpendingi→j,t is the logged (inverse-sine
transformed) amount of environmental ODA spending sent from country i to country
j at time t. Multinationalsi,j,t is the number of S&P 500 multinational corporations
162
present in both country i and country j at time t. DyadicCovariatesi,j,t represents
other relationships between country i and country j that may influence the formation
of a leader-follower relationship at time t, namely co-membership in language, colonial,
contiguity, trade agreement, and trade flow networks. NodalCovariatesi+j,t is the set of
nodal attributes that may affect the probability of country i acting as a leader to any
given country or country j following any given country at time t. These variables consist
of the same monadic covariates used in the leadership and innovation model that reflect
policymakers’ access to information, resources and capacity, and, via institutions, parties,
and issue salience, political will to develop environmental policy, as well as leader and
follower country fixed effects. Each nodal covariate adds a single variable equal to the
sum of the nodal covariate of the potential leader i and the potential follower j. All
dyadic and monadic covariates are centered and scaled for ease of interpretation.
A distinguishing feature of TERGMs is the ability to include network-level attributes
in addition to node- and dyad-level factors. EndogenousCovariatesN,t captures
attributes of network N that may affect the formation of relationships between countries
at time t. I include measures of the density of the influence network (number of ties),
the tendency for countries to follow each other (number of mutual relationships), the
tendency for countries with many followers to acquire more followers (geometrically-
weighted out-degree), the tendency for countries to share multiple followers or leaders
in common (geometrically-weighted edgewise shared partners), and the tendency for two
countries with shared followers or leaders to form direct relationships (cyclic triplets).
Finally, TemporalDependenciesN,t represents the relationship between the network N at
time t and its previous iterations through a term measuring the tendency for ties and
non-ties to carry over from one year to the next (dyadic stability), linear time trends,
and the tendency for nodes that formed a relationship at time t− 1 to form a reciprocal
relationship at time t.13 Missing data were imputed using Amelia in R (Honaker et al.
2011) and quantities of interest were estimated using btergm in R (Leifeld et al. 2018)
using 500 bootstrap replicates. As shown through goodness-of-fit plots in Figure 5.D.1,
13See Hunter et al. (2008) and Handcock et al. (2019) for a more in-depth discussion of the endogenous
covariates. See Leifeld et al. (2018) for a discussion of the temporal dependency terms.
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the model does a good job of accounting for the network’s endogenous dependencies.
I present the estimates for dyadic transnational advocacy terms of interest in
Figure 5.4.14 In line with H3a, countries appear to be 3% more likely to form
leader-follower environmental policymaking relationships when they share one-standard-
deviation (1.23 NGOs) more international environmental NGOs in common than the
mean (βOR = 1.03, CI95 = [1.00; 1.07]). Similarly, in line with H3c, a country that shares
with another country one-standard-deviation more S&P 500 companies (11.9 companies)
above the mean is 16% more likely to form a leader-follower relationship (βOR = 1.16,
CI95 = [1.13; 1.20]). However, contrary to the expectations of H3b, countries that
send environmental ODA funding to another country are slightly less likely to form a
leader-follower environmental policymaking relationship (βOR = 0.98, CI95 = [0.96; 0.99]).
While surprising, this estimate should be viewed with caution due to potential bias from
structural zeros.15
To illustrate the substantive importance of the relationships between environmental
policy influence and international environmental NGOs, I calculate the median predicted
probability of country i leading country j as a function of the number of NGOs that
countries i and j share, conditional on the model and the result of the network.16 In
Figure 5.5a, the probability that a country i is a leader to some other country j when
they share no international environmental NGOs in common is 6.7–6.8%. This probability
rises as the number of shared international environmental NGOs increases. For a country
i that shares eight international environmental NGOs in common with a country j, the
probability that country i leads country j is 63–69%.17
I perform a similar calculation for shared multinational corporations. In Figure 5.5b,
14See Table 5.D.1 for full results in tabular form.
15Since nearly all IDOs are agents of developed country governments and work almost exclusively in
developed countries, it is possible that I should treat developed-developed and developing-developing
country dyads as structural zeros for environmental ODA spending by IDOs. I address this possibility
by estimating the model on an influence network restricted to developed-developing country dyads (i.e.,
a bipartite network consisting of two types of nodes, ODA funders and ODA recipients). As shown in
Table 5.D.2, the estimated effect of environmental ODA spending by IDOs is not significantly different
from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.
16See (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012) and (Czarna et al. 2016) for details.
17I only show the predicted probabilities up to eight shared international environmental NGOs because
only ten countries share more than eight international environmental NGOs in common.
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Figure 5.4: Model estimates for transnational advocacy by large international environ-
mental NGOs, international development organizations, and multinational corporations
(DV: Environmental policy influence).
Coefficients and confidence intervals (90% and 95%) from a TERGM with 500 bootstrap
replicates.
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(a) Number of shared international environmental NGOs.
(b) Number of shared multinational corporations.
Figure 5.5: Predicted probability of country i leading country j by number of shared
transnational advocates
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a country i that shares no S&P 500 corporations in common with a country j has a 6%
chance of being a leader to country j. This probability increases such that a country
i sharing 5 S&P 500 corporations in common with country j has a 19%-20% chance of
being a leader to country j and a probability of approximately 80% if country i shares
100 or more S&P 500 corporations with country j.
I assess the robustness of these results through a suite of robustness checks. I also
explore a wide range of model parameterizations, varying the length of the rolling window
for inferring leader-follower relationships (Table 5.D.5), the significance threshold for
adding edges to the leader-follower network (Table 5.D.4), and the minimum number of
adoptions for a policy to be included in the analysis (Table 5.D.3). The main results hold
across nearly all these analyses.
These results indicate that transnational advocates, especially large international en-
vironmental NGOs and multinational corporations, play an important role in amplifying
countries’ environmental policymaking influence. These organizations help amplify the
international impact of environmental policies by informing policymakers in other coun-
tries about policies developed in the other jurisdictions in which these organizations work.
Through their activities, transnational advocates help shape the structure of environmen-
tal policy leadership.
5.2.3 Summary
Based on the two analyses presented in this section, large international environmental
NGOs have a positive, statistically robust, and substantively meaningful effect on both
the rate at which governments enact new environmental policies and the influence of the
countries with which these organizations work. Multinational corporations appear to play
a similar linking role, with countries more likely to influence each others’ policymaking
when they share more multinational corporations in common. However, corporate
environmental lobbying does not have a systematic relationship with environmental policy
innovation. Transnational advocates can increase countries’ influence without also raising
their rate of policy innovation, a result that underscores the importance of examining both
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environmental policy leadership and its constituent components.
5.3 Conditions for successful advocacy
The results thus far suggest that international environmental NGOs have a systematic and
substantively meaningful impact on environmental policy leadership, both spurring gov-
ernments to adopt new policies more quickly and helping extend their influence abroad.
In contrast, international development organizations and multinational corporations ap-
pear to have a limited impact, if any, on environmental policy leadership. In this section,
I investigate the conditions under which transnational environmental advocates tend to
find success in promoting environmental policy leadership. It is possible that, even if
international development organizations and multinationals do not affect environmental
policy leadership on average, there may be certain contexts in which these advocates
tend to be more successful in playing a role in environmental policy development. Of
course, there may also be circumstances in which international environmental NGOs are
less effective than others.
I sort the factors that potentially moderate the impact of transnational advocates
into three categories. The first category consists of the contextual conditions in which
transnational advocates operate. The second category captures the varied approaches to
and characteristics of transnational advocacy. The third category speaks to the different
issues on which transnational advocates work. I present results probing conditional
relationships for each of these aspects of advocacy in turn.
5.3.1 Contextual conditions
Transnational advocates engage with policymakers embedded in a wide range of economic
and political contexts, shaping the climate in which advocacy work takes place. I focus
on three of the most salient factors: economic development, democracy, and conflict.
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5.3.1.1 Economic development
It is not clear from the outset whether the activities of transnational environmental
advocates would be enhanced or diminished by a country’s level of development. On the
one hand, scholars have characterized institutional capacity and economic and human
resources as critical for environmental policy leadership (Jänicke 2005; Lenschow et al.
2005). On the other hand, transnational advocates stand to make a larger marginal
impact on information access and policymaking resources in developing countries.
Steinberg et al. (2001) notes that it is “difficult to find a major conservation policy
initiative of the past 35 years in [Costa Rica or Bolivia] that did not receive significant
support from overseas” (12). Baldwin et al. (2019) find renewable energy policies diffuse
among developing countries differently than among developed countries, but whether
these differences generalize to the entire domain of environmental policy is not known.
To test whether transnational advocates are more effective catalysts of environmental
policy leadership in developing or developed countries, I ran a set of models in which each
transnational advocate’s activity interacts with the host country’s OECD membership
status. As shown in Table 5.2, international environmental NGOs have a positive
effect on environmental policy leadership in developing countries (β = 8.48, SE = 2.60,
p < 0.01) but fail to have an impact on environmental policy leadership in developed
countries that is statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance.
Conversely, environmental lobbying by multinational corporations in developing countries
is not systematically related to environmental policy leadership, but corporate lobbying
in developed countries appears to lead to a steep drop in environmental policy leadership
(β = −28.28, SE = 13.12, p < 0.05).
These results suggest that international environmental NGOs have their largest impact
on environmental policy in developing countries, contexts in which they offer the largest
marginal impact in terms of information and capacity building. Corporate environmental
lobbying, in contrast, slows the rate of adoption and spread of environmental policies only
in developed countries. This finding aligns with the idea that corporations are more open
to environmental policy proposals in poorer countries and tend to oppose changes in
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Table 5.2: Leadership model results (contextual conditions, OECD membership)
Int. NGOs IDO (log $) Multinationals (log $)
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Transnational advocacy 8.48∗∗ 16.51∗∗ 2.14 4.17 −1.12 −2.18
(2.60) (5.07) (1.39) (2.71) (4.09) (7.96)
OECD member 4.51 8.79 1.02 1.99 28.79∗ 56.04∗
(11.33) (22.07) (11.57) (22.54) (14.46) (28.16)
Transnational advocacy ×
OECD member
−6.61 −12.88 −3.75· −7.31· −27.15∗ −52.85∗
(4.18) (8.14) (2.13) (4.15) (13.36) (26.01)
Combination:Advocacy in
OECD
1.86 3.63 −1.61 −3.14 −28.28∗ −55.02∗
(3.40) (6.62) (2.17) (4.23) (13.12) (25.54)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2138 2138 2139 2139 2138 2138
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic
panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation-robust standard errors
environmental policy in wealthier countries.18
5.3.1.2 Democracy
The effectiveness of transnational advocacy would seem to be enhanced by the presence
of policymakers who value environmental quality and have incentives to act accordingly.
Political scientists have long argued that non-democracies should under-provide public
goods (e.g., Olson 1993; Lake and Baum 2001), and scholars of environmental politics
have found evidence that electoral democracies tend to both have better environmental
quality (e.g., Li and Reuveny 2006; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Mak Arvin and Lew
2011) and contribute more to public goods like climate change mitigation (Bättig and
Bernauer 2009). However, whether democracies provide more favorable venues for
transnational advocacy is a slightly different question. Competition for access is a critical
component of successful advocacy (Scruggs 1999), so external advocates may benefit
when authoritarian regimes reduce competition by restricting the activities of domestic
18See the discussion on this topic in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.3.
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advocates. Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) provide an alternative perspective, suggesting
that international environmental NGOs could complement their domestic counterparts
by focusing their efforts on places where environmental protection is most challenging.
Policymakers in authoritarian regimes may be particularly receptive to the advocacy
efforts of multinational corporations, as the investments they offer promise economic
development as a means of legitimation (Bruun 2020).
I assess whether the relationship between transnational advocacy and environmental
policy leadership is moderated by democracy, I interacted each transnational advocate’s
activity with the host country’s score on the V-DEM polyarchy index, a measure of
electoral democracy (Bernhard et al. 2015; Coppedge et al. 2021). Table 5.3 indicates
that international environmental NGOs are effective in both democracies (β = 4.48, SE
= 2.46, p < 0.05) and authoritarian states (β = 7.55, SE = 2.27, p < 0.01), although
these organizations may be slightly less effective in democratic countries (β = −3.07, SE
= 1.80, p < 0.10).
This finding shows that, instead of being limited by the constraints of non-
democratic regimes, large international environmental NGOs are more effective in
autocratic countries. This could reflect the greater competition for influence in electoral
democracies, some fundamental compatibility between autocratic policymaking processes
and transnational advocates, or simply that international environmental NGOs place
particular emphasis on their advocacy efforts in places where domestic environmental
NGOs have less room to operate.19 Neither international development organizations nor
multinational corporations seem to have a systematic relationship with environmental
policy leadership in more or less democratic countries.
5.3.1.3 Conflict
Developing environmental policy is a costly endeavor, so transnational advocacy should
stand to be more effective when policymakers are willing to devote the resources and time
19A well-established critique of international NGOs is their lack of democratic legitimacy. For an
overview, see Collingwood (2006). Investigating this relationship is beyond the scope of this study, but
I note it here and leave it as a topic for future research.
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Table 5.3: Leadership model results (contextual conditions, electoral democracy)
Int. NGOs IDO (log $) Multinationals (log $)
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Transnational advocacy 7.55∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 1.55 3.01 −1.34 −2.62
(2.27) (4.42) (1.38) (2.68) (4.08) (7.97)
Electoral democracy −1.14 −2.22 0.01 0.02 −0.75 −1.47
(3.21) (6.25) (3.05) (5.95) (3.39) (6.62)
Transnational advocacy ×
Electoral democracy
−3.07· −5.99· −0.29 −0.56 −1.30 −2.54
(1.80) (3.50) (0.92) (1.80) (2.24) (4.38)
Combination:Advocacy in
democracies
4.48∗ 8.73∗ 1.26 2.45 −2.64 −5.16
(2.46) (4.80) (1.57) (3.07) (4.67) (9.13)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2137 2137 2141 2141 2141 2141
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic
panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation-robust standard errors
to environmental issues. One circumstance in which policymakers should be particularly
reticent to do so is when the country is experiencing widespread armed conflict. During
times of war, concerns about environmental protection are often given lower priority or
even set aside entirely. For example, the Syrian civil war led to widespread deforestation
and, due to the use of chemical and explosive weapons, soil and water contamination
(Gafaar 2021). However, it is also possible that the outbreak of war primarily affects
the stringency of environmental policies rather than the rate at which they are adopted
and spread. Policymakers continue to work during an armed conflict and, with the
army taking a more active role on security issues, there may actually be more time
(if not financial resources) for policymakers to work on social issues like environmental
protection.
To ascertain whether armed conflict moderates the relationship between transnational
advocacy and environmental policy leadership, I interacted each transnational advocate’s
activity with an indicator of whether the host country was the location of 1,000 or
more battle deaths in each year (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020).
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Table 5.4: Leadership model results (contextual conditions, armed conflict)
Int. NGOs IDO (log $) Multinationals (log $)
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Transnational advocacy 6.99∗∗ 13.59∗∗ 1.40 2.73 −1.53 −2.98
(2.30) (4.47) (1.38) (2.70) (4.08) (7.96)
Armed conflict −6.79 −13.22 −6.89 −13.43 −6.65 −12.96
(5.86) (11.39) (6.29) (12.26) (5.57) (10.85)
Transnational advocacy ×
Armed conflict
6.62 12.87 3.63 7.07 4.13 8.05
(5.77) (11.22) (7.16) (13.96) (5.77) (11.24)
Combination:Advocacy in
conflicts
13.61∗∗ 26.46∗∗ 5.03 9.80 2.60 5.06
(5.81) (11.30) (6.94) (13.53) (6.71) (13.07)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2139 2139 2141 2141 2140 2140
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic
panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation-robust standard errors
These analyses, presented in Table 5.4, suggest that conflict does not systematically
moderate the relationship between transnational advocacy and environmental policy.
International environmental NGOs have a positive and significant effect on environmental
policy leadership in countries at peace (β = 6.99, SE = 2.30, p < 0.01) and at war
(β = 13.61, SE = 5.81, p < 0.01), while neither IDOs nor multinational corporations
appear to have a systematic relationship with environmental policy leadership without
regard to a country’s conflict status.
5.3.1.4 Summary
Based on the three preceding analyses, it appears that, while generally in support
of the findings reported earlier in the chapter, the moderating effect of a country’s
political and economic contexts works differently for different advocates. The activities
of international environmental NGOs tend to increase environmental policy leadership
primarily in developing countries, regardless of the extent to which these countries are
democratic or experiencing conflict. In contrast, environmental lobbying by multinational
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corporations appears to reduce environmental policy leadership in wealthy countries,
while having little impact in other contexts. Spending on environmental projects by
international development organizations does not have a systematic relationship with
environmental policy leadership in any of these contexts, suggesting that their projects
may rely on, rather than create, the political enabling environments on which they
depend.
5.3.2 Organizational characteristics
Beyond the broader context in which transnational advocates work, it is also important
to consider the organizational characteristics of the transnational advocates themselves.
I focus on three such characteristics: the organization’s past activities in a country,
collaborative or confrontational advocacy styles, and opportunities for multistakeholder
advocacy. I discuss each of these characteristics in turn.
5.3.2.1 Past activity
The longer an advocacy organization is active in a country, the more opportunities they
have to build an image of legitimacy and gain access to policymakers. In contrast,
an organization that is only intermittently active in a country would be obliged to
re-create connections and context-specific knowledge, likely leading the organization
to be less effective at influencing policy processes. Accordingly, a transnational
advocacy organization’s past activities in a country may condition its ability to impact
environmental policy development in the present.
I examine the moderating role of past advocacy activities on the relationship between
transnational advocacy and environmental policy leadership by interacting the current
measure of each transnational advocate’s activities with its value in the prior year. This
formulation allows me to test if advocates are more effective in a given country in the
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Table 5.5: Leadership model results (organizational characteristics, past advocacy)
Int. NGOs IDO (log $) Multinationals (log $)
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Transnational advocacy 7.86∗∗ 15.34∗∗ 0.69 1.35 −1.05 −2.05
(2.72) (5.30) (1.31) (2.55) (4.29) (8.38)
Transnational advocacyt−1 0.51 0.99 2.70∗ 5.25∗ −0.71 −1.38
(2.49) (4.87) (1.31) (2.55) (4.14) (8.09)
Transnational advocacy ×
Transnational advocacyt−1
−1.12 −2.18 0.20 0.39 2.20 4.30
(1.45) (2.83) (0.99) (1.92) (2.53) (4.94)
Combination:Advocacy +
Past Advocacy
6.74∗∗ 13.16∗∗ 0.89 1.74 1.16 2.25
(2.57) (5.01) (1.49) (2.91) (4.83) (9.44)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2141 2141 2136 2136 2141 2141
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic
panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation-robust standard errors
present if they were also active in that country in the previous year.20 Table 5.5 shows
that there is little sign of past advocacy activities conditioning the impact of current
advocacy, with international environmental NGOs continuing to catalyze environmental
policy leadership in countries where they both were active in the previous year (β = 7.86,
SE = 2.72, p < 0.01) and where they were not previously active (β = 6.74, SE
= 2.57, p < 0.01). Neither international development organizations nor multinational
corporations display evidence of systematic relationships with environmental policy
leadership at low or high levels of past environmental spending.
5.3.2.2 Collaborative or confrontational advocacy styles
A second organizational characteristic of transnational advocates is advocacy style.
Focusing on international environmental NGOs, there are two broad types of approaches
20An important limitation of this test is that I use measures of transnational advocacy that represent
the collective activities of multiple individual organizations. Aggregating across organizations may fail
to capture, for example, one NGO leaving a country organization as another enters. However, this
approach is more attractive than other alternatives, such as recalculating advocacy measures using
arbitrary weights representing past advocacy activities.
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to environmental activism. The conventional stereotype of international environmental
NGOs is that of brash, disruptive activists who do not hesitate to use confrontational
tactics to make headlines and build pressure for change. Organizations that use these
outsider tactics include the likes of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Global Witness.
However, there is a set of quieter, more conventional advocacy organizations that take
more of a collaborative approach to policy advocacy, often opting to present informational
seminars, training workshops, and voluntary initiatives intended to strengthen like-
minded allies within the organizational structures of governments and polluters alike.
Many the giants of the international environmental NGO sector take these insider
approaches, including the World Resources Institute, the World Wildlife Fund, The
Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International. The selection of confrontational
or collaborative strategies is a subject of considerable scholarship, both in general (e.g.,
Stroup and Wong 2017) and specific tactical circumstances (e.g., Hadden 2015). Despite
this body of work, it remains unknown both whether one advocacy style tends to produce
higher levels of environmental policy leadership than another and whether the combined
presence of confrontational and collaborative organizations reinforces or diminishes each
other’s respective effectiveness.
To ascertain whether organizations that tend to use confrontational or collaborative
tactics see greater environmental policy leadership, I identified which of the eleven largest
international environmental NGOs use primarily confrontational (N=4) or primarily
collaborative (N=7) advocacy styles.21 I then counted the number of NGOs of each
advocacy style present in each country between 2001 and 2019.
As presented in Table 5.6, governments tend to increase their level of environmental
policy leadership in the presence of both confrontational international environmental
NGOs (β = 5.64, SE = 2.13, p < 0.01) and collaborative international environmental
NGOs (β = 2.66, SE = 1.61, p < 0.1), with no significant difference in the estimates for
21Specifically, I classified Friends of the Earth, Global Witness, Greenpeace, and Oceana as using a
confrontational advocacy style due to their campaign-driven approach and frequent use of naming-and-
shaming tactics. I classify Conservation International, Flora and Fauna International, the Rainforest
Alliance, The Nature Conservancy, the World Resources Institute, World Wildlife Fund, and World
Conservation Society as using a collaborative advocacy style due to their willingness to partner with
governments and polluters and their emphasis on technical and programming interventions.
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the two types of NGO advocacy styles. However, when the measures of collaborative
and confrontational advocacy styles are interacted with one another, they appear
to undermine each other. Collaborative NGOs are less effective in the presence of
confrontational NGOs (β = −2.05, SE= 1.12, p < 0.10) but continue to have a positive
and statistically significant impact on environmental policy leadership (β = 4.20, SE
= 2.18, p < 0.05). Confrontational NGOs see their impact diminish in the presence of
collaborative NGOs such that they no longer have an effect on environmental policy
leadership distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance
(β = 1.55, SE= 1.55,p < 1.58.
These results should be treated with caution, as the interaction only attains a
significance level of 90%, but they suggest that rather than finding synergies in their
insider and outsider tactics, collaborative and confrontational international environmental
NGOs diminish their respective impacts on environmental policy leadership. It is
frequently the case that NGOs with different advocacy styles work on the same issues
in the same countries.22 This analysis suggests that when international environmental
NGOs with different advocacy styles are both present, both types of organizations see
their catalytic effect on environmental policy leadership weaken.
5.3.2.3 Opportunities for multistakeholder advocacy
Collaboration among different types of environmental policy advocates, often referred to
as multistakeholder approaches, has become increasingly popular in recent years (Berman
2017; Gray and Purdy 2018). For example, the World Bank hosts the 2030 Water
Resources Group, an initiative organized by private, public, and civil society groups
to strengthen water management in fourteen countries.23 While the presence of different
types of environmental policy advocates in the same country creates opportunities for
multistakeholder advocacy, it may also raise the level of competition for access to the
22One such example is big game conservation in Africa, which has seen a lively debate among NGOs
over the merits of raising funds for conservation through trophy hunting (Lindsey et al. 2006).
23The founding members of the 2030 Water Resources Group include Nestlé, PepsiCo, The Coca-Cola
Company, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the International Finance Corporation,
and the World Wildlife Fund https://www.2030wrg.org/about-us/background/, accessed June 15, 2021.
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Table 5.6: Leadership model results (organizational characteristics, advocacy style)
Direct Interaction
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Collaborative int. ENGOs 5.64∗∗ 11.00∗∗ 6.25∗∗ 12.20∗∗
(2.13) (4.17) (2.18) (4.26)
Confrontational int. ENGOs 2.66· 5.19· 3.60∗ 7.03∗
(1.61) (3.15) (1.82) (3.55)












Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2140 2140 2138 2138
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors
from dynamic panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust standard errors
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policymaking process.
To understand how the presence of different types of transnational advocates mod-
erates their impact on environmental policy leadership, I interacted the measures for
international environmental NGOs, IDOs, and multinational corporations together in a
three-way interaction. As shown in Table 5.7, there is limited evidence that the effective-
ness of transnational advocates depends on the activities of other types of transnational
advocates. None of the interactions among international environmental NGOs, IDOs, and
multinationals reach conventional levels of statistical significance. International environ-
mental NGOs maintain their positive relationship with environmental policy leadership
in the presence of IDOs and corporate environmental lobbying (β = 4.68, SE= 3.25,
p < 0.10) while multinationals display a negative impact on environmental policy leader-
ship when international environmental NGOs and IDOs are present (β = 6.38, SE= 4.48,
p < 0.10). However, considering the risk of Type I errors under multiple testing, caution
should be exercised in interpreting these relationships.
5.3.2.4 Summary
In this subsection, I considered whether and the extent to which the organizational
characteristics of transnational advocates moderates their impact on environmental policy
leadership. I found little evidence that the past activities of transnational advocates affect
their impact on environmental policy leadership, but organizations’ varied advocacy styles
appear to be more important. International environmental NGOs that use collaborative
or confrontational policy advocacy strategies increase environmental policy leadership,
but when both types of organizations are present, both see their effect on environmental
policy leadership diminish. Finally, despite the growing prevalence of multistakeholder
approaches to environmental advocacy, there seem to be few synergies at work when
multiple types of transnational advocates are active in the same country.
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Table 5.7: Leadership model results (organizational characteristics, multistakeholder
advocacy)
Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 7.23∗∗ 14.07∗∗
(2.32) (4.52)
IDO (log $) 1.91 3.72
(1.48) (2.87)
Multinationals (log $) 1.22 2.37
(1.00) (1.95)
Int. ENGOs × IDO (log $) −1.51 −2.94
(3.97) (7.73)
Int. ENGOs × Multinationals (log $) −2.95 −5.74
(2.06) (4.00)
IDO (log $) × Multinationals (log $) −1.10 −2.14
(0.94) (1.82)
Int. ENGOs × IDO (log $) × Multinationals (log $) −0.82 −1.60
(0.99) (1.93)
NGOs + NGOs × IDO +
NGOs × Multinational + NGOs × IDO × Multinational
4.68· 9.10·
(3.25) (6.31)
IDO + NGOs × IDO + NGOs × IDO × Multinational 1.21 2.36
(1.91) (3.72)
Multinational + NGOs × Multinational +




Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 3366 3366
AIC 2141 2141
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; cdotp < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors
from dynamic panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust standard errors
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5.4 Issue characteristics
The third and final set of factors that conditions potentially affecting the relationship
between transnational advocacy and environmental policy leadership is variation in the
issues on which transnational advocates choose to work. In particular, I consider variation
in the complexity of different environmental policies and whether their content speaks to
traditional environmental governance issues. I discuss each of these factors in turn.
5.4.1 Issue complexity
Environmental policies that cut across many issue areas affect a wider range of
stakeholders and likely involve multiple ministries with relevant portfolios. When more
veto players (and more players in general) are involved in the policymaking process, it
tends to be more difficult to enact policy change (Tsebelis et al. 2002). Accordingly,
transnational advocates, like other advocates, could be expected to be less effective in
accelerating the rate of adoption and spread of more complex policies. Alternatively,
more complex policies tend to be more technical, receive less public attention, and, as a
result, attract less competition for access to policymakers among interested parties.
To assess if the effectiveness of transnational advocates in catalyzing environmental
policy leadership depends on policy complexity, I calculated alternative environmental
policy leadership scores in which each policy is weighted by its average number of subjects,
rounded to the nearest whole number.24 The weighting procedure consisted of creating
as many duplicates of each policy as its average policy complexity, with an average policy
complexity of 2.56 subjects and a standard deviation of 1.08 subjects. I then replaced
the environmental policy leadership measure with its complexity-weighted alternative.
As shown in Table 5.8, international environmental NGOs have a positive and
statistically significant effect on environmental policy leadership, even when more complex
policies are given more weight in the calculation of environmental policy leadership scores
(β = 6.65, SE= 2.26, p < 0.01). The point estimate is slightly lower than for the
24To illustrate, if a policy banning the fishing of mackerel was adopted by two countries, one in a law
touching on fisheries and the other in a law relating to fisheries, marine issues, and water, the policy
would have an average policy complexity of two subjects.
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unweighted scores (Table 5.B.1), but they are not different at conventional levels of
statistical significance. The estimates for international development organizations and
multinational corporations are not significantly different from zero, nor are the estimates
for the network autocorrelation terms.
5.4.2 Traditional and secondary environmental issues
Legitimacy, deriving both from constituency representation and technical expertise, is
thought to be a key element to successful advocacy (Stroup and Wong 2017). For large
international environmental NGOs, there is a set of traditional environmental issues on
which the relevance of their knowledge and social authority is clear. These traditional
issues revolve around flora, fauna, and environmental media, in contrast to issues relating
to natural resource use. The latter can be characterized as secondary environmental
issues, meaning that while policy debates on these natural resource use issues may have
some connection with environmental governance, they tend to have more direct ties to
economic production than traditional environmental issues.25 As discussed in Chapter
3, of the fifteen topics in the FAOLEX dataset, there are ten traditional environmental
issues—air & atmosphere, energy, environmental procedures (e.g., environmental impact
assessment), fisheries, forestry, land & soil, mineral resources, waste & hazardous
substances, water, and wild species & ecosystems—and five are secondary environmental
issues—agricultural & rural development, cultivated plants, food & nutrition, livestock,
and marine issues. International environmental NGOs would seem to be the most likely
type of transnational advocate to have a higher level of effectiveness in advocating
for environmental policy leadership on traditional environmental issues, as IDOs and
multinational corporations tend to engage on a broader set of policy topics. By this
same logic, international environmental NGOs may concentrate their advocacy efforts on
traditional environmental policy topics in the belief that they have more legitimacy, and
thus stand to be more effective, on these issues.
To assess whether transnational advocates’ effect on environmental policy leadership
25These issues most realistically lie on a spectrum, but a binary classification is sufficient for the
purposes of this analysis.
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Table 5.8: Leadership model results (issue characteristics, issue complexity)
Leadership weighted by issue complexity
Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 6.65 (2.26)∗∗ 14.19 (4.83)∗∗
Int. ENGO NAC 0.79 (1.30) 1.69 (2.78)
IDO (log $) 1.27 (1.32) 2.72 (2.81)
IDO NAC −0.68 (1.01) −1.45 (2.15)
Multinationals (log $) −4.15 (3.72) −8.85 (7.94)
Multinational NAC 2.24 (2.17) 4.78 (4.62)
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 2.22 (1.91) 4.73 (4.08)
CSO consultation 0.53 (1.90) 1.13 (4.07)
Globalization 7.20 (6.90) 15.35 (14.72)
GDP ($/pc) 0.05 (6.64) 0.08 (14.18)
Env. ministry −0.18 (4.21) −0.39 (8.99)
Veto players −0.00 (0.93) −0.00 (1.99)
Electoral democracy −0.50 (2.96) −1.07 (6.32)
Federalism −1.45 (4.99) −3.08 (10.65)
EU member 20.53 (7.80)∗∗ 43.83 (16.64)∗∗
Left government −0.36 (1.79) −0.77 (3.81)
Green party 7.35 (3.90)· 15.69 (8.32)·
GHG emissions (log tons) 1.29 (2.77) 2.74 (5.90)
Resource rents (% GDP) 4.99 (3.18) 10.65 (6.80)
Agricultural land (% area) −1.14 (3.93) −2.44 (8.40)
Armed conflict −4.37 (4.77) −9.34 (10.18)
Language NAC −5.10 (3.69) −10.89 (7.88)
Contiguity NAC −1.24 (2.62) −2.65 (5.60)
Colonial NAC 2.44 (2.35) 5.20 (5.02)
Trade agreement NAC 1.21 (1.81) 2.57 (3.86)




Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 3366 3366
AIC 1874 1874
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and
standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250 imputations.
Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-
robust standard errors
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is different for traditional and secondary environmental issues, I calculated alternative
environmental policy leadership scores, one for policies primarily relating to traditional
environmental issues and one for policies relating primarily to secondary environmental
issues. Since I had data on the specific issues on which multinationals engaged in
lobbying, I also calculated measures of corporate environmental lobbying on traditional
and secondary environmental issues.
As displayed in Table 5.9, it appears that international environmental NGOs are
effective at catalyzing environmental policy leadership on traditional environmental issues
(β = 8.86, SE= 2.53,p < 0.001). In contrast, international environmental NGOs do not
generate increases in environmental policy leadership that attain conventional levels of
statistical significance. This result indicates that the effect of international environmental
NGOs on environmental policy leadership varies from issue to issue, with the implication
that these organizations’ efforts on policies relating to flora, fauna, and pollution tend to
be more fruitful than their advocacy on resource use issues. Why this might be so, and the
practical implications of this relationship for addressing resource degradation, is an issue
worthy of future research. The estimates for IDOs and multinationals are not significant
at conventional levels of statistical significance, nor are the network autocorrelation terms.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I evaluated the empirical relationship between the activities of transna-
tional advocates and environmental policy leadership. I found that large international en-
vironmental NGOs have a positive, statistically significant, and substantively meaningful
effect on environmental policy leadership and its constituent components, environmen-
tal policy innovation and influence. Countries with multinational corporate activity in
common have an increased probability of forming an environmental policymaking leader-
follower relationship, but corporate environmental lobbying expenditures do not increase
environmental policy leadership in general. On average, environmental overseas devel-
opment assistance by international development organizations does not tend to have an
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Table 5.9: Leadership model results (issue characteristics, traditional and secondary
environmental issues)
Traditional environmental issues Secondary environmental issues
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 9.27 (2.53)∗∗∗ 17.23 (4.70)∗∗∗ 4.09 (2.96) 7.76 (5.62)
Int. ENGO NAC 0.34 (1.58) 0.63 (2.94) 0.96 (1.56) 1.82 (2.95)
IDO (log $) 1.37 (1.40) 2.55 (2.61) 0.34 (1.26) 0.65 (2.39)
IDO NAC −0.26 (1.29) −0.48 (2.41) 0.27 (1.02) 0.51 (1.93)
Multinationals (log $)
(traditional issues)
−2.28 (3.84) −4.25 (7.14)
Multinational NAC
(traditional issues)
−0.53 (2.47) −0.99 (4.59)
Multinationals (log $)
(secondary issues)
−0.20 (3.21) −0.39 (6.09)
Multinational NAC
(secondary issues)
−1.51 (2.35) −2.86 (4.45)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2709 2709 2478 2478
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; cdotp < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic
panel models fitted on 250 imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation-robust standard errors
impact on environmental policy leadership, innovation, or influence.
Since these conclusions speak to average effects, I examined how the relationship
between transnational advocacy and environmental policy leadership is moderated by
changing contextual conditions, organizational characteristics, and the issues on which
advocates work.
International environmental NGOs are particularly effective catalysts of environmen-
tal policy leadership across a variety of political and economic contexts and levels of
policy complexity. One novel finding from this analysis is that large international en-
vironmental NGOs with confrontational or collaborative advocacy styles appear to be
effective at sparking environmental policy leadership, although when organizations with
contrasting advocacy styles are present at the same time, environmental policy leadership
does not tend to increase. This slower pace of environmental policy development could be
normatively good or bad. For example, confrontational NGOs might generally advocate
that policymakers adopt their favored environmental policies, but resist the passage and
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spread of less stringent policies that collaborative NGOs would tend to endorse. The
presence of both types of advocacy styles may lead to a lower overall increase in envi-
ronmental policy leadership but with policy changes of a higher level of environmental
protection.
These environmental NGOs are also primarily effective on traditional environmental
issues relating to flora, fauna, and environmental media. In contrast, these advocates
have a weaker impact, if any, on secondary environmental issues relating to resource
use. This result supports the view that the effectiveness of advocates depends on their
relationship to the policy issue at hand. However, without more issue-specific data on
NGO activity, it is challenging to disentangle the effect of legitimacy from variation in
advocacy effort across different issues.
It is also instructive to compare the results of the influence analysis and the leadership
analysis for international environmental NGOs (Fig 5.4). On the one hand, countries
that share more international environmental NGOs in common are more likely to
form leader-follower relationships. However, the estimates for the network correlation
terms for environmental policy leadership were small and lacked statistical significance
(Fig 5.1). One possibility for reconciling these results is that transnational advocates
are not primarily serving as conduits for communicating environmental policy changes
by environmental policy leaders. Instead, transnational advocates may be strategic
when they link policymakers in different countries, perhaps reflecting a preference for
amplifying the international impact of favored environmental policies. In future work,
this possibility could be explored by considering whether transnational advocates like
international environmental NGOs are more likely to play a linking role for environmental
policies with high stringency.
While international development organizations did not have a systematic impact
on environmental policy leadership across these different conditions, the effect of
environmental lobbying by multinational corporations is more nuanced. In particular,
multinationals appear to have a null effect on environmental policy leadership in
developing countries, but a large negative effect on environmental policy leadership
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in developed countries. This result suggests that corporate environmental lobbying is
different in developed countries relative to developing countries. One possibility is that
multinationals tend to lobby for the status quo in developed countries, slowing the pace of
policy development, but sometimes lobby for policy change in developing countries that
may lack the environmental laws and regulations multinationals need to pursue their
business strategy successfully.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that the effects of transnational advocates did not
seem to be systematically moderated by the activities of other types of transnational
advocates. Understanding when and how advocates work or compete with each other,
and what these relationships mean for effectiveness, is an important area for future work.
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Appendix 5.A Summary statistics
Table 5.A.1: Summary statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Year 2009.50 5.77 2000 2004.8 2014.2 2019
Env. policy leadership 50.47 29.84 0.00 26.33 75.43 99.30
Int. ENGOs 2.63 2.48 0 1 4 11
Int. ENGO NAC 0.49 0.28 0 0.5 0.7 1
IDO (log $) 2.18 1.86 0 0 3.6 9
IDO NAC 0.07 0.20 0 0 0 1
Multinationals (log $) 5.68 4.62 0 0 10.1 15
Multinational NAC 0.43 0.32 0 0 0.7 1
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 1.25 1.06 0 0 1.7 6
CSO consultation 0.85 1.33 −2.48 0.04 1.64 10.87
Globalization 58.52 15.35 23.61 46.80 69.74 91.35
GDP ($ p.c.) 9.86 1.18 7.14 8.93 10.80 12.34
Env. ministry 0.70 0.43 0 0.2 1 1
Veto players 2.66 1.60 1 1 4 17
Electoral democracy 0.53 0.26 0.01 0.31 0.77 1.00
Federalism 0.08 0.23 0 0 0 1
EU member 0.13 0.34 0 0 0 1
OECD member 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 1
Left governmnet 0.52 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.75 1.00
Green party 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 1
GHG emissions (log tons) 4.08 2.28 −5.88 2.86 5.51 10.06
Resource rents (% GDP) 1.82 1.45 0.00 0.43 3.06 5.15
Agricultural land (% area) 39.18 21.24 0.45 21.23 55.05 85.49
Armed conflict 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 1
Language NAC 0.41 0.22 0.00 0.35 0.57 0.95
Contiguity NAC 0.39 0.25 0.00 0.20 0.57 0.98
Colonial NAC 0.47 0.28 0.00 0.33 0.66 0.99
Trade agreement NAC 0.48 0.15 0 0.4 0.6 1
Trade flow NAC 0.51 0.16 0.00 0.44 0.62 0.92
Missing values estimated using 250 imputations. Variables measured multiple ways (e.g., weighting by
policy complexity) not shown.
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Appendix 5.B Leadership model results
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Table 5.B.1: Leadership model results
Main model
Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 7.22 (2.27)∗∗ 14.09 (4.44)∗∗
Int. ENGO NAC 0.33 (1.34) 0.65 (2.61)
IDO (log $) 1.49 (1.37) 2.90 (2.68)
IDO NAC −0.50 (1.10) −0.97 (2.14)
Multinationals (log $) −1.47 (4.08) −2.88 (7.96)
Multinational NAC −0.18 (2.35) −0.34 (4.59)
Information
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 4.16 (1.99)∗ 8.10 (3.87)∗
CSO consultation 1.10 (2.02) 2.14 (3.95)
Globalization 8.96 (7.43) 17.47 (14.49)
Resources/capacity
GDP ($/pc) −2.55 (7.13) −4.99 (13.92)
Env. ministry 0.19 (4.74) 0.37 (9.26)
Veto players 0.92 (1.01) 1.79 (1.96)
Political will (institutions)
Electoral democracy −0.09 (3.08) −0.18 (6.00)
Federalism −1.20 (5.84) −2.33 (11.40)
EU member 20.92 (7.75)∗∗ 40.81 (15.12)∗∗
OECD member 4.40 (11.44) 8.58 (22.31)
Political will (parties)
Left government −0.61 (1.92) −1.19 (3.75)
Green party 6.19 (3.70)· 12.07 (7.22)·
Political will (issue salience)
GHG emissions (log tons) 0.27 (2.66) 0.51 (5.19)
Resource rents (% GDP) 8.36 (3.27)∗ 16.30 (6.36)∗
Agricultural land (% area) 2.39 (5.43) 4.66 (10.60)
Armed conflict −7.33 (6.19) −14.30 (12.08)
Political will (peers)
Language NAC −8.07 (4.70)· −15.74 (9.17)·
Contiguity NAC −1.31 (3.36) −2.56 (6.55)
Colonial NAC 3.10 (2.54) 6.04 (4.95)
Trade agreement NAC 2.18 (1.76) 4.25 (3.44)




Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 3366 3366
AIC 2139 2139
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients
and standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250
imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.B.3: Leadership model results (Robustness cont.)
First-difference Non-linear Broad lobbying measure
Short-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 6.47 (2.66)∗ 9.53 (3.04)∗∗ 18.58 (5.93)∗∗ 7.19 (2.28)∗∗ 14.02 (4.44)∗∗
Int. ENGOs2 −1.77 (1.41) −3.46 (2.75)
Int. ENGO NAC −1.21 (1.46) −0.76 (1.51) −1.49 (2.94) 0.32 (1.34) 0.62 (2.61)
IDO (log $) −0.79 (1.11) 0.36 (1.51) 0.69 (2.95) 1.49 (1.37) 2.90 (2.68)
IDO (log $)2 1.61 (1.15) 3.13 (2.25)
IDO NAC 0.48 (0.77) −0.41 (1.11) −0.79 (2.16) −0.49 (1.10) −0.96 (2.14)
Multinationals (log $) −1.19 (4.48) −2.43 (4.17) −4.74 (8.13)
Multinationals (log $)2 4.17 (2.86) 8.13 (5.57)
Multinationals (log $) (broad) 0.13 (4.50) 0.25 (8.77)
Multinational NAC 1.07 (3.17) 2.48 (3.13) 4.83 (6.10)
Multinational NAC (broad) −0.17 (2.41) −0.33 (4.70)
Information
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 0.36 (2.48) 4.10 (2.01)∗ 7.99 (3.92)∗ 4.08 (1.99)∗ 7.95 (3.88)∗
CSO consultation 2.20 (2.19) 0.35 (2.09) 0.69 (4.08) 1.01 (2.02) 1.97 (3.94)
Globalization −1.02 (11.62) 9.55 (7.46) 18.62 (14.54) 8.79 (7.43) 17.13 (14.48)
Resources/capacity
GDP ($/pc) −5.36 (8.11) −2.43 (7.14) −4.76 (13.94) −2.49 (7.12) −4.88 (13.90)
Env. ministry −0.08 (4.34) 0.52 (4.70) 1.01 (9.17) 0.16 (4.75) 0.32 (9.26)
Veto players −0.31 (1.13) 0.94 (1.02) 1.83 (1.99) 0.87 (1.00) 1.69 (1.94)
Political will (institutions)
Electoral democracy −2.28 (3.45) −0.19 (3.10) −0.38 (6.05) −0.02 (3.07) −0.03 (5.99)
Federalism 0.14 (5.59) −1.03 (5.86) −2.00 (11.42) −1.17 (5.85) −2.28 (11.40)
EU member 26.09 (7.70)∗∗∗ 18.89 (7.80)∗ 36.83 (15.21)∗ 21.03 (7.74)∗∗ 40.98 (15.08)∗∗
OECD member 22.32 (15.40) 5.44 (11.77) 10.61 (22.96) 4.53 (11.45) 8.82 (22.31)
Political will (parties)
Left government 0.00 (2.00) −0.64 (1.92) −1.24 (3.75) −0.60 (1.92) −1.17 (3.74)
Green party −6.98 (5.35) 6.22 (3.71)· 12.13 (7.24)· 6.23 (3.71)· 12.13 (7.23)·
Political will (issue salience)
GHG emissions (log tons) −1.08 (2.31) 0.28 (2.67) 0.54 (5.20) 0.30 (2.66) 0.58 (5.19)
Resource rents (% GDP) 1.79 (5.44) 8.20 (3.29)∗ 15.99 (6.40)∗ 8.33 (3.28)∗ 16.23 (6.38)∗
Agricultural land (% area) 0.10 (5.56) 2.94 (5.48) 5.74 (10.68) 2.36 (5.42) 4.59 (10.56)
Armed conflict 1.29 (4.95) −6.95 (6.20) −13.55 (12.10) −7.27 (6.19) −14.17 (12.07)
Political will (peers)
Language NAC −12.15 (3.82)∗∗ −8.41 (4.70)· −16.41 (9.18)· −8.06 (4.70)· −15.70 (9.17)·
Contiguity NAC 2.11 (3.08) −0.85 (3.37) −1.65 (6.58) −1.26 (3.36) −2.45 (6.54)
Colonial NAC 4.42 (2.52)· 3.02 (2.52) 5.88 (4.92) 3.07 (2.54) 5.99 (4.95)
Trade agreement NAC 1.58 (2.18) 1.90 (1.77) 3.71 (3.44) 2.13 (1.76) 4.16 (3.43)
Trade flow NAC 1.91 (2.03) 1.08 (1.72) 2.11 (3.35) 1.11 (1.73) 2.16 (3.37)
ρt−1 60.96 (3.70)
∗∗∗ 60.99 (3.71)∗∗∗
ρt−2 −12.23 (2.46)∗∗∗ −12.31 (2.46)∗∗∗
(Intercept) 2.59 (0.64)∗∗∗
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3553 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 3236 2139 2139 2140 2140
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250
imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust standard errors
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Table 5.B.4: Leadership model results (Robustness cont.)
IDO project count IDO and MNC presence
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 7.57 (2.30)∗∗∗ 14.83 (4.50)∗∗∗ 7.57 (2.28)∗∗∗ 14.75 (4.46)∗∗∗
Int. ENGO NAC 0.27 (1.36) 0.52 (2.67) 0.26 (1.36) 0.52 (2.64)
IDO (log count) 2.03 (2.14) 3.95 (4.18)
IDO (log projects) 0.60 (1.42) 1.17 (2.79)
IDO NAC −0.53 (1.07) −1.03 (2.10) −0.54 (1.08) −1.06 (2.10)
Multinationals (log count) 6.84 (7.02) 13.34 (13.69)
Multinationals (log $) −1.23 (4.06) −2.41 (7.95)
Multinational NAC −0.13 (2.31) −0.26 (4.53) −1.79 (2.11) −3.49 (4.12)
Information
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 4.51 (2.17)∗ 8.84 (4.25)∗ 4.18 (2.20)· 8.15 (4.27)·
CSO consultation 2.02 (2.37) 3.95 (4.65) 1.49 (2.28) 2.90 (4.45)
Globalization 9.96 (7.30) 19.50 (14.28) 9.73 (7.40) 18.95 (14.40)
Resources/capacity
GDP ($/pc) −2.97 (6.79) −5.84 (13.32) −3.31 (6.78) −6.47 (13.23)
Env. ministry 0.11 (4.93) 0.22 (9.66) −0.07 (5.00) −0.13 (9.75)
Veto players 0.93 (0.99) 1.82 (1.94) 0.88 (0.98) 1.72 (1.91)
Political will (institutions)
Electoral democracy −0.66 (3.09) −1.30 (6.05) −0.28 (3.01) −0.56 (5.86)
Federalism −0.87 (6.08) −1.69 (11.91) −0.79 (6.09) −1.53 (11.87)
EU member 20.21 (7.65)∗∗ 39.58 (14.99)∗∗ 19.99 (7.84)∗ 38.95 (15.27)∗
OECD member 5.31 (11.57) 10.41 (22.66) 5.71 (11.70) 11.13 (22.81)
Political will (parties)
Left government −0.56 (1.96) −1.10 (3.84) −0.53 (1.96) −1.03 (3.82)
Green party 6.29 (3.78)· 12.32 (7.40)· 6.20 (3.86) 12.08 (7.52)
Political will (issue salience)
GHG emissions (log tons) 2.49 (2.89) 4.88 (5.64) 2.51 (2.88) 4.89 (5.61)
Resource rents (% GDP) 4.43 (3.36) 8.68 (6.58) 4.50 (3.37) 8.76 (6.56)
Agricultural land (% area) −1.03 (4.02) −2.01 (7.87) −1.23 (4.04) −2.39 (7.88)
Armed conflict −7.59 (6.26) −14.88 (12.26) −7.30 (6.22) −14.22 (12.13)
Political will (peers)
Language NAC −8.22 (4.70)· −16.11 (9.22)· −8.16 (4.71)· −15.90 (9.19)·
Contiguity NAC −1.16 (3.32) −2.27 (6.51) −1.01 (3.32) −1.97 (6.46)
Colonial NAC 3.02 (2.53) 5.92 (4.96) 2.97 (2.54) 5.80 (4.95)
Trade agreement NAC 2.32 (1.76) 4.55 (3.45) 2.20 (1.76) 4.29 (3.44)
Trade flow NAC 1.07 (1.75) 2.09 (3.42) 1.06 (1.77) 2.06 (3.45)
ρt−1 61.12 (3.70)
∗∗∗ 60.99 (3.69)∗∗∗
ρt−2 −12.17 (2.46)∗∗∗ −12.30 (2.45)∗∗∗
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 2150 2150 2146 2146
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; cdotp < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250 imputations.
Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust standard errors
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Appendix 5.C Innovation model results
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Table 5.C.1: Innovation model results
Main innovation model
Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 6.63 (3.31)∗ 12.80 (6.38)∗
Int. ENGO NAC −1.12 (1.93) −2.16 (3.71)
IDO (log $) 5.70 (1.93)∗∗ 11.00 (3.72)∗∗
IDO NAC −2.19 (2.33) −4.22 (4.49)
Multinationals (log $) −3.21 (3.60) −6.19 (6.94)
Multinational NAC 0.67 (2.97) 1.29 (5.73)
Information
Dom. ENGOs (log #) −1.71 (3.48) −3.30 (6.72)
CSO consultation 1.49 (2.82) 2.87 (5.44)
Globalization 12.11 (7.91) 23.36 (15.25)
Resources/capacity
GDP ($/pc) 2.63 (5.30) 5.08 (10.22)
Env. ministry 6.62 (5.60) 12.76 (10.80)
Veto players −1.79 (1.35) −3.45 (2.60)
Political will (institutions)
Electoral democracy −0.63 (3.41) −1.21 (6.58)
Federalism −3.57 (8.82) −6.88 (17.01)
EU member 49.65 (11.16)∗∗∗ 95.81 (21.54)∗∗∗
OECD member −25.01 (12.07)∗ −48.27 (23.30)∗
Political will (parties)
Left government 1.07 (2.51) 2.07 (4.85)
Green party 7.53 (4.11)· 14.53 (7.92)·
Political will (issue salience)
GHG emissions (log tons) −1.68 (1.86) −3.23 (3.58)
Resource rents (% GDP) 2.26 (3.46) 4.35 (6.69)
Agricultural land (% area) 7.70 (6.25) 14.86 (12.06)
Armed conflict −3.00 (8.80) −5.78 (16.99)
Political will (peers)
Language NAC 2.22 (5.94) 4.29 (11.45)
Contiguity NAC −1.66 (3.72) −3.19 (7.19)
Colonial NAC 3.54 (3.10) 6.83 (5.98)
Trade agreement NAC 4.94 (2.59)· 9.52 (4.99)·




Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N 3366 3366
AIC 4361 4361
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients
and standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.C.3: Innovation model results (Robustness cont.)
First-difference Non-linear Broad lobbying measure
Short-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run
Int. ENGOs 7.05 (3.82)· 7.99 (4.55)· 15.43 (8.79)· 6.74 (3.30)∗ 13.01 (6.38)∗
Int. ENGOs2 −1.23 (2.75) −2.38 (5.31)
Int. ENGO NAC −0.53 (1.92) −1.82 (2.58) −3.52 (4.98) −1.11 (1.96) −2.14 (3.77)
IDO (log $) −0.50 (1.19) 6.07 (2.22)∗∗ 11.72 (4.28)∗∗ 5.76 (1.93)∗∗ 11.11 (3.73)∗∗
IDO (log $)2 −0.54 (1.59) −1.04 (3.08)
IDO NAC 0.64 (2.03) −2.14 (2.36) −4.13 (4.56) −2.18 (2.33) −4.20 (4.50)
Multinationals (log $) 2.51 (4.03) −2.76 (3.94) −5.32 (7.60)
Multinationals (log $)2 −2.88 (4.55) −5.56 (8.79)
Multinationals (log $) (broad) −1.82 (3.67) −3.51 (7.09)
Multinational NAC −0.74 (2.64) −1.05 (4.84) −2.02 (9.35)
Multinational NAC (broad) −0.75 (2.97) −1.45 (5.73)
Information
Dom. ENGOs (log #) −3.45 (5.37) −1.86 (3.50) −3.59 (6.75) −1.76 (3.49) −3.40 (6.72)
CSO consultation 4.52 (1.87)∗ 1.68 (3.03) 3.25 (5.85) 1.50 (2.82) 2.90 (5.43)
Globalization 9.11 (9.81) 11.67 (8.04) 22.53 (15.52) 12.13 (7.89) 23.41 (15.21)
Resources/capacity
GDP ($/pc) −2.81 (4.42) 2.39 (5.29) 4.61 (10.21) 2.82 (5.31) 5.44 (10.25)
Env. ministry 0.20 (3.15) 6.53 (5.60) 12.60 (10.81) 6.71 (5.63) 12.95 (10.85)
Veto players −1.32 (1.91) −1.74 (1.35) −3.37 (2.60) −1.77 (1.34) −3.41 (2.59)
Political will (institutions)
Electoral democracy −1.35 (2.77) −0.48 (3.44) −0.93 (6.64) −0.60 (3.41) −1.16 (6.58)
Federalism −3.20 (7.54) −3.59 (8.88) −6.93 (17.14) −3.53 (8.81) −6.81 (17.00)
EU member 139.78 (24.72)∗∗∗ 50.20 (11.19)∗∗∗ 96.92 (21.61)∗∗∗ 49.51 (11.14)∗∗∗ 95.54 (21.50)∗∗∗
OECD member −1.79 (39.23) −24.32 (12.14)∗ −46.96 (23.43)∗ −25.17 (12.10)∗ −48.57 (23.36)∗
Political will (parties)
Left government 1.45 (2.20) 1.05 (2.51) 2.02 (4.86) 1.04 (2.51) 2.02 (4.85)
Green party −3.53 (6.36) 7.57 (4.14)· 14.61 (7.99)· 7.65 (4.13)· 14.76 (7.96)·
Political will (issue salience)
GHG emissions (log tons) −1.14 (1.76) −1.65 (1.85) −3.19 (3.58) −1.67 (1.86) −3.22 (3.59)
Resource rents (% GDP) 3.30 (4.17) 2.27 (3.48) 4.38 (6.71) 2.28 (3.47) 4.39 (6.69)
Agricultural land (% area) 2.48 (5.96) 7.70 (6.23) 14.86 (12.03) 7.63 (6.27) 14.71 (12.09)
Armed conflict 15.40 (10.81) −3.00 (8.82) −5.79 (17.03) −3.06 (8.81) −5.90 (17.00)
Political will (peers)
Language NAC −3.38 (5.39) 2.24 (5.93) 4.33 (11.45) 2.13 (5.94) 4.12 (11.47)
Contiguity NAC −2.05 (3.77) −1.71 (3.66) −3.29 (7.07) −1.63 (3.73) −3.14 (7.19)
Colonial NAC 7.63 (3.08)∗ 3.44 (3.09) 6.64 (5.96) 3.51 (3.09) 6.78 (5.97)
Trade agreement NAC 0.25 (2.61) 5.10 (2.65)· 9.85 (5.11)· 4.94 (2.57)· 9.52 (4.95)·
Trade flow NAC −2.27 (2.32) 0.16 (1.88) 0.30 (3.62) 0.07 (1.89) 0.14 (3.64)
ρt−1 81.80 (2.83)
∗∗∗ 81.76 (2.83)∗∗∗
ρt−2 −33.60 (3.12)∗∗∗ −33.59 (3.11)∗∗∗
(Intercept) 0.57 (0.65)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3553 3366 3366 3366 3366
AIC 5787 4366 4366 4361 4361
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1. Coefficients and standard errors from dynamic panel models fitted on 250
imputations. Arellano et al. (1987)-type heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-robust standard errors
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Appendix 5.D Influence model results




















































































































Figure 5.D.1: Goodness-of-fit statistics for main bootstrapped TERGM model
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Table 5.D.1: Influence model results
Main model
Shared int. ENGOs 0.03 [0.00; 0.07]
Env. ODA sent by IDO (log $) −0.02 [−0.04;−0.01]
Shared multinationals 0.15 [0.12; 0.18]
Int. ENGOs −0.00 [−0.04; 0.04]
IDO (log $) −0.01 [−0.05;−0.00]
Multinationals (log $) −0.02 [−0.07; 0.03]
Exogenous (nodal)
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 0.04 [0.02; 0.07]
CSO consultation 0.00 [−0.05; 0.06]
Globalization 0.32 [0.23; 0.43]
GDP ($/pc) 0.12 [−0.02; 0.28]
Env. ministry −0.12 [−0.15;−0.08]
Veto players −0.03 [−0.06; 0.00]
Electoral democracy 0.00 [−0.07; 0.08]
Left government −0.02 [−0.04;−0.00]
Green party 0.04 [0.00; 0.07]
GHG emissions (log tons) 0.01 [−0.04; 0.07]
Resource rents (% GDP) −0.06 [−0.14; 0.01]
Agricultural land (% area) 0.00 [−0.03; 0.34]
Armed conflict 0.02 [0.00; 0.03]
Exogenous (dyadic)
Common language 0.23 [0.16; 0.29]
Contiguous 0.19 [0.09; 0.28]
Colonial relationship 0.07 [−0.07; 0.24]
Free trade agreement 0.18 [0.14; 0.23]
Trade flows (log $) 0.07 [0.04; 0.11]
Endogenous
# Reciprocal edges 0.06 [−0.04; 0.15]
Geom-wt. edge. shared partners 0.05 [−0.04; 0.13]
Geom-wt. out-degree −0.96 [−1.17;−0.58]
Cyclic triples −0.00 [−0.01; 0.00]
Stability 2.53 [2.43; 2.67]
Time trend 0.02 [0.01; 0.03]
Delayed reciprocity 0.01 [−0.08; 0.13]




Bold text indicates that 0 is outside of the 95% credible interval. Estimates are log-odds
from a temporal exponential random graph model with bootstrapped pseudolikelihood
methods. 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 5.D.2: Influence model results (robustness, only developed-developing dyads)
Restricted model (bipartite)
Shared int. ENGOs 0.06 [−0.01; 0.13]
Env. ODA sent by IDO (log $) −0.00 [−0.04; 0.03]
Shared multinationals −0.03 [−0.12; 0.06]
Int. ENGOs −0.05 [−0.13; 0.04]
IDO (log $) −0.01 [−0.05; 0.03]
Multinationals (log $) 0.06 [−0.06; 0.18]
Exogenous (nodal)
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 0.00 [−0.06; 0.06]
CSO consultation 0.07 [−0.05; 0.19]
Globalization 0.27 [0.13; 0.43]
GDP ($/pc) 0.11 [−0.17; 0.38]
Env. ministry −0.01 [−0.09; 0.10]
Veto players 0.00 [−0.05; 0.06]
Electoral democracy −0.13 [−0.28;−0.01]
Left government −0.01 [−0.04; 0.01]
Green party −0.03 [−0.10; 0.05]
GHG emissions (log tons) 0.08 [−0.01; 0.21]
Resource rents (% GDP) −0.12 [−0.25;−0.05]
Agricultural land (% area) −0.01 [−0.05; 0.40]
Armed conflict −0.00 [−0.03; 0.05]
Exogenous (dyadic)
Common language 0.17 [0.07; 0.26]
Contiguous −0.05 [−0.54; 0.39]
Colonial relationship 0.18 [−0.06; 0.45]
Free trade agreement 0.17 [0.09; 0.27]
Trade flows (log $) 0.11 [0.01; 0.22]
Endogenous
Geom-wt. dyad shared partners (funders) −0.12 [−0.19;−0.05]
Geom-wt. dyad shared partners (recipients) 0.00 [−0.01; 0.01]
Geom-wt. degree (funders) 0.13 [−0.17; 0.58]
Geom-wt. degree (recipients) 0.78 [0.25; 1.53]
Stability 2.38 [2.30; 2.52]





Bold text indicates that 0 is outside of the 95% credible interval. Estimates are log-odds from
a temporal exponential random graph model with bootstrapped pseudolikelihood methods. 500
bootstrap replications. Restricted to influence relationships between ODA funders and ODA
recipients, network formulated as bipartite network with undirected ties.
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Figure 5.D.2: Varying the minimum number of adoptions for a policy to be included in
the analysis.
Model estimates for transnational advocacy by large international environmental NGOs,
international development organizations, and multinational corporations (DV: Environ-
mental policy influence). Coefficients and confidence intervals (90% and 95%) from a
TERGM with 500 bootstrap replicates.
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Table 5.D.3: Influence model results (robustness, minimum adoptions)
Main (Min 1 adoption) Min 5 adoptions Min 10 adoptions
Shared int. ENGOs 0.03 [0.00; 0.07] 0.07 [0.04; 0.11] 0.07 [0.04; 0.11]
Env. ODA sent by IDO (log $) −0.02 [−0.04;−0.01] −0.03 [−0.05;−0.01] −0.03 [−0.06;−0.00]
Shared multinationals 0.15 [0.12; 0.18] 0.18 [0.13; 0.23] 0.21 [0.16; 0.26]
Int. ENGOs −0.00 [−0.04; 0.04] 0.04 [−0.03; 0.12] 0.03 [−0.04; 0.10]
IDO (log $) −0.01 [−0.05;−0.00] −0.02 [−0.07;−0.01] −0.01 [−0.08; 0.01]
Multinationals (log $) −0.02 [−0.07; 0.03] −0.03 [−0.09; 0.03] −0.03 [−0.08; 0.03]
Exogenous (nodal)
Dom. ENGOs (log #) 0.04 [0.02; 0.07] 0.03 [0.01; 0.06] 0.03 [−0.01; 0.07]
CSO consultation 0.00 [−0.05; 0.06] −0.00 [−0.07; 0.05] −0.02 [−0.07; 0.05]
Globalization 0.32 [0.23; 0.43] 0.48 [0.36; 0.60] 0.47 [0.36; 0.59]
GDP ($/pc) 0.12 [−0.02; 0.28] 0.23 [0.10; 0.36] 0.23 [0.11; 0.34]
Env. ministry −0.12 [−0.15;−0.08] −0.10 [−0.16;−0.04] −0.10 [−0.16;−0.05]
Veto players −0.03 [−0.06; 0.00] −0.03 [−0.06;−0.00] −0.02 [−0.06; 0.02]
Electoral democracy 0.00 [−0.07; 0.08] −0.02 [−0.11; 0.08] 0.00 [−0.09; 0.09]
Left government −0.02 [−0.04;−0.00] −0.02 [−0.03; 0.01] −0.02 [−0.04; 0.00]
Green party 0.04 [0.00; 0.07] 0.05 [0.00; 0.10] 0.05 [0.00; 0.09]
GHG emissions (log tons) 0.01 [−0.04; 0.07] 0.06 [0.02; 0.10] 0.05 [0.00; 0.09]
Resource rents (% GDP) −0.06 [−0.14; 0.01] −0.13 [−0.22;−0.06] −0.10 [−0.20;−0.03]
Agricultural land (% area) 0.00 [−0.03; 0.34] 0.03 [−0.00; 0.44] 0.06 [0.02; 0.47]
Armed conflict 0.02 [0.00; 0.03] 0.02 [−0.00; 0.03] 0.01 [−0.00; 0.03]
Exogenous (dyadic)
Common language 0.23 [0.16; 0.29] 0.19 [0.12; 0.25] 0.20 [0.12; 0.28]
Contiguous 0.19 [0.09; 0.28] 0.26 [0.17; 0.34] 0.25 [0.15; 0.33]
Colonial relationship 0.07 [−0.07; 0.24] 0.04 [−0.13; 0.25] 0.04 [−0.18; 0.25]
Free trade agreement 0.18 [0.14; 0.23] 0.23 [0.16; 0.28] 0.21 [0.15; 0.30]
Trade flows (log $) 0.07 [0.04; 0.11] 0.08 [0.03; 0.12] 0.09 [0.04; 0.14]
Endogenous
# Reciprocal edges 0.06 [−0.04; 0.15] −0.02 [−0.22; 0.11] 0.00 [−0.19; 0.19]
Geom-wt. edge. shared partners 0.05 [−0.04; 0.13] −0.02 [−0.09; 0.04] 0.07 [−0.01; 0.13]
Geom-wt. out-degree −0.96 [−1.17;−0.58] −0.59 [−0.88;−0.13] −0.46 [−0.75;−0.02]
Cyclic triples −0.00 [−0.01; 0.00] −0.01 [−0.02;−0.00] −0.01 [−0.02;−0.00]
Stability 2.53 [2.43; 2.67] 2.74 [2.67; 2.87] 2.75 [2.69; 2.86]
Time trend 0.02 [0.01; 0.03] −0.01 [−0.01; 0.00] −0.01 [−0.02; 0.01]
Delayed reciprocity 0.01 [−0.08; 0.13] 0.13 [0.02; 0.29] 0.08 [−0.13; 0.31]
# Edges −0.67 [−1.40;−0.29] −0.47 [−1.31; 0.04] −0.30 [−1.26; 0.34]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N(countries) 187 187 187
N(possible edges) 660858 660858 660858
Bold text indicates that 0 is outside of the 95% credible interval. Estimates are log-odds from a temporal
exponential random graph model with bootstrapped pseudolikelihood methods. 500 bootstrap replications.
Models vary in the minimum number of adoptions for a policy to be included in the analysis.
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Figure 5.D.3: Varying by p-value threshold for adding edges to leader-follower network.
Model estimates for transnational advocacy by large international environmental NGOs,
international development organizations, and multinational corporations (DV: Environ-
mental policy influence). Coefficients and confidence intervals (90% and 95%) from a









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.D.4: Varying by length of rolling window for inferring leader-follower relation-
ships.
Model estimates for transnational advocacy by large international environmental NGOs,
international development organizations, and multinational corporations (DV: Environ-
mental policy influence). Coefficients and confidence intervals (90% and 95%) from a

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the face of environmental challenges that range from biodiversity loss to nitrogen
pollution to climate change, leadership in the development of environmental policy may
be more important now than ever. With multiple ecosystem processes exceeding planetary
boundaries or threatening to do so in the near future (Steffen et al. 2015), it is critical
to identify which countries act as environmental policy leaders—and what can be done
to catalyze the adoption and spread of new environmental policies. In this dissertation
project, I have addressed both of these questions and demonstrated that transnational
advocates can catalyze (or obstruct) environmental policy leadership.
Looking beyond the specific context of the environment, understanding policy
leadership and its relationship with transnational advocacy is key to the comparative
study of public policy across a wide range of topics. My analysis has particularly strong
implications for other policy areas characterized by interdependent policymaking and
strong networks of transnational advocates, such as human rights (Keck and Sikkink
2014), women’s empowerment (True and Mintrom 2001), and education (Verger and
Novelli 2012).
I begin this chapter by providing a summary of my central arguments and findings.
Next, I discuss the contributions this dissertation makes to the study of policy leadership,
transnational policy advocacy, and comparative public policy more generally. I then
suggest several promising paths for future research into the causes of environmental
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policy leadership and the consequences of transnational environmental advocacy. Finally,
I conclude with some observations about the practical implications of my research to spur
policymakers to work, hopefully productively, to address environmental challenges.
6.1 Summary
This dissertation is built upon two core arguments. The first, described in Chapter 2,
is that policy leadership is 1) the tendency to take timely action in the development of
policy and 2) widespread influence over the policymaking of other governments. These
two components combine to produce persistent, observable patterns in the timing and
content of policy change. Policy leaders both walk the walk, quickly adopting new policies
at home, and talk the talk, affecting the decisions of policymakers abroad. This definition
of policy leadership lends itself to empirical measurement and explanation when viewed
through the lens of network analysis, with governments acting as leaders in a policymaking
network if they demonstrate the attributes of both rapid policy innovation (represented
as large node size) and widespread influence (represented as a large number of out-going
ties to other nodes).
The second argument, explored in Chapter 3, is that transnational advocates,
such as international environmental NGOs, international development organizations,
and multinational corporations, are uniquely positioned to affect environmental policy
leadership. The day-to-day activities of transnational advocates are similar in many
respects to their domestic counterparts, spurring policymakers to take positions on
environmental policies through communications campaigns, programming, and lobbying.
What distinguishes transnational advocates from other political actors, however, is the
ease with which they coordinate their policy priorities and advocacy activities across
jurisdictions. Working in multiple jurisdictions at the same time, transnational advocates
can act as go-betweens, facilitating transnational communication among policymakers.
Importantly, transnational advocates are not necessarily neutral connectors, but instead
strategic agents amplifying the international impact of their favored policies. I concluded
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Chapter 3 by describing a suite of new measures of transnational environmental
advocacy, consisting of data on the global presence of large international environmental
NGOs, environmental aid by international development organizations, and environmental
lobbying by multinational corporations.
In Chapter 4, I take on the challenge of measuring environmental policy leadership.
Through a systematic literature review, I show that existing data on environmental
policy adoptions largely overlook issues relating to conservation and resource use and
tend to limit their data collection to developed countries, typically those in Europe. To
overcome this challenge, I introduce policy extraction, a novel approach to identifying
environmental policy ideas in the texts of laws and regulations. I then apply the method
to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s FAOLEX database, generating a new dataset
of 3,000 environmental policies adopted by 195 countries from 1887 to 2019. With these
data in hand, I construct a measure of environmental policy leadership as the combination
of a country’s policy innovation rate and its number of follower countries, demonstrating
that the environmental policy leadership was relatively low on average until the 1990s,
when it started to climb until reaching a peak in the mid-2010s.
Bringing together these new measures of environmental policy leadership and transna-
tional environmental advocacy in Chapter 5, I found that the activities of large interna-
tional environmental NGOs systematically cause a positive, statistically significant, and
substantively meaningful increase in environmental policy leadership. This effect is con-
centrated in developing countries and for issues relating to traditional environmental is-
sues of flora, fauna, and pollution. Both collaborative and confrontational environmental
NGOs had a positive effect on environmental policy leadership, but, perhaps surprisingly,
their respective impact appeared to weaken when NGOs with contrasting advocacy styles
were present.
Lobbying on environmental issues by multinational corporations did not have a
systematic impact on environmental policy leadership in developing countries. In
developed countries, however, corporate environmental lobbying led to a sharp decrease
in environmental policy leadership, suggesting that multinationals may have substantially
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different stances on environmental policy development in rich and poor countries.
Environmental aid by international development organizations had little to no effect
on environmental policy leadership. Overall, these results support the argument that
transnational advocates affect environmental policy leadership, capable of acting both
as catalysts (large international environmental NGOs in developing countries) and as
impediments (multinational corporations in developed countries) to the adoption and
spread of environmental policies.
6.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, I make three primary contributions. The first is to advance the study
of policy leadership by embedding the concept firmly in the realm of observable behavior.
Instead of relying on subjective judgments of government intent or conflating policy
leadership with stringent policymaking, I propose a new, more precise conceptualization
that identifies policy leaders solely based on their internal rate of policy innovation and
their external influence on policymaking in other jurisdictions. By combining policy
innovation with influence, my definition of policy leadership aligns more closely with
broader understandings of leaders as actors that take decisive action and affect the actions
of their followers.
My second contribution is to the study of policy advocacy. Despite considerable work
detailing the formation and strategy of policy advocacy, attributing changes in policy
to advocacy is a longstanding challenge. This is in large part due to the difficulty
of constructing a plausible counterfactual of what policy changes would have taken
place in the absence of a given advocate’s activities. The boundary-spanning nature of
transnational advocates provides the opportunity to construct just such a counterfactual,
allowing me to examine differences in environmental policy leadership across countries
with differing levels of transnational environmental advocacy. As a result, I can link
changes in public policy to the activities of large international environmental NGOs,
international development organizations, and multinational corporations.
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Finally, I provide several new datasets that provide a strong foundation for extending
the study of comparative public policymaking to new issues and countries. I address
the imbalance in existing data on environmental policymaking, working backward from
the largest existing compilation of environmental laws and regulations to identify latent
policy ideas. In so doing, I aim to support the growing interest in studying public policy
beyond developed countries and thematically narrow issue areas.
6.3 Future research
There are at least three promising paths for future research that stem from this
dissertation project. The first is to dig into the specific mechanisms of advocacy and
how they work. Of the three strategic levers available to policy advocates—information
provision, capacity building, and pressure campaigns—which lever is most effective in
convincing policymakers to make change, and under what circumstances? Understanding
the means by which effective advocacy takes place is an ambitious, but potentially
invaluable, goal for political scientists to pursue.
A second topic for future research is the effect of transnational advocacy on the
stringency of environmental policy. It is important to understand not just that
policymakers respond to advocacy, but the extent to which the policies produced as
a result align with advocates’ preferences. The data presented in this project shed light
only on the latter because they describe the adoption of policy instruments, rather than
those policies’ specific settings.
There are several potential avenues for studying the relationship between transnational
advocacy and environmental policy stringency. These approaches are likely to require
an examination of the full texts of the environmental laws and regulations in the
FAOLEX database, instead of just their abstracts, to extract more information about
what each policy is intended to accomplish. One crude approach would simply identify the
prevalence of variants of the word “should,” which enables or empowers certain behaviors,
relative to variants of the word “shall,” which mandates or requires certain behaviors.
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Similarly, if a policy is longer than its country average, it may contain more details that
introduce additional complexity and raise the cost of compliance (see, e.g., Huber and
Shipan 2002).
The third promising area of research is the comparative study of corporate environ-
mental lobbying. Scholars of corporate lobbying generally observe that firms tend to
advocate against policy development (e.g., Cory et al. 2021), but studies of multinational
corporate lobbying emphasize these organizations’ relative openness to environmental
policy (e.g., Garcia-Johnson 2000). According to this logic, multinational corporations
may embrace environmental policy proposals as a means of lowering expropriation risk
and gaining an advantage over domestic competitors with less experience and available
capital for meeting environmental standards.
My analysis indicates that the consequences of multinational corporate environmental
lobbying depend on the broader economic context, with multinational environmental
lobbying having a null effect on environmental policy leadership in poor countries and
a negative effect in rich countries. There is ample room for future work examining how
the direction and substance of multinationals’ environmental lobbying differ in developed
and developing countries. It seems likely that multinationals support for the flow of new
environmental policies depends on the existing stock of laws and regulations, favoring
environmental policy development only up to the point at which expropriation risk is low
and there is little advantage to be gained from marginal changes in environmental policy
relative to domestic competitors.
6.4 Practical implications and final thoughts
In this dissertation, my goal was to understand which countries were acting as leaders
in the development of environmental policy and whether transnational advocacy was
effective in convincing decisionmakers to spend their time and resources on environmental
policymaking. I find that these organizations do, in fact, have the capacity to both
catalyze and stymie environmental policy leadership.
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This result was not a foregone conclusion. Focusing on the effect of advocacy on policy
change is, in many ways, a hard case. Transnational advocates are often thought to be
most likely to successfully affect the implementation or enforcement of environmental
policies (Bernstein and Cashore 2012), rather than their adoption. In the course of
conducting my research, I frequently encountered skepticism of the power of international
environmental NGOs to systematically affect environmental policy change, even from
these organizations’ own employees. Nevertheless, there is robust evidence that both large
international environmental NGOs and multinational corporations can play important
roles in environmental policy development.
My analysis shows that policymakers are more likely to spend their time and resources
working on environmental problems with greater international environmental NGO
presence in developing countries and less multinational corporate lobbying in developed
countries. When combined with existing knowledge about the environmental preferences
of different advocates, these conclusions lead to two clear practical implications.
First, given that large international environmental NGOs tend to favor stringent
environmental policy, it seems likely that their catalytic impact on environmental
policy leadership also generates increases in environmental policy stringency. Therefore,
along with existing efforts like raising public awareness, linking environmental issues to
human health, and making the business case for environmental protection, expanding
the activities of large international environmental NGOs should help promote more
responsive, more influential, and more stringent environmental policies in developing
countries.
Second, in light of existing knowledge about how corporations lobby on environmental
issues in developed countries (e.g., Brulle 2018; Cory et al. 2021), the negative relation-
ship between multinational corporate lobbying and environmental policy leadership in
developed countries may indicate that multinationals work to thwart increases in envi-
ronmental policy leadership in the Global North. Of course, many corporations have
publicly embraced environmental protection in recent years as part of their broader en-
vironmental, social, and governance strategies, so it is possible that corporate environ-
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mental lobbying has undergone a sea-change in recent years.1 However, there remains
ample room for skepticism because some firms, such as Exxon Mobil, have privately de-
scribed their environmental commitments as merely politically expedient “talking points”
(Thomson 2021). If future corporate environmental lobbying practices continue to resem-
ble the past, the evidence presented in this analysis suggests that finding ways to reduce
lobbying expenditures by multinational corporations is likely to lead to more responsive,
more influential, and more stringent environmental policies in developed countries.
Policymakers have demonstrated greater leadership in environmental policy over the
past thirty years, but, despite these efforts, many environmental problems have only
become more severe. As ecosystem processes near tipping points, it is critical to find ways
to accelerate the development and spread of new approaches to promoting sustainable
and equitable resource use and conservation. Based on this dissertation, it appears
that supporting the activities of large international environmental NGOs in developing
countries and reducing lobbying expenditures by multinational corporations in developed
countries would be two important steps toward catalyzing greater environmental policy
leadership.
1Examples include Microsoft’s plans to be “carbon negative” by 2030 (Smith 2020) and Shell’s pledge
to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 (Weiss 2020), among many others.
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